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l)BEHIND NETWORKS: 
KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER, FAVOR EXCHANGE AND PERFORMANCE
The value of knowledge for economic development can hardly be overstated as it
essentially determines what organizations do as well as how they do it. To ensure firm
survival or meet fierce competition, organizations are required to continually improve their
product and operations. That is, upgrade their knowledge base and develop new knowledge
on how to do the right things more efficiently. Managing organizational knowledge and
stimulating its development means that firms must carefully consider their knowledge
development and diffusion strategies. Doing so, as this book argues, requires practitioners
to realize that knowledge development and diffusion is a social cooperative process. At its
most basic level new knowledge is created as a result of human interaction. Knowledge is
shared between individuals an d is fueled by micro-objectives and motivations. Applying a
micro perspective, this book posits that knowledge exchange resembles the exchange of
gifts. It follows that professional networks, as the conduits through which knowledge is
exchanged, are an important determinant for scientists’ performance. Utilizing the full
potential of organizational scientific and human technical capital requires firms to map,
shape and encourage individual network formation. 
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Preface 
In a number of ways, the decision to enter the world of academia to engage in research 
represented a personal journey. Questions such as why and how is research conducted are 
intriguing and far reaching. While the first question could be answered using notions such 
as curiosity, fascination for specific phenomena and the acquisition of worthwhile skills, I 
soon found out that the answer to the question how research is conducted is anything but 
unequivocal. In this case (as in many others) how is preceded by the what. What is research? 
According to King et al. (1994)1 its goal is inference, its procedures public, resulting in 
uncertain conclusions and essential for this discussion, the content is the method2. The 
latter is meant to capture the notion that “science adheres to a set of rules of inference to 
which its validity depends” (ibid; p.9). Different scientific methods, such as the positivistic3 
or interpretive traditions4, prescribe a different set of rules required in order to understand 
reality. Despite (post) positivistic inclinations, influenced by a Kuhnian scientific paradigm 
no doubt, the topic turned out to be particularly ‘soft’ in the sense that a large part of what 
constitutes a ‘gift’ is hard to measure. Devising a research design that would allow me to 
quantify relationships based on empirical observations in ‘controlled environments’ to find 
meaningful (causal) relationships turned out to be challenging. Concerns such as these in 
research are omnipresent, and represent ‘the slippery problem of passing from statistical 
description to inductive generalization’ (Keynes, 1939)5. Making sense then, also required, 
qualitative methods such as the use of ‘thick’ descriptions (Geertz, 1973)6, although such 
methodologies were, to be fair, also mostly used from a positivist perspective. The notion 
of a single Truth, as put forward by positivists, is quite appealing and practical. Alas reality 
is, oftentimes if not always, a complex affair. It has been my aim (and hope) to design this 
study in such a manner so as to not trade breadth for depth of study and vice-versa. Breadth 
in terms of statistical analysis combined with depth offered by qualitative elements is 
sought after. The extent to which observations of this study will hold true is up for (future) 
falsification. It takes, as Popper (1936)7 posits, only one ‘black swan’. 
1 King, G., Keohane, R.O., & Verba, S. (1994), Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific inference in 
qualitative research, Princeton University Press: Princeton (NJ). 
2  Or as Pearson explains (1892:16): “the field of science is unlimited […]. The unity of all science consists  
alone in its method, not its material.”.  
3  (Logical) Positivism, first introduced by Auguste Comte, is a philosophy of science based on the notion that  
“the view that all true knowledge is scientific,” (Bullock & Trombley, 1999) and that all things are ultimately  
measurable.   
4  ‘Interpretive methods of research start from the notion that our knowledge from reality, including the domain  
of human action, is a social construction of human by human actors and that this applies equally to   
researchers. Thus there is no objective reality which can be discovered by researchers and replicated by  
others, in contrast to the assumptions of positivistic science (Walsham, 1993)’.   
5  Keynes, J.M. (1939), ‘Professor Tinbergen’s Method’’, Economic Journal, 49(195), 558—577.
6  Geertz, C. (1973), The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays, New York: Basic Books
7  Popper, K. (1963), Conjectures and Refutations, Routledge, London.
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Should that ‘black swan’ turn out to be a ‘black swan’ as recently posited and defined by 
Taleb (2007)8, as any effect that occurred outside the realm of normal expectations, then we 
might have to agree with Taleb’s observation that too often we fool ourselves into thinking 
we know more than we actually do. 
 
If there is one central notion that this book tries to impart, it would be the idea that knowledge 
development is both a social as well as a cooperative effort. Creativity and new knowledge 
flows through and from encounters, or clashes if you will, with new ideas and people, 
and more specifically the ideas and knowledge the latter introduce. This research is no 
different, as it has benefited from many, arranged as well as chance, encounters, discussions 
and critiquing. The gifts of knowledge and support received during the years of research 
leading up to this book entitle the generous givers to equally generous acknowledgment. 
Gifts offered and accepted, as theory explains, act as a symbolic reminder of the continuing 
relationship and gratitude that according to Simmel (1996), “will always constitute a part 
of the bond linking them”. Gratitude implies an indebtedness of some sort. As a recipient, I 
am indebted for contributions that came in many forms as well as from a myriad of people, 
people who might not necessarily be cognizant of the impact they had. Both aspects of the 
gift are explicitly recognized and expressed by means of the following acknowledgments.
First and foremost, I would like to express my gratitude for the support past 
and present, offered by my promoters, Wilfred Dolfsma, and Steef van de Velde. I thank 
Wilfred for a pleasant and productive cooperative effort, which survived and thrived despite 
commutes and several career switches. Your broad and varied research interests and ideas, 
input, enthusiasm, trust, continued engagement and encouragement have been invaluable 
for this study. By the same token I thank Steef for his support during this endeavor, his 
humor, phlegmatic goal-oriented mindset and not in the least his support in overcoming 
substantial hurdles, both expected and unexpected, proved to be indispensable. 
Second, I want to thank the members of the committee;  viz. Lucas Meijs, Pursey 
Heugens, Jan van den Ende, Roy Thurik, Arjo Klamer and Jaap Paauwe for exhibited 
flexibility, their time and effort in reviewing the manuscript and valuable contributions 
offered.
Third, I am indebted to those who have contributed by reading and discussing, this 
work in progress. Specifically, I wish to acknowledge the critical but always constructive 
conceptual and empirical contributions made by fellow researchers Bob Kijkuit, Ferdinand 
Jaspers, Jose Larco Martinelli and Serge Rijsdijk. The Rotterdam School of Management 
and in particular the Department of Management of Technology and Innovation proved 
to be both a pleasant and stimulating environment, making the department a thoroughly 
enjoyable place to work. Nowhere, became this spirit more evident than during the 
weekly seminars offering a stage for the presentation of new (and old) research ideas and 
constructive dialogue benefiting overall research quality. 
8 Taleb, N. N. (2007) The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. New York: Random House
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Fourth, I am grateful for the support I was given by the companies who agreed 
to participate in the research making data collection at their respective R&D laboratories 
possible. In particular I would like to thank Ridwan Sarwin, William Kloek, Wilma van 
Norden, Bob Poldermans, Eric Roos, Gerard Selten and Bea den Dekker for facilitating the 
interview and survey planning. Also I wish to thank all researchers, project managers and 
managers who spend time filling out the survey and/or agree to an interview, your input has 
been both invaluable and worthwhile. 
Fifth, I owe a special thanks to longtime friends; Melvin, Esther, Gerard, Karin, 
Jeroen, Mariska, Steven, Josine, Bart, Erik, Henk, Sander, Leander, Mariet, Menno and 
Andre, who were always willing to entertain my research ideas, theoretical concepts and 
the inevitable up and downs that are inherent to doing a PhD. No acknowledgment would be 
complete, however, without an explicit recognition of Erwin’s contributions. Your technical 
and design related expertise have been invaluable as well as your patience with my research 
related monologues were most appreciated. 
Finally, I wish to thank Bas and Jos for being paranimfs, brothers and most 
importantly friends during this an all my other endeavors.    
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Chapter 1  
Introduction to the study
1.1 Introduction
In democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms of 
knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others.
(Alexis de Tocqueville, 1835)
The general consensus among practitioners and academics is that firms’ success in today’s 
marketplace depends on their ability to innovate. Faced by this emerging reality, companies 
are spurred to manage, (re)combine and increase their knowledge stocks. In fact, many 
companies, recognizing the importance of knowledge sharing or flow,  allocate significant 
resources in an attempt to improve internal as well as external knowledge transfers among 
their knowledge workers. This development has led to a recent and marked interest in the 
benefits of networks and technological aids for improving knowledge transfer. But the real 
question, as this dissertation posits, is not so much what processes aid knowledge flows but 
how knowledge comes to be transferred to begin with. Companies’ interests are obvious but 
not necessarily in line with those of its employees. Why would knowledge workers want to 
share knowledge in light of the potential costs? If indeed motivation precedes action this 
question is far more relevant and has been neglected to a large extent by both practitioners 
and academia. This study seeks to contribute by conceptualizing knowledge transfers as 
‘gifts9’ exchanged between actors. This notion has marked implications for both theory and 
firms as they aim to stimulate and improve knowledge flows.  
Increasingly, tangible economic growth and the economic dynamics needed to fuel 
growth are considered to hinge on the effective use of intangible assets; (i.e. information 
and knowledge10) (OECD, 1999; 2001). For organizations, competing in today’s global 
marketplace, this means that innovation (i.e. knowledge development and application) plays 
an increasingly central role in their long-term survival (Deshpandé et al., 1993; Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1987; Ouchi, 1981; Peters & Waterman, 1982). Indeed, knowledge has evolved 
into organizations’ main resource for competitive advantage (Demsetz, 1988; Conner & 
Prahalad, 1996; Kogut & Zander 1992, 1996; Grant 1996; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). It 
is for this reason, that the ability of organizations to effectively generate and incorporate 
new knowledge has sparked the interest of both practitioners and management scholars. 
 Interest is justified for at least two reason; potential yields for innovations can be 
quite substantial and practice shows that many organizations are not satisfied with the returns 
9 Throughout this study the words favor and gift (exchange) will be used interchangeably. 
10 Notwithstanding the importance of knowledge throughout human history, it only became a sustained source 
of economic development at the beginning of the 19th century (Mokyr, 2002) when through a series of  
cultural changes practical and theoretical knowledge were both made more widely accessible.
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on innovation spending11. The second point also eludates to the fact that an increase in R&D 
spending, although an obvious response, seems to represent only a partial answer in the 
quest for higher innovation success rates. Understanding knowledge creation in general and 
within organization specifically, as is the focus of this dissertation, thus aims to contribute to 
the innovation performance of organizations.  
The particular research focus is based on and starts from a number of assumption regarding 
the nature of innovations and the associated knowledge creation process. Schumpeter’s 
(1934) idea that innovations are new combinations of existing knowledge and incremental 
learning form the bedrock of this study. Schumpeter’s view of innovation contains three 
main elements highlighting its inherently social and interactive aspects. Innovations:
(1) are new combinations of existing knowledge in a process that is social and involves 
creativity (Amabile, 1988; Woodman, Sawyer & Griffin, 1993; Perry‑Smith & Shalley, 
1993; Burt, 2004);
(2) are new combinations of existing knowledge, often not (directly) available but rather 
dispersed – finding information and solving problems depends to a great degree on networks 
of relationships (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973; Rogers, 1995);
(3) require that the knowledge, once located must be transferred, a process that differs for the 
different forms of knowledge (Hansen 1999; Kogut & Zanders, 1992; Von Hippel, 1994). 
Schumpeter’s view on innovation inevitably requires us to take notice of two notable 
implications. Firstly, although innovation, which is essentially a new idea (Van der 
Ven, 1986; p. 591), can be described as an organizational outcome, it always involves 
individuals12 (Glynn, 1996; Amabile, 1988; Woodman et al., 1993; Knight, 1967; Nonaka, 
1994). Individual innovative behavior is essential as the building blocks of innovation are 
ideas, and it is people who “...develop, carry, react to, and modify ideas” (Van de Ven, 
1986, p. 592). Secondly, the notion that innovation and the knowledge upon which they 
are based are a combination of existing knowledge has led to a focus on how knowledge is 
actually exchanged (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Moran & Ghosal, 
1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). 
Literature, especially social network literature (SNA), tends to focus almost exclusively 
on structural aspects of relations between individuals, to the neglect of substantive matters 
related to the relations individuals maintain. As such this study aims to improve understanding 
of knowledge exchange among R&D scientists in organizations and the motivational drivers 
that underlie such behavior. R&D researchers are knowledge workers par excellence playing 
11 A survey carried out by the Boston Consulting Group among 1000 executives in different industries showed 
that 51 percent of respondents did not feel that the investments in innovation projects yielded satisfactory  
returns (BCG, 2005).  
12 For example Amabile (1988; 126) defined creativity as “the production of novel and useful ideas by an 
individual or small group of individuals working together”. 
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a key role in an organization’s capability to generate new knowledge. As such, they are 
essential sources (and recipients) of information and knowledge (Harrigan & Dalmia, 1991; 
Kachra & White, 2008). In the course of their work, R&D researchers regularly request and 
are requested by other R&D researchers, both within and outside the organization, to share 
knowledge (Harrigan & Dalmia, 1991; Kachra & White, 2008; Schrader, 1991; Allen 1977; 
Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Bouty 2000).
 These knowledge flows between agents are, as the need for cooperation in research 
increases, becoming ever more important. Cooperation is necessary because innovations 
are based to a large extent on the ‘borrowing’ of previous knowledge (March & Simon, 
1958, p.177-188; Tortoriello, 2006), cooperation involving a number of actors who each 
are dependent on others is entailed. As knowledge may be dispersed across different parties 
within and outside the organization, knowledge exchange underpins knowledge creation 
and the resulting technological progress (Ebers 1999; Moran & Ghosal, 1996; Nahapiet & 
Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). Today more than ever, cooperation and the flow of 
knowledge between researchers represents the key to effective knowledge creation. This 
development can be linked to several trends in both the kind of problems researchers work 
on as well as the way research is organized. Firstly, the continuous increase of the totality 
of available knowledge and skills makes it impossible for individuals today to master a 
scientific field in its entirety let alone the totality of available knowledge, cooperation 
therefore becomes paramount. Secondly, research problems have become increasingly 
interdisciplinary (Surowiecki, 2004). Wenger (2002) stresses: “Today’s problem solving 
requires multiple perspectives. The days of Leonardo da Vinci are over”. Thirdly, combining 
and recombining existing knowledge requires access to required knowledge resources 
which are accessible oftentimes via ‘knowledge communities’ (Wenger & Snyder, 2000; 
Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Nonaka, 1994). Fourthly, following a trend towards open 
innovation (Chesbrough 2003), partly motivated by the enormous costs associated with 
R&D, companies increasingly engage in cooperation beyond the boundaries of the division 
or even the firm in order to effectively carry out innovation processes13. Companies move 
from a ‘not invented here’ to a ‘proudly found elsewhere’ paradigm. 
 Despite its importance, the flow or transfer of knowledge even within a single 
organization is far from obvious (e.g. Ghosal & Barlett 1988; Kogut & Zander 1992; Hansen 
1999; Szulanski 1996; Cross et al. 2001; Winter & Szulanski 2001). Knowledge may be 
present with actors in a network but not be transferred for a number of reasons, contrary 
to what SNA implicitly assumes. Actors may not want to exchange knowledge, or may not 
know about the need that others have for knowledge. 
13 Internet-based innovation platforms (e.g. www.innocentive.com, http://www.yourencore.com, 
 www.yet2.com), essentially a marketplace for solutions, are increasingly seen as viable research strategies  
by established firms (Lakhani et al., 2007; Nambisan, et al., 2008; Gianmario et al., 2006; Sawhney et al.,  
2006; Sawhney et al., 2000). 
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Put in terms of costs even though knowledge can be shared at no direct cost14, there are 
opportunity costs in terms of effort, time, uncertainty15 and redundancy16 (Reagens & 
McEvily, 2003). As Huysman and de Wit (2004) point out “Knowledge sharing cannot be 
forced; people will only share knowledge if there is a personal reason to do so” the reality 
of which is implied by the very nature of knowledge (e.g. Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Wenger, 
1998; Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001). 
Under these assumptions, this dissertation investigates why individuals inside organizations, 
in the absence of clearly defined, formal, enforceable obligations, feel compelled and continue 
to provide recipients with knowledge? An explanation for how actors are able to solicit the 
cooperation and exchange of knowledge from people within and outside of their network, 
is offered by the notion of favor or gift exchange17. Gift exchange, not necessarily fully 
voluntary, is driven by obligations of a social and informal nature (Dolfsma & Van der Eijk 
2008). Gift exchange, involving altruistic as well as more self-interested motives, provides 
the parties involved with a mechanism for the exchange of resources and an incentive to so. 
Social obligations stemming from favor exchange and the network position one inhabits 
can be employed to try to elicit future support (Coleman, 1988) for instance to acquire the 
knowledge or resources needed for (future) projects (cf. Avner 1997; Blau 1964; Bourdieu 
1977, 1986; Humphrey & Hugh‑Jones 1992; Darr 2003). The analysis looks specifically at 
who exchanges frequently within an organization, what position individuals inhabit within 
the organizational social network structure and how gift exchange behavior contributes to 
knowledge creation within the organization. Adopting a network (SNA) perspective, we will 
investigate knowledge creation and diffusion and the role of gift exchange.  
1.2 Note on the nature of gift exchange
Many have, over the course of this research, inquired into or debated heatedly even the 
nature of gift exchange. In so doing, it seemed that the topic implicitly touches upon deeply 
held, although for some more than others, believes of what drives human behavior. As such, 
positioning gift exchange theory in the context of altruism vs. self-interest debate is likely 
to be a welcome bookmark.
14 Intellectual objects are non-rivalrous: they are not consumed by their use (Alder, 2001; Arrow, 1984), 
meaning that you can transfer knowledge and retain it for one’s self.   
15 Intellectual objects or knowledge are (quasi) public goods, in that they are non‑exclusive: consumption 
or use by non-payers cannot be excluded. Once transferred use is difficult to monitor and enforce ex post  
(Appeleyard, 1996; Pfeffer, 1981; Schrader, 1991; Kachra & White, 2008). 
16 Sir Francis Bacon’s famous quote “knowledge is power” eloquently makes the point that knowledge 
represents a powerful resource. Sharing knowledge creates redundancy and as such represents the risk of a  
possible deterioration of the donor’s position vis-à-vis other individuals (Davenport, 1997; Reagens &  
McEvily, 2003).  
17 Gift exchange is the, in fulfillment of an obligation or spontaneous, conference of some material or 
intangible benefit that is, consciously or unconsciously, subject to expectations of reciprocity whereby the  
particulars of the return in terms of form and time are left unspecified at the time of the transaction.
17
5
Although the notion of gift exchange is well documented and researched in many context, 
ranging from its anthropological roots to more recently economic contexts, the concept is 
associated with a number of commonly-held (though wrong) believes about gift giving,   
 Gift giving by most is associated with the giving of presents and is motivated by 
altruistic behavior; no ulterior motives are in play. A recent book “Giving” by Bill Clinton 
(2007) as a case in point, also exemplifies this popular believe. Gift exchange theory, 
however, is more encompassing than “explicit” charitable gifts, epitomized by presents 
given at birthday and Christmas and other momentous events, positing that actually most 
things in life can be transformed into a gift including intangible goods like knowledge 
and know-how. Thus the notion of gift exchange is not just limited to charitable gifts – a 
significant economic phenomenon (Economist, 2006) – nor is the activity as one‑dimensional 
as it may seem at first glance. In terms of motives underlying gift exchange the theory 
posits that a mixture of motives are involved in giving, ranging, from pure altruism, in a 
minority of cases, to self-interest. Reciprocity, next to the obligation to give and receive 
(Mauss, 2000[1954]), exerts a strong influence over members of a community and failure 
to reciprocate has consequences possibly even resulting in excommunication. Self interest 
and reciprocity are closely related, though different concepts, allowing individuals to give 
knowing that they will or ‘ought to’ receive at some point in time. The extend to which the 
expectation of reciprocity is conscious is, though theoretically interesting, not so much the 
focus of this research, as is its effectiveness and importance as a mechanism for exchange. 
 Thus in line with theory this dissertation is developed from the notion that, gift 
exchange is omnipresent, yet the generosity and voluntarism usually associated with gift 
giving oftentimes is an illusion (Blau, 1964; Mauss, 1954). Even when altruistic motives 
play a role, these tend not to be unrelated to the motive of self interest as gifts foster good 
reputation, gratitude and return gifts. Even more to the point may be Putnam’s (2000) 
characterization of gifts as short-term altruism for long term self-interest.
1.3 Contribution to literature
Innovation has long since been considered of great important for productivity growth, 
constituting a considerable if not key competitive advantage for firms and nations alike. 
Although considered important by many economists (Schumpeter, 1934, Hayek, 1937, 1945; 
Penrose, 1959) systematic and empirical innovation studies didn’t took off until the 1960’s. 
Initially, adoption or diffusion of innovation represented the focus of much research.  Within 
this context, social network analysis (SNA) contributed significantly by examining the role of 
different elements of network structure in explaining innovation processes and outcomes, both 
on a macro and micro level (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; 
Galunic & Moran, 2000; Hansen, 1999; Landry et al., 2002; Nahaphiet & Ghosal, 1998; Allen 
& Cohen, 1969; Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1978; Tushman & Scalan, 1981; Burt, 1992, 2004). 
 Concomitant with a growing interest for innovation, organizational scholars began 
to view knowledge as an organization’s most strategic resource (Conner & Prahalad, 1996; 
Kogut & Zander, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Osterloh & Frey, 2000) and knowledge 
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creation and transfer fundamental to its performance  (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Tushman, 
1977; Moorman & Miner, 1998; Perry-Smith & Shalley, 2003; Tsai, 2001; Moran, 2005, 
Hansen, Mors & Lovas, 2005). Knowledge transfer’s pivotal role in knowledge creation is 
well documented in literature enabling combination and recombination processes essential 
for innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Moran & Ghosal, 
1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). However, as documented by an 
extensive body of literature knowledge transfers in organizational contexts are anything 
but automatic (Szulanski, 1996; Argote, 1999; Hansen, 1999; Reagans & McEvily, 
2003). Social network analysis can and does offer insights into knowledge transfer as it 
explores different types of intra-organizational networks or relations (Levin & Cross, 
2004; Hansen, 1999; Allen, 1977; Burt, 1992; Rogers, 1995) but has focused almost 
exclusively on structural aspects of relations between individuals. This focus seems partial 
as structural aspects only go so far when it comes to exploring the motivational drivers 
behind knowledge transfers between individuals. This observation is in line with a number 
of authors, who conclude that the micro processes or social dimensions of knowledge 
sharing in the innovation development process need further exploration (Tsai, 2000; 
Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Darr, Argote & Epple, 1995; and particularly Obstfeld, 2005). 
 In order to explore the ‘micro processes or social dimensions’ in knowledge 
transfers this study introduces the concept of gift exchange from the field of anthropology, 
as a means of creating and maintaining social ties. Transfers of knowledge are envisioned 
as gift exchanges between actors. Theoretically, this thesis connects gift exchange literature 
to the innovation and knowledge transfer literature streams. Gift exchange literature allows 
us to explain why individuals engage in exchange and as such it offers a more substantive 
view of relations in knowledge intensive settings. Empirically, the study will investigate 
the relationship between gift exchange incidence, network positions and innovation 
performance. At the same time perceived generosity in exchanges, an operationalization 
of the gift exchange concept, is explored in order to asses whether these differences can be 
related to performance and gift exchange incidence. That gift exchange theory can be used to 
explain performance has been illustrated in contexts other than innovation (cf. Flynn, 2003), 
but these relationships have not been tested empirically for knowledge intensive settings 
such as R&D labs, where knowledge exchange is both frequent and essential (Harrigan & 
Dalmia, 1991; Kachra & White, 2008). 
1.4 Research question
Organizational literature attests to the vital role knowledge and knowledge creation plays 
in organizations. Indeed, it is considered a primary driver of organizational performance 
(Tortotiello, 2006). Generating innovations18 requires organizations and ultimately the 
individuals that make up these institutions (Polanyi, 1962; Van de Ven, 1986; Inkpen, 
1996; Nonaka, 1994) to utilize existing know‑how as well as find and acquire new sources 
18 The concepts innovation and knowledge creation are used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
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of knowledge. Sharing and transferring knowledge between individuals relies on social 
structure as it provides the conduits through which knowledge flows (Podolny, 2001; Tsai & 
Ghosal, 1998; Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Put differently, knowledge in organizations is 
held at the individual level and expressed in the cooperation of members in social communities 
(e.g. networks) (Kogut & Zander, 1996). The study of intra-organizational knowledge 
transfers represent a valuable opportunity to improve our understanding of knowledge 
activation and sourcing. Knowledge transfers are posited to represent an exchange between 
individuals with both economic and social utilities. Both exchange aspects may be mutually 
supportive and are closely associated with the willingness to transfer knowledge. Given 
the crucial role of networks in finding information and solving problems, and the limited 
understanding of the motivational drivers behind these transfers, the research question we 
address in this dissertation is: 
• What is the impact of gift exchange incidence and network position on individual 
innovation19 performance?
1.5 Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework presented in this section describes the relationships and variables 
that are essential for this study. As such the conceptual framework is built from concepts 
and relationships and provides a visual representation of the hypothesized or expected 
relationships. The framework is based on and extends, as is the nature of research, existing 
scientific knowledge on the topic of knowledge creation and transfer. 
 Figure 1-1 shows that innovation performance is hypothesized to be explained 
by both structural attributes (e.g. network position) (P1), and relational attributes (e.g. 
gift exchange incidence) (P2). Moreover, this research explores the relationship between 
perceived generosity and gift exchange incidence (P3). The different expectations visualized 
by means of different paths within the model, will be formally introduced and put to the test 
in chapter six. 
19 The innovation development process is defined and conceived as an interactive problem solving process 
involving interpersonal relationships between relevant interdependent actors which may transcend  
departmental and even organizational boundaries (Landry et al., 2002). It is defined as a process since it may  
take several consecutive rounds each with its own challenges before an outcome is produced. 
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Figure 1‑1 Conceptual Framework
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•  Gift exchange 
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•  In-degree centrality
•  Brokerage
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Innovation Performance
•  Subjective (creativity)
•  Objective (patent output)
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P2
P3
1.6 Outline of the study
The dissertation consists of seven chapters. While the current chapter (one) provided the 
introduction to the study, subsequent chapters explore the concept of exchange in the context 
of innovation, in line with the research questions of this study. Chapters two, three and four, 
are based on three articles, which enquire into the nature and contribution of gift exchange, 
as set out by the first research question. The empirical study, to a large extent designed in 
accordance with the second research question, is introduced and results analyzed in chapters 
five and six. Reading the theoretical insights offered by chapters two, three and four is not 
required, per se, in order to understand the empirical part of this study. At the same time, 
as the theoretical contributions provide the bedrock for empirical results and visa versa, 
the main contribution of this study lies in the merging of the two scientific realms. Finally, 
chapter seven presents the overall conclusion and implications of the study. Figure 1-2 
provides an overview of the different chapters and their respective position within the study. 
The content of each chapter is shortly discussed below.    
 Chapter two, ‘Knowledge Development and Coordination via Market, Hierarchy 
and Gift Exchange’, argues to some detail that economic value creation in general and 
knowledge creation in particular requires coordination. In so doing, the article explores 
the notion that coordination can take several forms. In addition to an all pervasive market 
mechanism, where prices coordinate, and hierarchy as epitomized by corporations, where 
authority coordinates, other forms have been suggested. Some have called these networks, 
others clans. This chapter suggests that the notion of gift exchange allows for the middle 
ground between market and hierarchy to be explored more fruitfully. The three coordination 
mechanisms are assessed in the context of knowledge creation and diffusion. Each has 
particular advantages, but those offered by gift exchange make it an effective and sometimes 
preferred alternative. 
 Chapter 3, ‘No Black Box and No Black Hole: from Social Capital to Gift 
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Exchange’, does not elaborate on gift exchange theory and its characteristics as discussed 
in chapter two per se, as much as it sets out to complement social capital literature with 
respect to identified theoretical lacunae. A body of literature that notwithstanding its 
recognition of the (explanatory) value of social relations in many spheres of people’s lives 
underexposes the production mechanisms of social capital. As such chapter three explores 
relationships between individuals in a community and the cooperation between them. These 
relations are studied by reviewing the economic and management literature on social capital, 
supplemented by literature in sociology and anthropology on gift exchange. The use of 
the word capital in this context is deliberate and means to impart that relationships and 
social networks are a valuable asset. Social capital represents especially within knowledge 
intensive environments, a potentially powerful tool for understanding why actors, in 
knowledge communities (Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Nonaka, 
1994), continue to interact and cooperate. Yet, for all its explanatory value, social capitals’ 
underlying mechanisms remain underdeveloped. How is social capital created, how is it 
put to use, and how is it maintained? This chapter uses and develops the literature on gift 
exchange to develop the concept of social capital further.
 In chapter four, titled ‘Making Knowledge Work in Networks: The nature of 
knowledge and the role of gifts’, knowledge - in particular both its creation and transfer - is 
investigated. Theoretically this chapter extends the notions put forwards in chapters 2 and 3 and 
demonstrates the relevance of interpersonal exchange via gifts/favors in a context of 
knowledge production. A reality that has been (mostly indirectly) recognized on many 
occasions in literature but the implications of which are not necessarily understood or 
investigated. Processes of knowledge transfer within and between firms have been studied 
from a structural or network perspective extensively. It is a central theme in the knowledge 
management literature. The social network literature however, faces an ‘action problem’. 
Focusing on structural elements such as an agent’s position in a network and the types of 
relations entertained cannot explain why actors actually exchange knowledge. This is a 
particularly pertinent question for the exchange of knowledge, given that it is elusive. The 
exchange of it can easily be avoided. This chapter argues that the concept of gift exchange, 
explains why some agents do and others don’t exchange knowledge with each other. Gift 
exchange – following Mauss’ dictum to “give, receive and reciprocate” – establishes 
obligations which explain why relations are established, persist, end, and particularly are 
actually used.
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Figure 1‑2 Overview of the Study
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Chapter five, ‘Research Design’, lays out the research design of the empirical study. The 
study’s multilevel research design, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative elements, 
and the associated benefits, is explained and justified. After which a description of the 
research setting, or the context of the study if you will, is provided. Finally, this chapter 
expounds the main variables of the study and addresses matters of validity and reliability. 
As such, this chapter bridges the conceptual and empirical parts of this study and provides a 
stepping stone for chapter six’ empirical expose. 
 Subsequently chapter six, ‘Innovation Performance: Structural and Relational 
Determinants’, applies both descriptive and inferential statistics, prefaced by qualitative 
observations, in order to probe the validity of the proposed relationships. A critical assessment 
of the exchange and innovation performance relationship follows. Next determinants of 
perceived generosity are established and explored providing a broader context in terms of 
gift exchange’s effects. Results, both expected and unexpected, indicate that actors’ structural 
and relational attributes are tied to several outcome variables. 
 Finally chapter seven, ‘Discussion and Conclusions’, presents the overall 
conclusions of this study. Theoretical and practical relevance of the research findings are 
reviewed.  This review is concluded by an outline of the limitations of this study as well as 
research directions for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Knowledge Development and Coordination 
via Market, Hierarchy and Gift Exchange 20,21
2.1 Introduction
From hunter-gatherer society onwards people in society have experienced the need to 
cooperate. The need for cooperation, where individuals become dependent on one another, 
has increased over time as a result of increased ongoing division of labor and specialization. 
Indeed, as Adam Smith claims, division of labor and specialization have been an important 
source for economic development. Individuals no longer master the totality of available 
knowledge and skills and so the need for exchange of resources and cooperation increased. 
This is acknowledged broadly in economics (Hayek, 1945; Schumpeter, 1934; Nahapiet & 
Ghosal, 1998), but ill understood in that discipline (Lopes & Caldas 2008). As individuals 
only have partially overlapping goals and interests, exchange and cooperation needs 
coordination of some sort (Barnard 1968). By necessity, coordination, be it through the 
market, in a hierarchy or through some other means of cooperation, requires that not only 
self interest is relied on, but that shared goals and moral convictions are assumed to exist and 
play a role (Akerlof 1982, Dolfsma 1998, Le Grand 2003, Lopes & Caldas 2008).
In a world characterized by emerging knowledge economies, intangible assets such as 
knowledge and information have become increasingly important for economic dynamics 
(OECD, 2001). Where the conceptualization of coordination of economic activities is 
problematic even in case of tangibles, in case of a discussion of knowledge creation and 
diffusion this problem is enhanced. Knowledge has specific properties as a commodity that 
need to be taken into account when discussing coordination in this context. 
 This chapter will discuss the three different mechanisms of coordination between 
actors that have been acknowledged in the literature. A first coordination mechanism is 
market exchange. Well known among economists, market exchange can be defined as 
voluntary agreement involving the offer of any sort of present, continuing, or future utility 
in exchange for utilities of any sort offered in return (Weber 1978). Secondly we can identify 
hierarchies or bureaucracies, well established as a coordination mechanism at least since 
Williamson (1975). Here authority, derived from a person’s position in an organization, can 
be used to coordinate. A third coordination mechanism is not as well established. In the 
literature different terms are used: social relations (Adler & Kwon, 2002), communities 
(Adler, 2001; Bowles & Gintis, 1998), clans (Ouchi, 1979;1980), (social) networks (Powell, 
20 This paper was presented at the World Conference for Social Economics, University of Amsterdam, June 
2007; we would like to thank participants to the session for their comments and suggestions, but would like 
to emphasize that responsibility of the text remains the authors’. 
21 This chapter is a revised version of “Knowledge Development and Coordination via Market, Hierarchy and 
Gift Exchange” to appear in J. Davis (ed.), 2009, Global Social Economy: Development, work and Policy, 
London & New York: Routledge.
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1990; Miles & Snow, 1986; Thorelli, 1986). Despite the different terms and descriptions 
almost all of these concepts have in common that they describe situations where the 
coordination between individuals is based on socio-cultural mechanisms instead of market 
or hierarchy.
 The existing literature has examined the merits of market and hierarchy as a 
means of coordination, but not in the context of knowledge development and diffusion. 
Given the relevance of innovation in the current economic context, this is a major concern. 
Social economics is well positioned to address this issue, as it is able to analyze not just 
the two coordination mechanisms most often analyzed – market and hierarchy – but also 
to conceptually grasp the middle ground where social relations and social values play a 
role. Notwithstanding the ideal typical approach that a conceptual discussion takes almost 
by necessity, these exchange mechanisms may not necessarily be substitutes but can be 
complements (Akerlof 1982, Bradach & Eccles 1989).
2.2 Ways of Coordinating
In market exchange the presumption is that economic order will emerge from independent, 
egoistic acts of autonomous individuals in pursuit of their own gain. Hierarchy assumes 
that the best economic outcome will result from standardization and following the chain 
of command. A third way, one we shall describe as gift exchange, generally refers to a 
type of exchange conducted between parties that are characterized by social properties 
and particularistic ties, the nature of which influences the exchange. In a world with zero 
transaction costs one may argue that markets as a way of coordinating behavior might be 
preferable (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975). When transaction costs are present, hierarchy 
might work better (Hennart 1993; Kreps 1990; Williamson 1975). The literature that has 
developed to understand hierarchy from an economic perspective may be able to deal 
conceptually with situations where individuals are boundedly rational, have only partially 
overlapping goals, and are opportunistic (Williamson 1975). Certainly when discussing 
knowledge development, and diffusion, however, trust and social norms may play a role 
too. Understanding how this plays a role may require one to look for ways of coordination 
where the parties involved are not legally obliged to behave in a certain way because a labor 
contract specifies it, nor are they involved in a quid pro quo where all relevant goods traded 
are specified (Arrow, 1972). We will briefly present the different ways of coordinating – 
markets (A), hierarchy (B), and social relations or gift exchange (C) – and discuss the extent 
to which they help understand the process of knowledge development and diffusion.
A. Markets
For economists, a perfect market is not an empirical reality but, rather, a set of assumptions: 
a large number of firms compete in a market for homogeneous commodities to cater to the 
demand of a large number of consumers. No producing firm or consumer is able to influence 
the price; all parties have complete knowledge (Stigler, 1968). Markets are where demand 
and supply meet to set an equilibrium price; all necessary information is summarized in the 
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prices quoted in a market. Modern economics view the market as a price‑setting mechanism 
and have left its workings implied rather than explicitly discussed (see Barber, 1977; Coase, 
1988; Rangan, 2000; Stigler, 1968). Cooperation between actors can take place anonymously; 
rules of the game are clear to all participants. As Williamson (1975, p.5) puts it “The marvel 
of the economic system is that prices serve as sufficient statistics, thereby economizing on 
bounded rationality.” In this ideal type of market exchange, the exchange that takes place is 
de-socialized in nature, it is not “embedded” in a larger social context (Granovetter 1985). 
In addition it is assumed that exchanges are freely consented to by opportunistic economic 
actors (Williamson, 1975). Exchange takes place within the context of complete contracts, 
marginal pricing assures optimized production and allocation and lastly property rights are 
protected by the state and the appropriate legal institutions. A Pareto efficient situation will 
result from free and unfettered working of the market; exchange in competitive markets 
assures that the exchange is equitable. 
 In the ‘pure’ market model it is assumed that risk but no fundamental uncertainty is 
present. If not all possible future states of the world and the likelihood of their occurrence are 
known, there is a situation of fundamental uncertainty. Certainly in such a situation complete 
contracting is impossible. Prices are likely not to reflect the true value of the commodity 
exchanged and/or prices do not contain all relevant information (Hennart, 1993). One may 
characterize such situations as market failure, and economists do so. The term implies 
that markets may be made to work in these situations. One may also claim that a different 
mechanism is at work.
Knowledge and the Market
Many firms make use of the market mechanism to develop and procure relevant knowledge. 
In the year 2000 $142 billion was paid internationally by users to parties that owned 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in order to make use of knowledge that was legally 
protected under IPR Law (Dolfsma, 2006).  The IPR system thus allows for a market that 
coordinates the exchange of knowledge. Knowledge as a commodity to be exchanged on the 
market is no ordinary good. It is non-rivalrous: it is not consumed by their use (Adler, 2001; 
Arrow, 1984), and non-exclusive: consumption or use by non-payers cannot be excluded. 
Knowledge is a (quasi) public good – reliance on the market creates a trade‑off between 
production and allocation. The market may not stimulate the creation of new knowledge in 
amounts that are beneficial for society (Alder, 2001; Stiglitz, 1994; Nelson, 1959; Romer, 
2002). If knowledge is available in an explicit form, and possibly digitized too, it can be very 
easily copied by others (Soete & ter Weel 2005; Cowan, David & Foray 2000).
 Knowledge development is cumulative, though the extent to which this is true 
differs across fields. New knowledge is for the most part based on (related) work done by 
others (in the past): we stand on the shoulders of giants (and dwarfs). One of the conditions 
conducive to scientific progress thus is “open research” or the full and free dissemination of 
research results (Nelson 1959). However, from the perspective of the party that invested in 
the generation of new knowledge, the notion of “open research” may be unappealing since 
it increases the risk of not recouping initial investment. 
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 Furthermore, Grant (1996) points out that for knowledge creation, but less so for 
knowledge diffusion, due to the far-reaching extent of specialization, the coordinated effort 
of many individual specialists and organizations of different kinds is needed. Market are at 
a significant disadvantage when it comes to performing this coordinating role. Because they 
address actors as motivated by extrinsic benefits, markets may actually increase the risk of 
opportunistic behavior (Le Grand 2003; Grant 1996). Thus, while markets as a means of 
coordinating behavior for knowledge development and diffusion are not to be dismissed, 
neither are they to be relied on exclusively.  
B. Hierarchy
Transaction cost theory (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1975) stresses that to transact actors 
involved incur costs – transaction costs – other than those needed for the good or service 
exchanged. These transaction costs are costs of coordination, and include costs of contract 
drafting and contract enforcement. According to transaction cost theory, transactions may 
take place either in the market or in a hierarchy (firm, organization) – these are the two 
alternatives. Given the type of transaction (for instance its frequency, investments required, 
number of competitors faced, duration of the contract), and the characteristics of the good 
involved, transaction costs will differ (Hennart, 1993; Krebs, 1990; Williamson, 1975). 
 By seeking to explain what type of activities need to be left to the market, and which 
need to be brought within the domain of the firm, transaction costs theory endogenizes the 
boundaries of the firm. Hierarchies coordinate the activities of individuals through the use of 
authority (legitimate power) aiming at some organizational goal (Williamson 1975; Ouchi 
1979, 1980; Adler 2001; Adler & Kwon 2002). The organization uses authority to set rules 
and issue directives with regard to processes completed or standards of output or quality 
(Grant, 1996; Ouchi, 1979). Members must abide by the rules and directives. Surveillance 
and direction of subordinates are employed by hierarchy to ensure that rules are followed, 
which involves a cost on its own (Hennart 1993; Ouchi 1980). A perception of equity about 
the coordination in a hierarchy is the result of social agreement that the hierarchy has the 
ability and the right to value each contribution and reward it fairly (Ouchi, 1980). Hierarchy 
may be efficient especially in case of a complex situation where the activities of multiple 
specialized units and large numbers of people need to be coordinated (Grant 1996; Jacques 
1990; Romme 1996). 
 Hierarchy’s costs are associated with measuring performance. When “tasks become 
highly unique, completely integrated or ambiguous for other reasons” performance may 
be impossible to measure (Ouchi, 1980; Adler, 2001). Certainly when the counterfactual 
– the outcome that could have resulted had someone acted in line with the interests of 
the hierarchy rather than her own – is impossible to determine, performance of hierarchy 
members cannot be determined. This is obviously the case when new knowledge is (not) 
created or diffused. Hierarchies may offset performance measurement problems when an 
incomplete employment contract allows for providing directions on a day-to-day basis and 
almost casual monitoring as a by-product. 
 As Homans (1950) has argued, however, when people work closely together within 
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a organization an atmosphere of trust and goal congruence results. Opportunistic behavior 
and therefore the need for monitoring are reduced. Hierarchies can create an ‘atmosphere 
of trust’ since they not only provide the stability of long-term cooperative relationships 
but also employ socialization to create goal congruence and a sense of shared destiny and 
belonging (Ouchi, 1979, 1980; Adler, 2001; Grant, 1996). Thus, hierarchies permit parties to 
deal with uncertainty/ complexity in an adaptive sequential fashion. While it may be argued 
that an atmosphere of trust is more likely to grow within hierarchy than in the market, trust 
may be established between parties in the market as well (Van der Eijk, Dolfsma & Jolink 
2006). What is more important to observe, conceptually, is that the emergence of trust within 
hierarchy is not taken into account in transaction costs theory.
Knowledge and Hierarchy
To coordinate, hierarchies create horizontally and vertically differentiated units to divide 
labor. Such organizational structuring may be especially efficient when performing routine 
tasks but encounters difficulty in case of creation of new knowledge (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979, 
Scott, 1992; Adler, 2001). Hierarchy coordinates by centralizing information. However, 
centralizing information functions effectively only if information is “characterized by a high 
degree of confirmation and little novelty” (Romme, 1996) and is not tacit in nature (Grant, 
1996). Managers may not be able to coordinate and absorb the knowledge their experts have 
mastered. Knowledge also gives rise to performance measurement difficulties (Adler, 2001). 
According to Adler (2001) vertical differentiation performs well in facilitating downward 
communication of explicit knowledge and commands, but is less effective in facilitating 
upward communication of new ideas and knowledge. Hierarchy may thus be an obstacle 
to learning. Learning might instead require team‑like, non‑hierarchical structures (Iannello, 
1992; Levinthal & March, 1993; Peters, 1987; Senge, 1990; Romme, 1996). As Powell et al. 
(1996, p.118) point out “Knowledge creation occurs in the context of a community, one that 
is fluid and evolving rather than tightly bound or static. The canonical formal organization, 
with its bureaucratic rigidities, is a poor vehicle for learning”. 
 Direct horizontal communication between the relevant experts in different units 
might compensate for hierarchy’s difficulty in facilitating upward communication of 
new ideas and knowledge needed for coordination. However, horizontal differentiations 
within hierarchies makes cooperation with regard to knowledge creation between units 
difficult, because units oftentimes have different goals, priorities, working procedures or 
even locations depending on the needs and circumstances that they face that make direct, 
horizontal (informal) contact between experts difficult. What is more, even though formal 
structure is able to stimulate knowledge development and diffusion, imposing directives to 
be creative is not likely to work well. Coordination of knowledge development activities 
often requires a more ‘personal’ kind of  interaction between experts rather than managers 
than can be achieved by means of rules and directives (Galbraith 1973; Grant 1996; Hansen, 
1999; Kogut & Zander 1992). 
 Galbraith (1973) points out that information processing within the hierarchy 
besides the formal vertical linkages oftentimes takes place via informal horizontal linkages. 
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In this connection, Romme (1996) points towards the importance of teams for knowledge 
production. Brown and Duguid (1991) emphasize that knowledge creation takes place 
within the context of an informal community which generally spans departmental and even 
organizational boundaries. Given the informal nature of many of these horizontal linkages 
and exchanges, the employment of authority as hierarchy’s central coordination mechanism 
is impaired. This, however, does not prevent horizontal knowledge exchanges from taking 
place. What in the absence of hierarchy and the market mechanism, whose rigidities are 
considered a poor vehicle for learning, coordinates these exchanges?
C. Social Relations: Gifts
A number of scholars have proposed alternative ways of coordinating the behavior of actors. 
Sometimes these are presented as ‘in-between’ markets and hierarchies to be analyzed in 
similar terms, sometimes they are posed as alternatives in their own right. Terms such as 
social relations (Adler & Kwon 2002), communities (Adler 2001; Bowles & Gintis 1998), 
clans (Ouchi 1980) and networks (Powell 1990; Miles & Snow 1986; Thorelli 1986) have 
been introduced. Most of these conceptions have a common aim to coordinate by curbing 
the effects of opportunism and goal incongruence using social and/or cultural mechanisms 
such as trust (Adler, 2001; Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Nooteboom, 2002), common values and 
beliefs (Ouchi, 1980; Granovetter, 1985) or network and reputation effects (Powell, 1990; 
Nooteboom, 2002). 
Coordination through both hierarchy as well as through the market can fail, especially 
as we have argued in the context of knowledge development and diffusion (innovation). 
Coordination does not need to be formal either in terms of (labor) contracts and directives, 
however (Ouchi 1980; Scott, 1992), as informal mechanisms of coordination can provide 
an alternative. Trust, the expectation that the exchange partner will act honestly and in good 
faith (Ring & Van de Ven 1992), can alleviate fears of opportunistic behavior and as such has 
been compared to a lubricant to both social and economic activity (Arrow 1974). Economic 
transactions that might otherwise prove extremely costly and time consuming to arrange, or 
involving extensive use of bureaucratic procedures to supervise, are undertaken in informal 
settings. Values and beliefs held in common – a ‘culture’ in the anthropological sense of 
the term – by a community will allow for and support such informal dealings. A national 
context, social stratification as well as a group or organizational culture can be involved, 
even when each can prevent trust from emerging in the informal setting. Common values 
and beliefs become internalized via socialization and habituation partly in the form of tacit 
knowledge (Hofstede, 1991; Schein, 1992; Rousseau, 1990), and are associated with shared 
representation and systems of meaning among parties (Cicourel, 1973;  Rousseau, 1990; 
Schein, 1992; Allaire & Firsirotu, 1984). Common agreement between individuals about 
what constitutes proper behavior and a sense of solidarity or common destiny reduces goal 
incongruence. While usually not explicitly for that purpose , the tendency for opportunistic 
behavior and thus the need for monitoring are thereby reduced, sometimes reduced 
significantly. While Ouchi (1980) emphasizes the ability of the organization to employ 
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common values and beliefs as a result of socialization, coordination on the basis of informal 
and socio-cultural mechanisms can also take place across organizational borders (e.g. Allen, 
1977; Allen & Cohen, 1968; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Von Hippel, 1987; Agrawal et al., 
2003).
Social relations and gift exchange as a third coordination mechanism beside market or 
hierarchy is not as much explored even when there are some suggestions (Ouchi 1980; Powell 
1990; Van der Eijk, Dolfsma & Jolink 2006). Table 1 summarizes some of the main features 
of each of these three coordination mechanisms. We will elaborate on this further below 
in the context of knowledge development and diffusion. What needs to be acknowledged, 
however, are the interconnections and interactions between mechanisms discussed as ideal 
types here (Williams 1988; Nooteboom 2000, 2002; Parsons 1951; Shapiro 1987). 
 
Table 2‑1 Coordination Mechanisms
Dimension Market Hierarchy Social relations / Gift exchange 
What is 
exchanged?
Goods and services 
for money or barter
Obedience to authority for 
material and spiritual security; 
time in return for some type of 
monetary compensation
Favors / gifts: tangible (goods/ 
money) and intangible 
(information/services/love/ 
status) (Foa & Foa 1980) 
Specific or  
(deliberately) 
unclear terms of 
exchange
Specific Unspecified, open (employee 
will follow directives within 
general limits of law and of 
morality.)
Deliberately unclear ( A gift/ 
favor creates an obligation to 
reciprocate; however, the value, 
form and timing of the counter 
gift is left open to discretion [van 
der Eijk et al. 2006])
Expected 
individual
orientation
Self-interest Subordination to directives 
and rules
Reciprocity, social obligations 
(vertical & horizontal)
System regulation Self-regulation; 
contract law, 
property rights
Organizational procedures;
third party arbiters; labor law
Reputation effect; benefits of 
continued cooperation; 
hostages; moral norm of 
reciprocity; norms and social 
solidarity; network closure.
Adapted from Adler & Kwon (2002), Biggart & Delbridge (2004), Bugental (2000), Fiske (1992), 
Ouchi (1980) and Powell (1990).
Thus, individuals may be motivated by, or addressed as having, egoistic or other-oriented 
considerations. Other-oriented considerations might be altruistic ones, but need not be solely 
directed at the well-being of others. Similarly, coordination of the actions of individuals 
might be through concrete persons or take an impersonal route through directives and 
rules developed explicitly. Coordination through the market as well as through hierarchy 
has been conceptualized generally as involving actors that are egoistically motivated 
where coordination takes the route of impersonal interaction. In Table 2, both market and 
hierarchy are to be found in Cell I only. It should be noted that also social and personal 
interaction can be egoistically motivated. As has been argued by social scientists since 
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the classical anthropologists Mauss and Malinowsky, social interaction and gift exchange 
involves egoism, power struggles, as well as altruism (see also Bugental 2000; Williams 
1988; Sherry 1983; Komter, 1996; Vandevelde, 2000) ; it can be highly personal involving 
strong ties but also impersonal as in cases where immediate personal relations are absent 
and actors address (unknown) others. Social relations and gift exchange thus encompasses 
Cells II through IV. Coordination through gift exchange can thus complement the market 
and hierarchy as a means of coordination. For instance, in a context where the value and 
belief system emphasizes the moral significance of reciprocity, gift exchange may need to 
depend less on calculative self-interest to coordinate.  
Table 2‑2: Coordination Dissected
Sources
Motivation Impersonal Personal
Egoistic I - Sanctions imposed by 
authority; contractual obligation
II - Calculative self-interest; benefits of 
continued cooperation (Abreu 1998; Telser 
1980; Axelrod 1984; Hill 1990; Heide & Miner 
1992; Parkhe 1993); reputation (Weigelt & 
Camerer 1988; Kreps 1990; Coleman 1990); 
hostages (Williamson 1985)
Other-oriented III - Norms, value and belief 
systems, ethics(Porter & 
Sensenbrenner 1998; Nye 
1979; Hofstede 1991; Schein 
1992)
IV - Relations of affect; routines, habituation; 
empathy
Adapted from Willliams (1988) and Nooteboom (2002)
Gift exchange known for its role in establishing social ties or maintaining relationships 
(Cheal 1996; Darr 2003; Mauss 1954; Gouldner 1960; Larsen & Watson 2001; Belk 1979; 
van der Eijk et al. 2006), despite the presence of  possible ulterior motives (Sherry 1983). 
As exchange continues, positive emotions are generated and uncertainty is reduced which, 
in turn, generates cohesion and commitment to the exchange relation (Lawler et al. 2000; 
Homans 1958). As both Granovetter (1985) and Homans (1950) argue: what may have started 
out as a purely goal-oriented interaction tends to become embedded over time in social trust 
relations. These relations of affect can act as a source of cooperation and exchange (Coleman 
1988; Ingram & Robert 2000). Altruistic behavior can result from routines and habituation, 
as can be argued even from a behaviorist psychological point of view. Operant conditioning 
in exchange, i.e. behaviors that are reinforced by rewards, are more likely to be repeated 
over time (Homans 1958, 1974). Behavior that becomes a routine, or non‑reflective and 
tacit in nature, can continue even when the behavior is no longer reinforced by (immediate) 
rewards (Homans, 1958, 1974). 
 Some social mechanisms such as expected benefits of continued future cooperation, 
hostage and reputation effect, emphasize the egoistic element to social interaction by focusing 
on the incentive structure participants face when deciding to honor their obligations. The 
latter of these is one of the less egoistic mechanisms, and may be on the boundary of self-
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interested and other‑oriented, indicating the difficulty of distinguishing them conceptually or 
empirically. In a situation where the focal actor and the recipient are part of atriad  (Simmel, 
1964), given that the reputation  effect is sufficiently strong, the incentive structure can 
be structured in such a way that calculative self-interest makes honoring debts rational 
(Krebs, 1990; Ostrom & Ahn, 2003; Coleman, 1988; Sherry, 1983; Ferrary, 2003; Gouldner, 
1960). As Williamson (1975. p.107) formulates it in a rare instance where he acknowledges 
the social in the economic realm: “Individual aggressiveness is curbed by the prospect of 
ostracism among peers, in both trade and social circumstances”. By the same token if one 
has a reputation for generously compensating those who have helped you, one will induce 
others to do you favors. ([Barney & Hansen, 1994] taken from Rose‑Ackerman, 1998). 
In the literature on gifts, this is known as the Matthew Effect: those who have shall be 
given to. This may lead to a situation where those who do not have are ex-communicated. 
Nevertheless, as the value of a gift is defined within a specific context, the deleterious effects 
may be more limited than in cases where action is coordinated by the market or by hierarchy. 
In any case the Matthew Effect is an effect that is well-documented in how science develops 
as well (Merton 1968).
2.3 Knowledge and Gift exchange 
We submit that exchange outside of market and hierarchy is predicated on gift exchange 
(e.g., Akerlof, 1982; Blau, 1964; Boulding, 1981 ; Heath, 1976; Homans, 1974; Mauss 1954; 
Sherry, 1983), and involves actors, resources and structures (Molm, 2003). Gift exchange is 
omnipresent and not just limited to charitable (‘altruistic’) gifts. It is a significant economic 
phenomenon (The Economist, 2006). Gift exchange allows for the exchange of both tangible 
goods as well as intangible goods. 
 Gift exchange has a number of properties that differentiate it from other forms of 
coordination. Firstly, according to the norm of reciprocity  an individual is obliged to give, 
to receive  and to reciprocate (Gouldner 1960; Levi-Strauss 1996; Malinowski 1996; Mauss 
1954; Sahlins 1996; Schwartz 1996; Simmel 1996). The imperative nature of this three-fold 
obligation derives from its cultural embeddedness (Sherry 1983). Gift exchange is carried 
out without a legal contract, even in business settings (Darr 2003; Ferrary, 2003), but does 
create strong obligation to reciprocate (Gouldner, 1960; Levi-Strauss, 1996; Malinowski, 
1996; Mauss, 1954; Sahlins, 1996; Schwartz, 1996; Simmel, 1996). Those who cannot or 
will not reciprocate are no longer part of the community or are subordinated. Gift exchange 
gives rise to a psychological contract between the giver and givee (Schein, 1965). Acceptance 
of the gift is, to a certain extent, acceptance of the giver and the relationship between the 
parties (Larsen & Watson 2001; Carrier 1991). Gifts valued highest tend to be those where 
a personal element is involved – it is for this reason that the material value of a gift is often 
hidden from direct view, though not unappreciated, especially between actors that know 
each other and are close. By the same token the refusal of the initial gift marks the refusal 
to initiate the dynamic of exchange, thus to refuse a gift is to refuse a relationship (Ferrary 
2003; Mauss 1954). 
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 Second, the nature of the countergift is not specified beforehand ‑ reciprocity is 
open to discretion as to the value, the form and the moment of occurrence of the counter gift 
(Bourdieu 1977; Gouldner 1960; Mauss 1954; Deckop et al. 2003). Schwartz (1996) states 
that it is even prohibited to make an equal‑return ‘payment’ (homeomorphic reciprocity) 
in gift exchange since this is tantamount to returning the offered gift to the donor – in the 
context of knowledge development returning the same good makes no sense as knowledge 
has public goods characteristics; at the same time paying for a gift of knowledge in a social 
context of trust negates the personal element and symbolically ends the relation. Many 
scholars emphasize that the return gift should ultimately, over the longer term be of roughly 
equal value, even when equivalence is context dependent and defined by the actors involved 
(Gouldner, 1960). 
 Thirdly, the diachronous nature of the exchange means that the gift is not 
reciprocated by immediate compensation, but instead by a deferred form of return (Mauss 
1954; Bourdieu 1977; Ferrary 2003; Deckop et al. 2003). A deferred return obligates one 
individual to another, and thus creates a social debt. As a coordination mechanism it thus 
operates through time, making it particularly useful for knowledge development and the 
circumstances in which it flourishes.
Gift exchange coordinates exchange by interlocking personal and impersonal sources 
of coordination based on both egoistic and altruistic motivation, enabling exchange in 
circumstances where the market and hierarchy cannot (Ferrary 2003; Smart 1993). Some 
have argued that gift exchange may be the only type of exchange to develop specific 
commercial products – open source software being a case in point (Zeitlyn 2003). The 
literature generally stresses that there is a propensity to give, yet there also is a need for equity 
(Adams 1965; Deckop et al. 2003; Gouldner 1960; Maitland 2002; Walster et al. 1973). 
Reciprocity is essential to this conceptualization, since an initial gift creates an informal 
obligation to reciprocate in due time or when needed (Gouldner 1960; Levi-Strauss 1996; 
Malinowski 1996; Mauss 1954; Sahlins 1996; Schwartz 1996; Simmel 1996) and has been 
characterized as short-term altruism for long-term self-interest (Putnam 2000: 134). Much of 
gift exchange’s effectiveness hinges on the force of the felt need to reciprocate, internalized 
or socially imposed, considering that the value, form and moment of the counter-gift is not 
specified before hand.
It has been argued that intellectual objects more often than physical ones are the result of 
cooperation (Bowles & Gintis, 1998; Dolfsma, 2008). Some consider knowledge creation as 
equivalent to combination, exchange and recombination of existing knowledge (Schumpeter, 
1934). In that sense knowledge development is a cumulative process (Nelson, 1959; Nelson, 
2004) where scientists must necessarily draw on the work of others. Moreover it oftentimes 
requires the integration of the specialized knowledge of multiple individuals (Grant, 1996), 
and as such collaborative teamwork, cooperation and knowledge sharing become essential 
(Adler, 2001; Moran & Ghosal, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). At the 
same time, coordination via the market and hierarchy was shown to be difficult when dealing 
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with knowledge. Partly because the outcome of the innovation process is fundamentally 
uncertain, the viability of use of contracts is limited: detailed rights and obligations for 
all possible future scenarios is prohibitively difficult and thus costly (Nooteboom, 2002). 
Even when drafting elaborate contracts is still just feasible technically, such contracts may 
undermine the trust necessary for knowledge development (Klein Wolthuis, Hillebrand & 
Nooteboom 2005).  Monitoring activities during the process of knowledge development 
may be difficult too; indeed, establishing the quality of the knowledge developed after it 
has been created may be difficult, even ex post. The linear model of developing knowledge, 
where a separate group of individuals is to develop knowledge until it is ready and then to 
pass it on for design of a product that will be sold in the market, is obsolete. Knowledge 
development is a perpetual process, and the market does not offer definitive tests ex post 
of the usefulness of what is developed. There is more involved, thus, than a situation of 
asymmetric information and a problem of determining what is the individual contribution 
to a group outcome. 
 For anything more that the very minor adaptations of existing goods and processes, 
actors will resort to an alternative coordination mechanism, at least in part. The generation 
and diffusion of knowledge depends to a very large extent upon ‘communities’ (Brown 
& Duguid 1991; Cohendet et al. 2004). These communities are made up of (oftentimes) 
informal networks and ties (Freeman 1991; Cross et al. 2002; Madhaven & Grover 1998). 
Gift exchange provides such an alternative perspective on coordination.
 A number of features of gift exchange are especially relevant when dealing with 
and engaging in the exchange of knowledge based assets: decentralization of monitoring, 
provision of incentives for knowledge sharing on an individual level, and a guide to 
knowledge exchange within and across organizational boundaries.    
Monitoring. One striking feature of gift exchange is that coordination occurs in the absence 
of a centralized structure capable of making decisions binding on its members. When “tasks 
become exceedingly unique, fully integrated, or ambiguous for other reasons, then even 
bureaucratic mechanisms fail” (Ouchi 1980, p.134). However, performance ambiguity on an 
organizational level does not necessarily equate to performance ambiguity on an individual 
level. As coordination via gift exchange generally takes place on an individual level, the 
need to monitor is effectively decentralized to that individual level. Given that actors are 
generally more capable of monitoring and valuing one another’s performance, gift exchange 
can coordinate in the face of extensive performance measurement difficulties. 
Motivation. For coordination of behavior to be effective, the willingness of the actors 
involved to engage is required. This is especially relevant within the context of innovation 
since “knowledge sharing cannot be forced; people will only share knowledge if there is a 
personal reason to do so” (Huysman & de Wit 2004). For coordination between individuals 
in the context of innovation to be effective there must thus be an intent or willingness, in 
addition to the ability, to share relevant knowledge (Hansen 1999). The willingness issue 
is especially relevant, though infrequently analyzed, considering the costs and uncertainty 
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associated with sharing knowledge in terms of time, energy, and vulnerability on the part 
of the donor (Reagens & McEvily, 2003). The actor’s position is vulnerable as redundancy 
increases, competition from the givee may result and a countergift may not materialize 
(Davenport 1997; Reagens & McEvily 2003).
 Yet, despite the possible costs from the donor’s perspective, knowledge continues 
to be shared (e.g. Wenger & Snyder 2000; Wenger 1998; Brown & Duguid 1991; 2001). 
Why do individuals, in the absence of clearly defined, formal, enforceable obligations or 
contracts, continue to provide recipients with knowledge? Gift exchange provides the parties 
involved with a context for  the exchange of resources, as well as a socially embedded 
informal sanctioning or enforcement mechanism. Gift exchange incorporates altruistic as 
well as more self-interested motives, of which the latter are generally emphasized. The act of 
giving creates obligations, which the giver can draw on in the future (Coleman 1988; Mauss 
1954; Bourdieu 1977). The givee owes the giver, at some point in the future, something of 
similar value, depending on the rituals for giving within the relevant group (Avner 1997; 
Blau 1964; Bourdieu 1977, 1986; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones 1992; Darr 2003). At the same 
time, through giving, a reputation can be established and accumulate which can provide 
prestige and standing as well as ease of access to resources held by others. A reputation for 
generosity or trustworthiness can be a valuable asset (Bourdieu 1977).  
Access to knowledge within and between organizations. Horizontal differentiations 
or departmentalization within hierarchies makes cooperation with regard to knowledge 
creation between units difficult, firstly because units have different knowledge bases, and 
secondly, because units often have different priorities (Adler 2001). Cooperation required 
for knowledge development requires participation of specialists, not merely as a result of the 
tacit nature of much knowledge (Burt 2004; Grant, 1996; Hansen, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 
1992). Coordination of tasks related to knowledge development requires a more “personal” 
interaction than can be achieved by means of rules and directives (Gailbraith, 1973), 
even when the formalized interaction should not be underestimated (Aalbers et al. 2006). 
Galbraith (1973) argues that information processing within the hierarchy often bypasses 
vertical linkages, taking place via informal (horizontal) ties. Romme (1996) points to teams 
for knowledge production. Brown and Duguid (1991) emphasize that knowledge creation 
takes place within (informal) communities of practice which may span across departmental 
and even organizational boundaries. Given the informal nature of many of these linkages, 
the use of authority as the central coordination mechanism within a hierarchy is impaired. 
 Gift exchange can enable knowledge exchange in circumstances where the 
market and hierarchy cannot (Ferrary 2003; Smart 1993) since it allows actors to forge 
and personalize relationships and to develop personal ties that can act as a ‘guarantee’ that 
their initial gift will not be abused and will also be returned (Zucker, 1986; Shapiro, 1987). 
Knowledge that is classified and highly sensitive is exchanged between individuals from 
different firms, even if the giver and their firms may be at risk when the givee abuses the 
trust placed in him. Bouty (2000) shows that despite the risks, giving and favor exchange 
of this kind ends up helping both giver, givee, and both their firms.  In such circumstances 
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the risks and costs of knowledge development and diffusion can be considerably reduced 
when gift exchange is used as a coordination mechanism. Knowledge is thus exchanged via 
informal routes and personal networks, possibly transcending organizational borders (Allen, 
1977; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Von Hippel, 1987) as communities-of-practice may extend 
beyond them (Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Wenger, 1998; Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001). Gift 
exchange both relies on and establishes a shared frame of reference that allow the parties 
involved to determine what the risks and costs are of using this mechanism as opposed 
to another mechanism (cf. Van Eijk et al. 2006). Gift exchange allows people to establish 
and maintain social relations  that can help actors gain access to relevant individuals and 
communities while allowing at the same time some ‘guarantee’ to prevent abuse.
2.4 Conclusion  
In addition to market and hierarchy there is a third coordination mechanism, one that is not 
much discussed: gift exchange in social relations. Some have argued that gift exchange is 
conceptually of the same order as market or hierarchy; we argue that it is of a different order, 
requiring additional concepts to understand (Biggart & Delbrigde, 2004). In this chapter we 
argue that in the context of knowledge development and diffusion gift exchange has often been 
the preferred alternative. We discuss this coordination mechanism conceptually, especially 
focusing on the context of knowledge development. Depending on the circumstances one 
mechanism may be better suited to provide coordination; in some circumstances coordination 
mechanisms work in tandem (Adler 2001; Bradach & Eccles 1989). Gift exchange offers an 
understanding of how social relations develop and are maintained that allows for the trust 
required under the circumstances of uncertainty that characterize knowledge development.
 Gift exchange allows actors to forge and personalize relationships and to develop 
guarantees through personal bonding (Zucker 1986; Shapiro 1987). As anthropologists in 
line with Mauss have argued: there is a need to give, receive, and reciprocate. If one does 
not adhere to this, one may be ex-communicated and barred from exchanges that are both 
socially and economically meaningful. This certainly holds for non-standard situations 
where technological and market uncertainty and the possibility of opportunism are high 
such as for venture capital provision in Silicon Valley (Ferrary 2003), as well as in markets 
that are mature (Darr 2003). Contrary to the dictum of the New Institutional (Neoclassical) 
Economics that ‘in the beginning there were markets’, Boulding (1981) has even claimed 
that gift exchange is the quintessential kind of exchange. In the context of knowledge 
development he certainly is correct.
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Chapter 3 
No Black Box and No Black Hole: 
from Social Capital to Gift Exchange 22
3.1 Introduction
Social capital resides in members of a group, and in their relations. Social capital may extend 
to (parts of) a company, and may extend beyond the company. Understanding social capital 
is relevant for understanding what is going on within and between companies. How does 
social capital emerge, how is it maintained, and how is it used? The vast literature on social 
capital has only begun to address these questions.
 Over the years, the concept of social capital has gathered attention at an extraordinary 
rate. Fine (2000) states that social theory is currently being rewritten through the lens of 
social capital. The idea that relationships and social networks are a valuable asset, in that 
they can facilitate action, is the common denominator. As such, much of the attention of 
scholars has focused on the tangible benefits social capital can provide,  and has, as such, 
been put to the test in a wide variety of contexts (e.g. Adler & Kwon, 2002; Field, 2003; 
Fine, 2000; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998)  demonstrating its relevancy in 
those contexts. Despite its popularity, social capital has not yet crystallized and conceptually 
is still hampered by the lack of a common definition regarding the concept and its elements 
(Adam & Roncevic, 2003). Furthermore, much attention in the literature has been directed 
to identifying social capital and less so to issues of how social capital is created, how it is put 
to use and how it is maintained. These processes are not self‑evident: the benefits of social 
capital do not materialize at will and not every individual is likely to benefit to the same 
extent.
 The focus of this paper is on relations between individuals in a community and 
the cooperation between them. These relations will be studied by reviewing the economic 
and management literature on social capital, supplemented by the literature in sociology 
and anthropology on gift exchange. This latter literature focuses, on the one hand, on gift 
exchange as a possibly instrumental exchange of resources, services or information. On the 
other hand, in line with Homans (1950), the literature reveals that relatively frequent gift 
exchange generates cohesion and commitment to exchange relations (Lawler et al., 2000) 
where people are more likely to invest in mutual relationships under such circumstances 
(Mauss, 1954; Bourdieu, 1977; Larsen and Watson, 2001). From this literature, social 
capital emerges as a consequence of exchange relations, capturing the procedural aspects 
of social relationships. The literature on gifts suggests mechanisms for reciprocity, equity, 
interpretation/meaning and the strength of a relationship, which may be tied up with the 
existing literature on social capital. 
22 This chapter is a revised version of van der Eijk, R., Dolfsma, W & Jolink, A (200), On a source of social 
capital: gift exchange, Journal of Business Ethics, in press.
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 In this conceptual paper we argue that socials capital, as a concept, remains a black 
box in the sense that the mechanisms that constitute it remain underdeveloped and that it is 
a black hole in the sense that many empirical phenomena are attributed to its presence. The 
literature on gift exchange suggests ways of opening the black box by exploring mechanisms, 
proposing that creation, use and maintenance of social capital is to be understood as a 
corollary of gift exchange. 
3.2 Social Capital
The concept of social capital was mainly developed in the late 1980s. Although the first 
use of the term social capital has been credited to Hanifan in 1916 (Dika & Singh, 2003; 
Fine, 2000), Bourdieu (1986), Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) are considered to be the 
founding fathers of the concept of social capital. Their approach and conceptualization of 
social capital differ substantially mainly resulting from the respective points of departure 
or perspectives. One of the contentious points for discussion is whether social capital is an 
egocentric or a sociocentric concept – i.e. does it reside in individuals or in the relations 
between them (Adam & Roncevic, 2003; Adler & Kwon, 2002)? Most authors, however, 
agree with Coleman that social capital deals with aspects of social structure which enable 
social action; social relationships can act as a resource for social action (Coleman, 1988; 
Burt, 1992; Bourdieu, 1986). Tentatively, one may describe social capital as the sum of 
actual or potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the social 
structure that facilitate exchange and social interaction. As a function of the configuration 
and content of the network of more or less durable social relations, one can access social 
capital either directly or indirectly. Social capital thus emerges as the intended, instrumental 
or unintentional result of social interaction or exchange.
 Adler & Kwon (2002) have argued that social capital has a number of characteristics. 
First, social capital can be invested in, for instance one can expand or deepen one’s network 
of external contacts thus enlarging the stock of social capital (Bourdieu, 1977, 1986). 
Second, social capital is appropriable in the sense that an actor’s network can be used for 
different purposes by the focal actor and not by others (Coleman, 1988; Bourdieu, 1986). 
Third, social capital needs maintenance as social ties may weaken due to relational atrophy 
(Cheal, 1988). Four, social capital resides in individuals as well as in mutual ties. As a result, 
if one party defects on or terminates the relationship, social capital vanishes. Social capital 
in some ways resembles a “collective good” (e.g. Coleman, 1988). Although one can ‘own’ 
social capital, it is not one’s private property since it resides in the ties between individuals. 
However, unlike a pure “collective good”, one can exclude others or be excluded by others 
from social capital’s benefits. 
 Nahapiet and Ghosal (1998) claim that social capital can be argued to have three 
dimensions: a structural, a relational and a cognitive dimension. The structural dimension 
describes the totality of impersonal configuration of linkages between actors (Nahapiet & 
Ghosal, 1998; Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). According to Coleman (1988), social 
capital is accumulated history in the form of a social structure appropriable for productive 
48
36
use by an actor in the pursuit of his interests. Among the most important facets of the 
structural dimension we can identify the presence or absence of network ties between actors 
(Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). The significance of an actor’s social capital is not 
exclusively determined by the number of direct and indirect ties and the respective resources 
that the individuals have at their disposal. The structural embeddedness or configurations of 
ties that make up an individual’s exchange network play a role as well. Thus the configurations 
of the focal actor’s exchange network affect the quality of someone’s exchange network and 
therefore his social capital. Networks – defined as specific types of relations linking sets of 
people, objects or events (Knoke & Kuklinski, 1982) – may however be just one example of 
the structural dimension of social capital.
 Secondly, the relational dimension focuses on the specific content of an individual’s 
ties: how individuals value their contacts, over and above the quantity of ties. The emphasis 
is on the behavioral embeddedness of social relations, which “describes the kind of personal 
relationships people have developed with each other through a history of interactions” 
(Granovetter, 1992). 
 Thirdly, the cognitive dimension of social capital deals with that aspect of the social 
infrastructure which represents shared meanings and interpretations. As Foley and Edwards 
(1997) have argued: “social capital cannot be conceived in purely structural terms because 
even in its structural sense it carries a cultural freight (‘expectations, obligations, trust’) that 
is nested in structure but not simply reducible to structure. Second, what is equally clear 
about the cultural component of social capital is that it is appropriated by individuals but 
is not simply an attribute of individuals (...) It is precisely this socio cultural component 
of social capital that provides the context with which it acquires meaning and becomes 
available to individuals and groups in a way that can facilitate an individual or collective 
action not otherwise possible”. The cultural dimension then represents a resource in that it 
provides shared understanding among parties (Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Cicourel, 1973). If 
one were to take a sociocentric position, one would obviously be more inclined to emphasize 
this cognitive dimension.
 Coleman (1988) emphasizes that social capital constitutes an aspect of the social 
structure and is capable of facilitating the actions of individuals within that structure. These 
actions relate to the (potential) benefits of social capital, identified and categorized by 
Sandefur and Laumann (1998): information, influence and solidarity. These benefits allow 
actors to achieve ends which would be impossible to achieve without social capital, or only 
by means of (significant) additional costs. 
 A substantial amount of research, in difference areas, has focused on the (mostly 
positive) consequences of social capital (e.g. Alder & Kwon, 2002; Jackman & Miller, 1998; 
Field, 2003; Fine, 2000; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). Significantly less 
has been written about the way social capital is created and maintained, which is at stake in 
this paper. Or, as Ulmann Margalit (1978) argues: an explanation is incomplete if the How-
question is not addressed in addition to the Why‑question.
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3.3 Social Capital & Gift Exchange
The literature on social capital, trust, and collaboration identifies a number of sources 
of cooperation, most of which can be categorized in two categories (e.g. Shapiro, 1987; 
Nooteboom, 2002). On the one hand, impersonal sources, such as sanctions by an external 
authority, social norms and values, are discussed (Bradach & Eccles, 1989; Dore, 1983; 
Granovetter, 1985; Zucker, 1986). Personal sources as a source of social capital and trust 
are, on the other hand, discussed in this literature as well. In part motivated by self interest, 
current and ongoing cooperation can bring benefit to the focal actor (Abreu, 1998, Axelrod, 
1984, Frank, 1988, Heide & Miner, 1992, Hill, 1990, Kreps et al., 1982, Parkhe, 1993; 
Telser, 1980). A focal actor’s reputation (Weigelt & Caramer, 1988; Kreps, 1990; Coleman, 
1988), or the hostages taken by the focal actor (Williamson, 1985), can be a basis for the 
focal actor to trust the partner to cooperate. Some others refer to such sources of social 
capital as closed networks, shared ideology, culture, and social norms and values without 
further elaboration (Coleman 1988, Ferrary 2003, Field 2003, Laumann and Pappi 1982, 
Portes 1998, Putnam 1993, Sandefur & Laumann 1988). In part the latter are motivated by 
altruistic motivations such as relations of affect as well as by routines or individual habits. 
Where impersonal sources of cooperation from the point of view of an individual actor 
can be regarded as a given and can only to be altered indirectly, personal sources, arising 
in specific personalized interactions, can be influenced. In this paper we suggest that gift 
exchange provides the actor with the means to create and maintain relations of trust where 
social capital might be said to reside. In the literature the purported effects of a presence of 
social capital is mostly discussed. Social capital appears to emerge from a black box, and 
is enigmatically invoked to explain a plethora of phenomena –mostly good but sometimes 
bad. In that respect social capital is in many cases perceived as a black hole. By suggesting 
a way in which the creation, maintenance, but also demise of trust and social capital can be 
understood, we may be able to open the black box.
 Some authors have hinted at other sources for social capital, leaving most of the 
elaborations for later. Putnam (1993) points at norms, trust and network ties as sources of the 
creation and maintenance of social capital. For Coleman (1988) social capital results from 
properties of social structures, most notably network closure and multiplex ties, but this 
seems to raise an even larger amount of questions. According to Portes (1998) the motives of 
recipients and donors are sources of social capital. She distinguishes between consummatory 
motives, referring to an internalized norm resulting from socialization during childhood 
and/or from a shared faith, and instrumental motives, referring to access to resources. The 
viability of instrumental motives in the creation of social capital results from the creation 
of mutual obligations and enforceable trust. Bourdieu (1986) emphasizes the instrumental 
nature of social capital construction as well. 
 Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988) argue that social capital can be formed 
purposefully as well as unintentionally. Social capital may result from instrumental behavior. 
Bourdieu emphasizes the role of social obligation, trust and the advantages of connections in 
social capital (Smart, 1993). Bourdieu underlines the fact that connections and obligations 
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are not givens, but are the product of investment strategies - consciously or unconsciously - 
aimed at establishing or reproducing social relationships that are directly usable in the short 
or long term (Bourdieu, 1977; 1986). Thus, self-interested and otherwise purposive actors 
may strategically enter into certain kinds of relationships (Coleman, 1990, 1994; Field, 
2003; Portes, 1998; Sandefur & Laumann, 1998). Social capital may also be a byproduct 
of broad spectrum of activities, and many investments in social capital are not intentionally 
made as such. Social capital may emerge and vanish as a byproduct of activities engaged 
in for reasons other than the accumulation of social capital (Coleman, 1988, 1990; Field, 
2003; Sandefur & Laumann, 1998; Paldam & Svendsen, 2000). In addition, its value is often 
as much for the broader public as for those individuals who actually belong to and have 
invested in the relations (Coleman, 1988; Field, 2003).
 In this paper we will draw on the concept of gift exchange, developed predominantly 
in the anthropological literature, as a concept which allows social scientists to understand 
how relations emerge, how they are maintained, and how they may be drawn on. As Portes 
(1998) has pointed out: “Resources obtained through social capital have, from the point 
of view of the recipient, the character of a gift”. The notion of gift in this literature is thus 
more encompassing than the one understood in ordinary day life. Here gifts are equated with 
charitable gifts – a significant economic phenomenon (Economist, 2006). Coleman (1994) 
cites examples of individuals’ intentional creation of obligations by, for instance, performing 
unsolicited favors and giving gifts to others. These obligations become a basis for future 
exchange. Coleman in particular argues that they are a kind of ‘entitlement’ to future social 
support.
Gift exchange and emergence of social capital
Boulding (1981) surmises that gift exchange is the quintessential form of exchange. The vast 
literature on gift exchange points out that gift exchange plays a vital role in the construction 
of social networks (Cheal, 1996; Larsen & Watson, 2001; Gouldner, 1960); gifts may be 
used to initiate, maintain, or sever relationships with individuals or groups (Belk, 1979; 
Sherry, 1983; Larsen & Watson, 2001; Cheal, 1996; Darr, 2003; Mauss, 1954; Gouldner, 
1960). Frequent gift or favor exchange leads to positive emotions and uncertainty reduction 
which, in turn, generates cohesion and commitment to exchange relations (Lawler et al., 
2000). 
 In contrast to popular belief, gifts may be exchanged for both instrumental as well as 
for more purely altruistic reasons. Classical anthropologists such as Mauss and Malinowski 
have argued persuasively that, indeed, the exchange of gifts is motivated by self-interest in 
many cases. Even when altruistic motives play a role, these tend not to be unrelated to the 
motive of self interest. By drawing on the well-established research on gifts, one is able to 
incorporate all of the dimensions that are attributed to social capital, as well as clarify how 
social capital is established and maintained. 
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The literature on gift exchange points out that gift exchange may both be a form of 
instrumental behavior often taking place in a context of quasi enforced reciprocity, but the 
obligations resulting from gift exchange may also be an unintentional by-product (Blau, 
1964, Bourdieu, 1977, Heath, 1976; Homans, 1974; Mauss, 1954). Rose-Ackerman (1998) 
points out that gifts, presented to people and institutions in a position where they might 
benefit the giver, actually come close to being prices (or, depending on the situation, even 
bribes) –  if the appropriate ritual is not adopted(Smart 1993). 
 Gift giving may be a strategic, self motivated action meant to create an obligation in 
the exchange partner to reciprocate (Bourdieu, 1977; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones, 1992; Darr, 
2003). The generosity and voluntarism observed in gift giving may be an illusion and only 
be altruism in appearance (Blau, 1964; Mauss, 1954). Ostensibly, there is not necessarily 
an expectation of equivalent or formal return ([Beals, 1970] quoted in Sherry, 1983), but in 
reality the purposive focal actor – consciously or unconsciously (Komter, 1996; McGrath et 
al., 1996; Levi-Strauss, 1996) – takes into account past and or future outcomes for herself, 
and is at least partly motivated by the expectation of some return-gift, whether direct (such 
as power over others) or indirect (such as social approval) (Blau, 1964). As Zucker (1986) 
argues, creation of trust is implicit in the expectation of a counter-gift in gift exchange; it 
should not become explicit, however (Bourdieu 1992, Darr 2003). It is, nevertheless, this 
equity over the longer term that makes the exchange mutually beneficial and therefore its 
existence and continuance is reasonable (Cook & Emerson, 1984). Enforcement is self-
regulating, since, between equals, if one partner fails to reciprocate, the other actor is likely 
to discontinue the exchange (Nye, 1979). 
 Because gift exchange is generally unbalanced when viewed at one particular 
point in time, a longitudinal perspective more accurately reveals the nature of gift giving. A 
deferred return obligates one individual to another, and creates ‘social debt‘. Significant time 
may pass between the gift and the counter-gift. Gift exchange is carried out without a legal 
contract (Ferrary, 2003), but instead informal existence of interpersonal relationships and 
trust makes it possible to leave the particulars of the exchange unspecified (Uehara, 1990; 
Zucker, 1986). If the obligations could in fact be enforced and imposed on by third parties 
we would be talking about market transactions. 
 Gift exchange is a distinct form of exchange that is characterized by a set of 
three principles that Marcel Mauss (1954) has been very adamant about. As part of a 
community, anybody is obliged to (1) give, to (2) receive23 and to (3) reciprocate (cf. Dore 
1983; Gouldner, 1960; Levi-Strauss, 1996; Malinowski, 1996; Sahlins, 1972; Schwartz, 
1996; Simmel, 1996). The imperative nature of this three-fold obligation derives from its 
cultural embeddedness (Sherry, 1983). These obligations are certainly social in that they are 
enforced by the community. In addition, they may have moral overtones. As a result, donors 
and recipients feel psychologically obliged to act according to the principles (cf. Schein, 
1965). In a situation where this psychological contract is violated, one will question the 
reciprocal goodwill of the other. Acceptance of the gift is, to a certain extent, acceptance 
23 Cf. proverbs “never look a gift horse in the mouth”, “never criticize or express displeasure at a gift”.
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of the giver and the relationship between the parties (Larsen & Watson, 2001; Carrier, 
1991). It is also an acceptance of the perception that the giver has of the receiver. It is 
for this reason that a gift which is perceived as improper by the receiver may be rejected, 
may fail to initiate a relation, and may harm an existing relation. Refusal of the initial gift 
marks the refusal to initiate the dynamic of exchange, thus to refuse a gift is to refuse a 
relationship and one’s role in that relation (Ferrary, 2003; Mauss, 1954). Reciprocity is 
open to discretion as to the value and form of the counter gift: the currency with which the 
obligation is repaid can be different from the form with which they were incurred. Schwartz 
(1996) states that it is even prohibited to make an equal‑return ‘payment’ (homeomorphic 
reciprocity) in gift exchange, as that is tantamount to returning the offered gift to the donor 
and discontinuing the relationship. Gift exchange is diachronous since reciprocity is open 
to discretion with regard to time; a gift is not reciprocated by immediate compensation, but 
instead by a deferred form of compensation (Mauss, 1954; Bourdieu, 1977; Ferrary, 2003.; 
Deckop et al., 2003). The ‘objective’ value of the counter-gift may be ostensibly lower then 
the original gift if circumstances permit this. If the party who is originally at the receiving 
end is evidently not in a position to return gifts of approximately equal value he need not 
do so – he may not have enough resources, but there may be other reasons for the scales 
being ‘objectively’ out of balance, even permanently (Komter 1996). Material value of gifts 
exchanged can be compensated for by obvious inculcation of immaterial value –such as 
time, effort and creativity– in the counter-gift. The instrumental nature of gift exchange 
can also be apparent when a dependent party who is evidently less well endowed gives 
to a more central party, being better endowed, in the expectation to receive in return, but 
certainly not something of equal value. The instrumental reason for giving in the first place 
is to be able to establish a relation that will be beneficial in the long run, possibly by being 
able to tap into the other relations that the receiving party maintains (Ferrary 2003). Thus, 
the exact nature or moment of the counter‑gift is necessarily not specified beforehand – gifts 
are ‘silent’ as it were (Bourdieu, 1977; Gouldner, 1960; Mauss, 1954; Deckop et al., 2003). 
Many scholars emphasize that the return‑gift should ultimately be of roughly equivalent 
value, however this equivalence refers to equivalence as defined by the actors involved, 
including their inter-subjective understanding of the value of the gifts actually exchanged, 
given an understanding of people’s positions and endowments. ‘Objectively’, even in the 
long run, the exchange might not be equal in value (Gouldner, 1960). 
Maintenance of social capital
Virtually any resource – material or immaterial, tangible or intangible, of high or low value 
– can be transformed into a gift or favor (Blau, 1964, Heath, 1976; Homans, 1974; Sherry, 
1983). Gifts may be flowers, a box of chocolates, an invitation, a handshake or joke, a 
suggestion or tip one knows to be relevant, for the received attention or heed, knowledge 
and ideas. A gift may even take the form of money, if and when given with the proper ritual 
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such as a gift‑wrapping (Zelizer 1997; Khalil 2004). The more obviously valuable a first gift 
is, for instance, the more the giver is likely to signal to the receiver or givee that the gift is 
actually a bribe or price. 
 The alteration from a resource to a gift is realized by observing and keeping in mind 
the social relationships, the proper occasions and decorum, and using the signals and rituals 
that should accompany gift giving as established in a community (Deal and Kennedy 1982). 
Relations start with gift giving, as they convey the message that one intends to relate to the 
other; gift giving conveys that one has a specific perception of the other as someone who 
would appreciate the gift offered and is willing and able to offer a counter-gift the original 
giver would also appreciate. A first gift is in fact an offer to become a member of an existing, 
what we would call, Social Capital Community, or, alternatively, a request to be allowed to 
join the Social Capital Community of the receiving party. A Social Capital Community can 
be as small as a group of two persons. Given the possibility to offend the receiver by giving 
a gift, the original gift with which a relation starts is not likely to be idiosyncratic. The more 
a first gift signals a specific perception of the receiver and his context, the bigger the chances 
of offense are as the giver might have misperceived the situation. Gift exchange allows for 
a common bond to be established and maintained (‘social capital’), and thus contributes to 
value creation by providing access to resources.
 Gift exchange serves both economic and social purposes (Belk, 1979; Larsen & 
Watson, 2001; Cheal, 1996), and may be mutually supportive (Ferrary 2003; Smart 1993).24 
While gift exchange is (necessarily) between individuals, these individuals may be from 
the same organization (e.g., Flynn 2003), or from different organizations, where individuals 
represent organizations (Child & Faulkner 1998, Ferrary 2003). Gift exchange has been 
regarded by some as a purely economic exchange between two parties (Larsen and Watson, 
2001). Gift exchange is not merely an economic transaction, however, it is also a good in 
itself, a ‘process benefit’, establishing or affirming, but possibly also damaging, destroying or 
forestalling a personal relationship (Ferrary 2003; Offer, 1997). Gifts not only transfer utility 
but are also social interactions embedded in social structures (Cheal, 1996). The relation 
between giver and receiver is primarily personal and can therefore have a value independent 
of and in addition to their instrumental function of regulating transactions (Rose-Ackerman, 
1998). Darr (2003) thus claims that gift exchange and market transactions are ‘inextricably 
intertwined’ in contemporary markets (cf. Granovetter 1985, Dolfsma et al. 2005). Smart 
(1993, p.389) avows we should “avoid the  Scylla of assuming that gift exchange and market 
exchange are completely different types of relationships and the Charybdis of dissolving 
the distinction in a unifying theoretical practice of explaining all actions as outcomes of the 
strategic pursuit of the advantage of the agent” (cf. Dore 1983). As there is a limit to the 
number of relations (ties) one is able to sustain – especially if the ties are strong ties – there 
is necessarily a boundary to one’s (immediate) Social Capital Community. One may be 
able to tap into the social capital that inheres in more indirect connections, but only if one’s 
24 Some have argued that gift exchange may be the only type of exchange to create a commercial product that 
can be used – open source software being a case in point (Zeitlyn 2003).
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direct relation allows this (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Granovetter, 1973, Lin, 1998). Gift 
exchange will generally not extent beyond an (emerging) Social Capital Community.
Social capital’s ability to facilitate social action, in the absence of any legal enforcement, 
depends on individuals’ willingness and sense of obligation towards the other. Many 
emphasize generalized reciprocity, such as in the example of voluntary blood donations to 
unknown others, usually related to concepts such as shared ideology, culture and norms/
values (Coleman, 1988; Ferrary, 2003; Field, 2000; Laumann & Pappi, 1982; Portes, 
1998; Putnam, 1993; Sandefur & Laumann, 1988). Although generalized reciprocity can 
be defined as part of social capital, it does represent a less potent form of social capital 
and could be considered as an enabler. Social capital’s ability to facilitate action is most 
effective if and when it results from gift exchange resulting personal obligations between 
concrete individuals. Individuals generally are more forthcoming towards friends and 
acquaintances than strangers or persons the are less connected with in general (Coleman 
1988). Strong ties generally provide a larger likelihood of reciprocation than weak ties, 
where reciprocation facilitates actors’ access to resources and support (Burt 1992, Hansen 
1999). Once established, a Social Capital Community decreases the risk associated with 
exchange as a result of the reputation (Kreps, 1990; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003; Coleman, 1988; 
Sherry, 1983; Ferrary, 2003) and repeated interaction effect (Abreu, 1998, Fudenberg & 
Maskin, 1986; Kreps et al., 1982), hence actors’ preference for dealing with insiders instead 
of outsiders. Thus in contrast to what many authors seem to assume social capital does not 
exist in absence of a social context; in its most potent form, social capital mainly results from 
concrete interaction (gift exchange) between concrete individuals. 
 Social capital thus needs maintenance (Adler and Kwon 2002). Gift exchange 
can be considered as an investment to create a relation that can be drawn on later and that 
can thus be referred to as social capital (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998). “Gifts 
can be described as an investment in the relationship between donor and recipient. The 
greater the value of the gift, the more substantial the investment” (Larsen & Watson 2001, 
p.899). The generosity and voluntarism observed in gift giving may be an illusion and only 
an apparent altruism (Blau, 1964; Mauss, 1954). Indeed, social capital is not simply there 
for anybody to use, as both Coleman (1988) and Putnam (1993) assume. Investments are 
necessary since connections are not givens but require continuous maintenance (Bourdieu, 
1977, 1986). Gift exchange engenders the relationships in which social capital can be said 
to reside (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998). The symbolic denial of economic 
calculation of gift exchanges then serves the requirement of strategic interaction (Bourdieu, 
1977).
Gifts - Inclusion & Exclusion
Social relationships and group boundaries are formed and sustained through the perpetuating 
exchange cycle of giving and receiving (Ruth et al., 1999). The latter aspect of the gift, its 
instrumentality in maintaining social ties (Belk, 1979; Cheal, 1988; Mauss, 1954; Ruth et 
al., 1999; Sherry, 1983; McGrath et al., 1996), is highlighted by Belk and Coon (1993) who 
stress that gift giving creates a bond of goodwill and social indebtedness between people. 
55
43
In their argument, instrumental and altruistic motives are not so neatly separated.  This 
indebtedness is what highlights gift giving as an exchange and perpetuates the exchange 
process – as long as the scales are not balanced. Gift exchange then establishes repetitive, self 
enforcing bonds (Offer, 1997); the outstanding obligations between the exchange partners 
make it expedient not to break off relationships, for both ‘creditor’ and ‘debtor’,  as  both 
have an interest in maintaining their long-term relation (Gouldner, 1960). On the other hand, 
however it has been argued that a person should not maintain a pattern of gift exchange that 
is perceived as highly unbalanced. This will not only affect his sense of emotional state of 
mind, but if it were to occur within a firm, for instance, this unbalance would make it less 
productive (Flynn 2003). Being perceived as a creditor, rather than as a debtor, however, does 
increase one’s status or reputation within a community, something which may best be done 
by exchanging gifts frequently (Flynn 2003). An organization where gifts are exchanged is 
a caring organization where knowledge creation and diffusion is more likely to occur (Von 
Krogh 1998). 
 Belk and Coon (1993) emphasize how gift giving creates a bond of goodwill and 
social indebtedness between people. Indebtedness perpetuates the exchanges process. A 
deferred return obligates one individual to another, and therefore creates social debt. At 
the same time, Belk (1976) has described the tension generated and reduced in unbalanced 
exchanges as an important dynamic in gift giving. While the giving of large gifts that 
the receiver may not reciprocate enables one person to gain control over another person, 
exchanges of small or token gifts permit a recipient to demonstrate trustworthiness in the 
short run ([Blehr, 1974] taken from Sherry, 1983). Many gift exchanges that are meant to 
maintain social ties or bonds occur within a context of ritualized occasions, such as at birthdays 
or during Christmas. These ritualized occasions often serve as maintenance rites (Cheal, 
1988), keeping the established relationships going (cf. Bourdieu 1977, 1986). A sequence 
of reciprocal gift exchanges establishes a transactional relationship between individuals 
(Sherry, 1983). Relations are, in other words, re‑affirmed by regular gift exchange.
 Social capital inheres in the ties between individuals and thus takes both parties to 
be drawn on. A counter-gift cannot be legally enforced and is by its very nature part of the 
social realm.  Individuals can be (purposefully) included as well as excluded from a Social 
Capital Community. Understanding the emergence, maintenance and possible disappearance 
of social capital as arising from gift exchange, it becomes clear how and why boundaries 
are drawn between (groups of) social individuals, resulting in processes of inclusion and 
exclusion (Dolfsma & Dannreuther 2003).
 As Levi-Strauss (1996) puts it: “to give is to receive”. The literature on gifts, as 
well as empirical findings on gift exchange, show that those who give more are also the ones 
who receive more (Komter, 1996). Actors can try to shape their environment to become 
members of a group (inclusion) – giving them access to the benefits of social capital present 
in that particular group. Actors who are unable or unwilling to give, prove to be the poorest 
recipients (Komter, 1996) - both a cause and an effect for those individuals to have no 
social networks (Gouldner 1960). Komter (1996) has, consistent with the abovementioned, 
observed that “people seem to choose – probably mostly not consciously – those social 
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partners in their gift relationships who are attractive to them, because they can expect them 
to give in return at some time”. Homans (1950, p.182) points out that “the higher a man’s 
social rank, the larger will be the number of persons that originate interaction for him” (cf. 
Darr 2003). Bodemann (1988) point out that powerful people –being in a position where they 
can confer benefits to others – will receive more gifts than less powerful individuals, so that 
they might be more likely to reciprocate the focal agent. The (less-extended) social networks 
of less powerful or resource-poor individuals lead to less participation in gift exchange and 
diminishing opportunities to develop feelings of ‘faithfulness and gratitude’ (Simmel, 1996). 
Individuals may very well seek supportive relationships with network members who have 
different – not just more – resources (see, e.g., Lin and Dumin, 1986). Even though Mauss 
has stated that gifts should be accepted, there are ways a person may prevent from being 
offered one. Rejecting a gift publicly offered is an offense for both parties. Anticipating 
that a gift may not be accepted, signaling that a (particular kind of) gift will not be deemed 
appropriate, or that a particular giver if and when considering to offer a gift will not be 
admitted to a community prevents the gift from being offered in the first place and thus 
from having to reciprocate later. Such signaling prevents the establishment of a relation or 
inclusion into a Social Capital Community. Also: an exchange of gifts can start or go awry. 
As the gift signals the kind of person the giver is (or wants to be), the perception by the giver 
of the receiver, as well as the perception by the giver of the relationship as it exists or should 
develop, there is scope for misunderstandings to arise. Certainly because of the necessarily 
‘silent’ nature of the gift. As Sherry (1983) points out: “those to whom we give differ from 
those to whom we do not give“. 
 While trust can emerge and grow due to gift exchange, it can thus vanish as well: 
“Risk-taking and trusting behavior are thus really different sides of the same coin” (Deutsch 
1958, p.266; cf. Mayer et al. 1995). Trust may be betrayed (Elangovan and Shapiro 1998), 
but if it works, transaction costs can go down substantially, conferring economic benefits to 
the parties involved as well as social ones (Dore 1983). If the wrong gift is offered in the 
wrong way, a relationship will not start off and an existing relationship can seize to exist, 
destroying all the social capital that existed between parties in the process. Not only will the 
parties involved miss out on a potentially lucrative relation, they may also lose ‘face’ (Smart 
1993).
 Knowing the right people and moving in the right circles is a good start but does 
not mean that one can use the social capital present (Ingram & Robert 2000). Social capital, 
as the discussion of gifts suggests, does not float around in the group, but exists between 
concrete individuals and are tangible expressions of their social relations (Sherry, 1983). 
One person is not generally in a position to profit from the social capital present in the 
relation between a second and third person. Gifts can be a medium through which social 
boundaries are expressed, frequently invoked in ritual (e.g. Smart 1993; Schneider, 1981 
[from Sherry, 1983]; Dolfsma & Dannreuther 2003). Reciprocity in gift exchange should 
not be exclusively considered as affirming or reinforcing social networks (Komter 1996). 
Douglas and Isherwood (1979) succinctly observed that ‘reciprocity in itself is a principle 
of exclusion’. Inappropriate gifts, inappropriately given gifts, or inappropriate givers can 
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therefore lead to exclusion from or can prevent the inclusion into a Social Capital Community. 
Gifts or return‑gifts that are too much out of balance can equally harm the relation.
Using Social Capital
Gift exchange not only initiates and facilitates the exchange of resources it also affects the 
realm of social relations. Gift exchange, if and when performed using the appropriate rituals, 
establishes and maintains relationships between individuals. The social capital that inheres 
in these ties and relationships between actors can be appropriated for different purposes. 
Being connected is a resource in itself since people are able to make use of their connection 
to obtain other benefits. An important mechanism that underlies this aspect of social capital 
is reciprocity which was shown to be an important element of gift exchange. Reciprocity 
is seen to strengthen the rights of the provider to call upon the receiver and the obligation 
of the latter to provide it at some future point (Blehr, 1974; Uehara, 1990). Or as Sherry 
(1983) formulates it “to avoid feeling inferior and to safeguard reputation, the recipient must 
reciprocate. Failure to reciprocate appropriately can result in an asymmetrical relationship”. 
The need to reciprocate may be seen as an outstanding obligation by the receiver to the 
giver, that are created between gift exchanging individuals, which according to Coleman 
(1990) can be considered as credit slips which can be put to use when the actor requires 
its use. These ‘credit slips’ or obligations then facilitate the mobilization of concomitant 
benefits and resources and appropriation of existing ties and relationships. In determining 
whether the resources could be called upon in practice, Coleman identifies two ‘crucial’ 
context specific elements namely the ‘actual extent of obligations held’ and ‘the level of 
trustworthiness of the social environment’.
 Burt (1992), however, concludes that trust is an essential characteristic of 
obligations since we never know a debt is recognized until the trusted person reciprocates. 
At some point, somehow, failure to reciprocate may well, however, entail excommunication. 
Burt emphasizes that there is a limit to the extent to which generalized reciprocity (Levi-
Strauss, 1996; 1969; Ekeh, 1974),25 can be expected to operate within a community. 
We are not denying that generalized reciprocity matters, but, as for instance studies of 
the development Open Source Software has indicated (Lakhami & Von Hippel 2003) 
generalized reciprocity is likely to be circumscribed and less powerful in eliciting the help 
of others than direct reciprocity (Bourdieu, 1977; Gouldner, 1960; Wilke & Lanzetta, 1970; 
Regan, 1971; Mauss, 1954).26 The likelihood for reciprocity to occur is, ceteris paribus other 
relevant characteristics of the relationships involved, expected to the higher in case of direct 
reciprocity as compared to generalized reciprocity. At the same time, the literature on gifts 
indicates that, from the perspective of the members of a community, there needs to be some 
25 In line with the discussion in the appendix, generalized reciprocity is a situation in which individual A 
presents a gift or favor to individual B but is reciprocated by a third individual C making reciprocity indirect 
or mediated.
26 In line with the discussion in the appendix direct reciprocity is a situation in which individual A gives to and 
is reciprocated by individual B; in contrast to generalized reciprocity individual B is now personally indebted 
to individual A (Levi-Strauss, 1996; 1969; Ekeh, 1974).  
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balance in the relationship (Sahlins, 1972; Walster, et al., 1973; Adams, 1965; Blau, 1968; 
Homans, 1974). New members have not contributed to the community to the same extent as 
established members have and as a result their credit with and reputation thereof is limited. 
A person whose position in a community is not established yet will receive gifts, largely due 
to the existence of generalized reciprocity in that community, but not to the same extent and 
of the same kind that more established members do.
As a counter-gift cannot be (legally) demanded, it may then matter crucially how relations 
in a Social Capital Community are drawn on to elicit a particular counter-gift if and when 
needed.
3.4 Discussion: no black box, no black hole
Emerson (1981) and Gouldner (1960) conceive exchange relationships as being predicated 
upon dependence of two parties on each other’s resources. In a situation of dispersed 
resources, exchange becomes a necessary condition for resource combination (Moran 
& Ghosal, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). Bargaining power of 
participants will vary according to alternatives sources of supply open to them (e.g. Heath, 
1976). The giving of gifts is a way of conferring material benefit on each other (Sherry, 
1983). Ostensibly, there is no expectation of equivalent and formal return ([Beals, 1970] 
from Sherry, 1983). According to Mauss, people of a community must give, accept or receive 
a gift, and they must reciprocate. Counter-gifts must not be immediate and of the same value 
as that would turn a gift exchange a market exchange, and might turn the gift into a bribe. 
Again ostensibly, the act of giving takes precedence over the gift itself; acknowledgement of 
the gift invariably involves reference to the value and benefit of the gift (Sherry, 1983). The 
value of a gift is not necessarily defined by the price in the marketplace but is likely just as 
much to be a reflection of factors other than the ones one associates with the market place 
such as scarcity, monetary price and alternative sources of supply (Belk & Coon, 1993).27 
 Gift exchange can lead to lower transaction costs since it allows individuals to trade 
with one another without relying solely on formal mechanisms such as legal contracts and 
litigation. In the process of exchanging gifts, both parties get to know each other and the 
other’s perceptions and frame of reference. It is believed by most exchange theorists that 
actors will engage in gift exchange if both parties believe that exchange provides them with 
more utility (satisfaction) than any other option currently open to them (Uehara, 1990). Offer 
(1997) and Ferrary (2003) point out that under certain circumstances reciprocal exchange, 
without the presence of a contract or financial compensation is preferred. Firstly, not all 
goods exchanged are merchandisable in the sense that their circulation cannot be transmitted 
via the market with a commercial contract and a monetary counter payment (for example 
certain types of information). Secondly, reciprocal exchange has been preferred when trade 
involves a personal interaction, and when goods or services are unique, expensive or have 
27 Appendix I presents a more formalized discussion on this, based on Boulding (1981).
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many dimensions of quality. 
 The notion of gift exchange opens up the black box of social capital. Discussing 
social capital as the result of gift exchange, allows one to understand how social capital is 
created, maintained and used. This, in turn, makes clear what can and what cannot be usefully 
attributed to social capital and that, hence, not all good (or bad) can be ascribed to it, almost 
at will, thus turning the concept into a black hole. The phenomena of gift exchange shows 
that the social and the economic sphere should not be conceived of as separate spheres – 
spheres overlap and are interrelated, and motives for gift exchange are both instrumental and 
(much) less self-interested (Dolfsma, Finch & McMaster 2005). Through gift exchange one 
may initiate and maintain relationships, as (mutual) obligations are created in its process. As 
a corollary of the cycle of giving and reciprocating, trust emerges and cooperation between 
the (exchange) parties involved is more likely to take root (Sahlins, 1972; Mauss, 1954; 
Gouldner, 1960; Uehara, 1990). As such, these benefits ascribed to social capital can now be 
properly understood.  
 Gift exchange creates and maintains social capital as a gift requires the receiver 
to give in return. Relationships between individuals are formed and sustained through the 
perpetual cycle of giving and receiving (Ruth et al., 1999). Frequent gift or favor exchanges 
lead to positive emotions and reduces uncertainty, generating cohesion and commitment 
(Lawler et al., 2000). Repeated social interactions – only possible if the cycle is not obviously 
broken – makes it possible for trust to develop (Landry et al., 2002; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998; 
Adler, 2001; Williamson, 1993). The indebtedness of others to the focal actor allows him to 
call in favors from those who are indebted to him. However, the exact nature of the counter 
gift, nor the moment at which it occurs, can be fully determined by the focal agent. No 
formal, enforceable agreement is involved; if there would be such an enforceable agreement, 
one would have to speak of a market transaction with a different dynamic. Building a new 
Social Capital Community, or extending an existing one, requires protracted investments in 
the form of gift exchange between individuals. Gift exchange only occurs when both parties 
are willing and able to give, receive and reciprocate resources in a broad sense of the term, 
however. If gifts are not returned, if inappropriate gifts are given in an inappropriate manner, 
or if too much or not enough is given, the relationship created and sustained by gift exchange 
can break down and people can be excluded from a Social Capital Community. Thus, in 
time, social capital is created and sustained by gift exchange, but at the same time, once 
created, social capital facilitates exchange of both gifts and market commodities particularly 
in uncertain circumstances (Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998). 
3.5 Some Implications for Empirical Research
Even though the thrust of the argument in this paper, drawing largely on the anthropological 
literature on gift exchange, has been that one needs to understand the importance of the 
frame of reference people in a Social Capital Community entertain, this does not mean 
that the anthropologists’ tool-kit is the only tool-kit for doing empirical research. Certainly, 
ethnographic research of the kind that Marcel Mauss, Claude Levi-Strauss, Mary Douglass 
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and many others have undertaken to provide ‘thick descriptions’ (Geertz 1973) is of great 
use, but other methods of research are as well. Flynn (2003) has shown how the extent to 
which people subjectively feel they ‘owe’ others can explain their (gifting) behavior in a 
community. Surveys can thus be used too. A third method that will provide useful insights, 
perhaps of a theoretical nature in particular, is that of the controlled experiment (Burgess 
& Nielsen, 1974; Greenberg & Frisch, 1972; Pruitt, 1968; Lawler & Yoon, 1998). Each of 
these methods will illuminate different but related aspects of the process of gift exchange 
and emergence or decay of social capital, thus opening its black box and revealing why it is 
not a black hole.
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Appendix A
It is instructive to consider Boulding’s (1981) formalization of the exchange of gifts (grants, 
as he calls them). He considers two individuals (A and B) exchanging two different goods (x 
and y, respectively). These x’s and y’s may be commodities, money, but may also represent 
“communications, information, threats, promises, affirmations, persuasions, and so on” 
(Boulding 1981, p.19). A sends out something, x, which he perceives as sending xa, to B; 
B, similarly, may send something, y, which she perceives as sending yb to A. When xa 
and yb arrive at B respectively A, they may be (perceived of as) different from what was 
intended: xb and ya. When there is a simultaneous exchange of commodities, a ‘complete’ 
market exchange emerges. In such a ‘simple’ market exchange, it may be unproblematic 
to assume that xa = xb and yb = ya; only the solid arrows of Figure 1 need be considered. 
Such alignment of perceptions may not occur. Indeed, as Boulding (1981, p.21) argues: “in 
many forms, even in commodity exchange, the difference between xa and xb and between 
yb and ya may be of great significance.” In many exchanges, then, flows of information and 
communication are involved: x’a x’b and y’b y’a – the dashed lines.
Figure 3‑1 ‘Simple’ Market Exchange (Boulding 1981)
The gift is then that exchange in which one of the commodity flows is zero, for instance 
yb = ya  = 0. This is presented in Figure 2. At some later occasion, A will expect B to 
reciprocate, but reciprocation may not occur and the value of that which is reciprocated may 
not ‘objectively’ be similar or the same. There is, thus, considerable uncertainty involved 
in gift exchange. 
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Figure 3‑2 Gift Exchange (Boulding, 1981)
To the extent that gift exchange is instrumental, and thus motivated by self-interest, we may 
assume that some sense of a terms of trade (T) between A and B will play a role. If v is the 
quantity of x exchanged, and u the quantity of y, then the terms of trade for A in case of a 
gift from A to B will be Ta:
  Ta =             ( y’a u’a )       
     (Equation A‑1)   
       ( xa va ) + ( x’b v’b )
The terms of trade for B can be determined by analogy.28 One would then expect, pace 
Boulding and others who have emphasized the instrumental nature of gift exchange as 
mentioned in the main body of the paper, that both A and B will only engage in gift exchange 
iff:  Ta, Tb ≥ 1. Part of the exchange, incorporated in y’a y’b is the promise or obligation of a 
counter-gift. The original gift will be given in the expectation of a counter-gift to come, and 
B will communicate to A that one it to be expected. Gift exchange will go awry if and when 
either the perception by B of good x given by A to B (xb) or the understanding by A of the 
signals from B (y’b) are misguided. In a knowledge economy, information-communication 
can in fact be what is expected as a counter-gift; in the present framework, consistent with 
Bouling’s argument, this would be yb ya and not y’a y’b. Assuming continued interaction, 
at some later moment in time, another exchange similar to that of Figure A-2 will occur, in 
opposite direction.
28 The discussion presupposes cardinal utility or an objective determination of value, but, according to Boulding 
(1962), one can reformulate in terms of ordinal utility or (inter-) subjective value. 
68
56
Chapter 4 
Open Innovation:  
Knowledge, Networks and Gift Exchange 29,30
4.1 Introduction 
Increasingly economies are seen as knowledge economies; intangible assets such as 
knowledge and information have become increasingly important for economic dynamics. 
Innovation still remains an elusive concept however. While some 30 years ago the innovation 
process was thought to consist of a number of linear, sequential stages, more recently it is 
thought to be an interactive process where knowledge is exchanged in a context of more 
or less stable relations (Autio et al. 2004; Landry et al. 2002). Chesbrough (2003a) has 
made a strong argument that firms should conceive of their innovation processes as engaging 
beyond the boundaries of the division or even the firm. This paper explores the conceptual 
implications of this observation for conceiving how persons in an organization will share 
knowledge both within as well as across firm boundaries, and thus complements the more 
strategic issues in this discussion about ‘open innovation’ (cf. Chesbrough 2003a, 2003b; 
Henkel 2006). 
 The burgeoning literature on open innovation has so far not looked into the 
intricacies of individuals sharing knowledge. A shifting ‘locus of innovation’ (von Hippel 
2003b, p.39) will not leave the interactions between persons, as members of departments or 
of firms, unaffected: how can the interactions they have within and across firm boundaries 
be understood? Social network analysis (SNA) offers insights into knowledge transfer as 
it explores network structure and network position (Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966; 
Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; Galunic & Moran, 2000; Hansen, 1999; Landry et al., 2002; 
Nahaphiet & Ghosal, 1998; Allen & Cohen, 1969; Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1978; Tushman & 
Scalan, 1981; Burt, 1992, 2004). 
 Despite these contributions several unanswered questions remain. Especially the 
micro processes of socially sharing knowledge need further exploration (Tsai, 2000; Kim 
& Mauborgne, 1998; Darr, Argote & Epple, 1995; and particularly Obstfeld, 2005), and 
particularly in the domain of open innovation (von Hippel 1987; Henkel 2006; Lakhani & von 
Hippel). The almost exclusive focus on structural aspects of relations between individuals, 
to the neglect of substantive matters related to the relations individuals maintain, needs to be 
addressed if OI is to be understood. The “action problem” Obstfeld  (2005) identified must 
be addressed: why, when and how will people in a network actually act, share knowledge, 
using the network structure that is there. 
 We will discuss the extraordinary characteristics of knowledge in this context. 
29 We would like to thank Ferdinand Jaspers, Albert Jolink, participants in a seminar at RSM Erasmus 
University, and two referees for this journal for comments. Disclaimer.
30 Rene van der Eijk & Wilfred Dolfsma
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Social network literature can and does explain knowledge transfer between individuals to 
a considerable degree, as we show. We offer a solution to the action problem faced by this 
literature by offering the concept of gift exchange. A means of creating and maintaining 
social ties, gift explains why individuals engage in exchange, how relations are sustained 
and will be used when knowledge transfer is explored.
4.2 Knowledge creation and knowledge characteristics
The idea that the innovation development process can be understood as a process that to 
a large extend is fueled by social relationships is closely related to Schumpeter’s (1934) 
idea that innovations are new combinations of existing knowledge and incremental learning. 
Extending Schumpeter’s view on innovation, Burt (2004) has shown that being in a position 
where one receives and transfers knowledge will also allow you to actually be (more) creative 
yourself. Cooperation involving a number of actors who each are dependent on others is 
entailed. This is not uncommon within organizations, and is in part what organizations 
are there for (Lopes & Castro Caldas 2008). The exchange of knowledge is different for 
a number of reasons that we will elaborate upon below (cf. von Krogh 1998). Knowledge 
exchange may be less obvious then the exchange of more tangible resources (Szulanski 
1996). We focus on knowledge transfer between persons that is not mandated by formal 
instruction (hierarchy) nor contractually obliged (market). When referring to knowledge and 
knowledge transfer, we refer to both knowledge newly developed for the relevant context, or 
existing knowledge that can be the basis for new goods or subsequent new insights.
We identify four characteristics of knowledge which affect the way in which it is transfered, 
and especially in the context of OI. 
Knowledge as a  public good. Knowledge is a (quasi) public goods, in that it is non‑
exclusive: consumption or use by non-payers cannot be excluded. Knowledge is also non-
rivalrous: they are not consumed by their use (Alder, 2001; Arrow, 1984). “Information 
[thus] is costly to produce but cheap to reproduce” (Shapiro et al. 1999, p21). As imitation 
or communication of intellectual objects is easy and cheap, there is a tendency for these 
goods to be under-produced (Nelson, 1959; Romer, 2002). Information and knowledge are 
faced with an information paradox (Arrow, 1971; Adler 2001). Prior to the acquisition of 
information the value to the buyer cannot be established. If the potential buyer is allowed 
to inspect the good so as to determine its value to her, there no longer is a need for her to 
actually buy it as the product cannot be repossessed after the inspection. Providing a sample 
of the good may mitigate the paradox, but only if the provider can be trusted to indicate 
exactly how representative the sample will be of the complete product. There will be a 
tendency for the provider to adversely select what to share with the buyer.
Knowledge as a cumulative good. The process of knowledge generation and the 
resulting technological advance for the most part is a cumulative process, where scientists 
draw on the work done (by others) in the past, and is generally based on the efforts of 
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many inventors and developers (Scotschmer 1991; Nelson 1959; Mokyr 2002). Knowledge 
generation requires that individuals have related knowledge; acquiring new knowledge 
involves tacit dimensions and requires coding and decoding (Polanyi 1966; Berger & 
Luckman 1967; Dolfsma 2008). This process involves the integration of this new knowledge 
into the existing larger framework of knowledge of the individual in which meaning is given 
to this new piece of information (Polanyi, 1966; Dolfsma, 2008). This means that actors find 
it easier to adopt and interpret knowledge that is “related” to their knowledge base (Markides 
& Williamson, 1994; Hansen, 2002). Accumulated stocks of knowledge are essential to the 
innovation development process first as a resource to directly develop innovations, and, 
secondly as a basis for absorbing new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Markides & 
Williamson, 1994; Obstfeld, 2005; Hansen, 2002; Powell et al., 1996). The literature on 
technological paradigms has argued that what holds for individuals also applies to groups of 
individuals, for instance involved in the development of a technological field (Dosi 1982; De 
Poel et al. 2002; Mokyr 2002). Knowledge then, in the words of Isaac Newton, is developed 
while standing on the shoulders of giants (Merton 1965; Scotchmer 1991; Dolfsma, 2008). 
Uncertainty. Obtaining a piece of existing or new knowledge is fraught with 
uncertainty, even when development of new technological knowledge is path dependent. 
Uncertainty of a technological nature is well documented, but uncertainty of a strategic 
nature is involved as well. Knowledge easily spills over unintentionally, and is in general 
a commodity the use and development of which is affected by opportunistic behavior of 
other parties, increasing associated transactions costs (Jones et al., 1997). As characteristics 
and value of the knowledge yet to be developed is impossible to determine beforehand, 
contracting for the complete set of future scenarios that may develop cannot be undertaken 
(Inkpen, 1996; Starpoli, 1998). Contracts drafted, monitoring, and litigation between agents 
offers even less solace in the case of knowledge than in general (Field, 2003; Hodgson 
2005). 
Knowledge communities. New knowledge is created in part as a result of the 
‘communities of practice’, interactions between individuals who may or may not be members 
of the same organization (Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Nonaka, 
1994). Communities of practice, groups of actors ranging from a few individuals to several 
hundred members, interact on a regular basis to solve problems (Knight, 1967). Members 
build relationships of trust due to their affiliation and the engagement in common practices, 
they share similar interests and/or expertise (Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Wenger, 1998; Brown 
& Duguid, 1991; 2001). Communities of practice are thus repositories of social capital, 
facilitating exchange; they enable quick identification of and connection with individuals 
who have relevant knowledge. They are thus “significant repositories for the development, 
maintenance, and reproduction of knowledge” (Brown & Duguid, 2001; cf. Lesser 2000), 
allowing individual members to solve problems and transfer best practices (Wenger 1998). 
Although co-location is considered important for knowledge spillovers to occur (Decarolis 
& Deeds, 1999; Dar, Argote & Epple, 1995), communities of practices can also span 
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geographical distances (Agrawal et al., 2003; Brown & Duguid, 2001). Communities of 
practice tend to be associated with informal contacts between individuals  (Dar, Argote & 
Epple, 1995; Furukawa & Goto, 2006; Park, 2002). 
The exchange of knowledge between people is by no means an easy or self-evident process 
(Hansen 1999; Szulanski 1996, Winter & Szulanski 2001). For these reasons a number of 
scholars have, in the past, suggested that a mode of exchange and coordination different 
from that of market or hierarchy may be better suited for exchange of knowledge (Bradach 
& Eccles 1989; Dore 1983; Macaulay 1963; Ouchi, 1980; Powell 1991; Dolfsma & van der 
Eijk 2008). What such a mode of exchange would look like and how it would function was 
largely left unclear.
4.3 Social Network Literature
A networks is a set of relations linking actors (people or organizations), objects or events 
(Knoke & Kuklinski 1982; Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Social network theory 
assumes a structuralist position: actors are influenced by the social context in which they are 
embedded. The position of actors in a network as well as type and number of ties influence 
the actors’ actions.
 Social network literature holds that while knowledge may reside in individuals, it 
is through networks that knowledge is exchanged and can be both put to use and developed 
further (Allen, 1977; Tushman 1978; Tushman & Scanlan 1981; Rogers, 1995; Coleman, 
Katz and Menzel 1966). Network configurations and positions in the social network 
facilitate dissemination of information, and thus innovation. In line with what the literature 
on communities-of-practice suggests, social network theory indicates that, for instance, the 
shape of the network (its density, redundancy, clutsering, size) (Allen & Cohen 1969; Katz 
& Tushman 1981; Tsai 2001) or the position of individuals (centrality, tie strength) (Hansen, 
1999; Uzzi, 1997; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Granovetter, 1973; 1982) represent an 
important resource for knowledge creation. Others investigated the networks characterized 
as either high or low levels of redundancy. If redundancy is low, there may be many more 
weak ties that constitute the network, but there may also be loosely related subgroups in the 
network. Subgroups may be connected by structural holes that can exert great influence on 
the exchange (e.g. Burt, 1992; 2004). “Closed” or cohesive networks where redundancy 
is high cannot easily be controlled and are less likely to provide access to novel ideas, 
information and knowledge as the inflow of new ideas into a closed network is more limited 
than in a non-redundant network (Granovetter 1973). Such a network structure, usually 
marked by frequent communication and strong ties, does however, offer actors the benefits 
of cooperative, coordinated action (Granovetter 1985; Obstfeld 2005) and the ability and 
willingness to share complex knowledge as a shared frame of reference and trust may 
develop (Coleman 1988; Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Walker et 
al. 1997). Transfer of tacit knowledge requires such close, personal interaction of individuals 
(Kogut & Zander 1992; Hansen 1999; Nonaka 1994; Polanyi 1966). 
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 A network structure provides possibilities for actors to exchange with some actors 
and not with others (Skvoretz & Lovaglia 1995). Under-emphasizing the role of agency, 
social network literature suggests implicitly that the exchange of knowledge depends (only) 
on the ‘pipes and prisms’ of the network. Actors properly connected, it is assumed,  will not 
be excluded from knowledge; there will be no rivalry in its use. Knowledge as a public good 
may be under‑produced because a network is not properly configured. Indeed, SNA relies on 
the assumption that knowledge is a public good. 
 SNA does not discuss the content of what is transferred using the networks, and so 
may not seem to take a special position with regard to the cumulative nature of knowledge 
development. Relations between individuals are only the conduits through which knowledge 
and resources are exchanged (e.g. Podolny 2001; Tsai & Ghosal 1998; Owen-Smith & Powell 
2004), although SNA, for instance, has shown that certain types of knowledge are best 
transferred through specific kinds of relations (Granovetter 1973; Hansen 1999; Uzzi 1997; 
Aalbers et al. 2006; Cross et al. 2002; Allen & Cohen 1969). Given the different strengths 
and weaknesses of the different network structures it is not surprising that subsequent 
research has taken a contingency approach emphasizing that different network structures 
are beneficial in different circumstances (e.g. Rowley, Behrens & Krackhardt 2000; Ahuja, 
2000; Podolny, 2001). 
 Acknowledging a role for strategic uncertainty due to agents’ behavior is 
problematic, however, within the SNA framework. Opportunistic behavior on the part of 
actors in a network, as a result of which knowledge may not be freely shared, is inexplicable 
for SNA. What may be claimed is that there is a tendency for certain kinds of behavior 
to be present in networks of a certain kind. In closed, dense network, where all the nodes 
are mutually connected, the risk of opportunistic behavior is lower due to emergence of 
enforceable norms (Coleman, 1988; Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993) reputation effects 
(Kreps 1990; Ostrom and Ahn 2003; Coleman 1988; Sherry 1983; Ferrary 2003) and repeat-
interaction effects (Abreu, 1998, Fudenberg & Maskin, 1986; Kreps et al., 1982).
 If, therefore, certain knowledge is to be transferred structural conditions for 
doing so are known from SNA. The difficulties of the diffusion and further development of 
knowledge reach beyond the structural elements, however. While SNA theory has recognized 
the information and resource benefits of networks, it has not focused on motivational/
incentive issues (cf. Hansen 1999; Moran & Ghosal 1996; Van der Eijk et al. 2006). A 
more thorough understanding of the micro processes of socially sharing knowledge is 
needed (Tsai, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Darr, Argote & Epple, 1995; Obstfeld, 2005). 
Why actors supply or share knowledge, or how relations can get started, be mobilized and 
coordinated, has received little attention. A fuller understanding of these may inform new 
forms of HRM policies constructively (cf. Laursen & Foss 2003). Obstfeld (2005) has, thus, 
claimed, rightfully, that SNA has an action problem. 
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4.4 The Action Problem    
Whenever there are individuals who can achieve some common goal through cooperation, 
but who each have other goals as well that are not aligned with the shared goal nor with 
each others’ additional goals, a potential problem of (collective) action exists. This action 
problem is the result of a potential conflict between the common interest and the interests 
of the individual (Olson 1965; Hardin 1968). To achieve a mutually beneficial form of 
cooperation partially overlapping goals need to be aligned and the actors’ selfish incentives, 
the extent of which can vary, need to be overcome. This is what Obstfeld (2005) has dubbed 
the action problem for social network theory. The action problem actually consists of two 
parts: one is the problem that one cannot be sure that a specific other one is related to will 
act in the expected manner when required. A second sense in which the action problem can 
be interpreted relates to the behavior of others in the network, either directly identifyable or 
further removed (see Figure 1; cf. Ekeh 1974). Since SNA however has focused exclusively 
on structural elements, it cannot assume what it in fact does assume: that the social capital 
that inheres in a network can be drawn on at will (cf. Coleman 1988, Van der Eijk et al 2006).
 Whenever achieving some goal involves the assistance of others, actors will still 
need to enlist the cooperation of other parties. In the context of innovations, for instance, 
relational ties and networks do play a crucial part in locating and accessing relevant 
knowledge. In actual fact actors find solutions for problems that theoretically are still 
puzzling. Coordinating intra- and even inter-organizational collaboration, despite possibly 
conflicting (organizational) goals and the threat of opportunistic behavior, and in the absence 
of coordination and/or regulation by external authority, does occur (Bouty 2000; Gulati & 
Singh, 1998; Ahuja, 2000). 
Figure 4‑1 A Classification of Gift Exchange /Reciprocity
I: Direct:   A     B 
II: Generalized (indirect): 
     B
   A
           C
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III: Generalized (community; “Pay it Forward”) 
                                                                 B
   A
      Y
As Huysman and de Wit (2004) point out “Knowledge sharing cannot be forced; people 
will only share knowledge if there is a personal reason to do so” due to the kind of good 
knowledge is (e.g. Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Wenger, 1998; Brown & Duguid, 1991; 2001). 
Why do individuals, in the absence of clearly defined, formal, enforceable obligations, feel 
compelled to (continue to) provide recipients with knowledge?   
4.5 Gift /Favor exchange 
For innovation it is clear that the flow of knowledge between agents within the same and in 
different organisations is required. The flow of knowledge even within a single organization 
is far from obvious (e.g. Ghosal & Barlett 1988; Kogut & Zander 1992; Hansen 1999; 
Szulanski 1996; Cross et al. 2001; Szulanski & Winter 2001). Knowledge may be present 
with actors in a network but not be transferred for a number of reasons, contrary to what 
SNA implicitly assumes. Actors may not want to exchange knowledge, or may not know 
about the need that others have for knowledge. 
 We have argued earlier (Van der Eijk et al. 2006; cf Flynn 2003, Dolfsma 2008b) 
that the literature discussing cooperation where direction in a hierarchical setting or through 
the market cannot be relied on is rather unsatisfactory. The notion of gift exchange provides 
an explanation of how actors are able to solicit the cooperation and exchange of knowledge 
from people within their network as well as from people beyond it. There have been earlier 
suggestions to invoke this literature (Zeitlyn 2003), but never has there been an extensive 
argument for it. 
 Gift exchange theory offers insight into a wide variety of contexts (e.g., Blau 
1964, Heath 1976; Homans 1974; Akerlof 1982). Gift exchange is usually but erroneously 
associated with the giving and receiving of  explicit gifts on occasions such as birthdays, 
anniversaries, holidays and other special personal moments but is more encompassing. 
However significant in economic terms (Economist 2006), gift exchange is not limited to 
gifts in that sense. A mixture of motives is involved in gift exchange, including altruism and 
self-interest (Malinowski 1996; Mauss 1954; Blau 1964; Ekeh 1974). Smart (1993) points 
out that the exchange partners need not be unaware of the instrumental goals involved. Both 
the possibly instrumental goals involved as well as the perceived value of a gift must be 
ignored (cf. Bourdieu 1993, Beltramini 1996). If actors fall short of these expectations, the 
particular dyadic exchange relationship may be terminated and excommunication from the 
wider social relational network may follow (Van der Eijk et al. 2006). As Williamson (1975: 
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p.107) states: “Individual aggressiveness is curbed by the prospect of ostracism among 
peers, in both trade and social circumstances”.
 Mauss (1954) has indicated that people are required to (1) give, (2) receive, and (3) 
reciprocate (cf. Dore 1983; Gouldner, 1960; Levi-Strauss, 1996; Malinowski, 1996; Sahlins, 
1996; Schwartz, 1996; Simmel, 1996). Most resources can be gifts, as gifts may be defined 
as those goods, material or immaterial, including knowledge, feedback and tips, given to an 
alter in the expectation that it will be accepted and reciprocated. Gift exchange needs to be 
out-of-balance at any moment in time so that it is clear that a relation will continue in the 
future. 
 Because gift exchange is unbalanced when viewed at one point in time, a 
longitudinal perspective reveals the nature of gift giving: a gift is not reciprocated by an 
immediate return or compensation (Mauss 1954; Bourdieu 1977; Ferrary 2003.; Deckop et 
al. 2003). A deferred return obligates one individual to another, creating a social debt. Since 
reciprocity is open to discretion as to the value and form of the counter gift the nature of the 
compensation is not specified before hand (Bourdieu 1977; Gouldner 1960; Mauss 1954; 
Deckop et al. 2003). Gift exchange is carried out without a legal contract (Ferrary 2003), 
but even so it creates an informal non strict obligation to reciprocate (Gouldner 1960; Levi-
Strauss 1996; Malinowski 1996; Mauss 1954; Sahlins 1996; Schwartz 1996; Simmel 1996). 
Gift giving thus confers benefits of an economic and a social nature simultaneously (Belk 
1979; Larsen & Watson 2001). Gift exchange is, thus, not only an economic transaction 
providing economic (material) benefit, it is also a good in itself, a ‘process benefit’, in the 
sense of sustaining personal relationships (Avner 1997). Personal relations between giver 
and receiver are an important dimension of many transactions and have a value independent 
of their instrumental functions in regulating transactions (Rose-Ackerman 1998). The notion 
of gift exchange thus explains how relations are established, maintained, or may discontinue 
(Larsen & Watson 2001; Belk 1979; Gouldner, 1960; Cheal 1988; Mauss, 1954; Ruth et al., 
1999; Sherry, 1983; McGrath et al., 1996).
 As a corollary of the cycle of giving and reciprocating of a resource unspecified, 
diffuse, future obligations, as well as trust and gratitude are generated between the 
(exchange) parties involved (Sahlins 1996; Mauss 1954; Gouldner 1960; Euhara 1990; 
Blau 1964; Belk and Coon 1993).  Gift exchange is thus associated with the generation 
of positive emotions and uncertainty reduction which generates cohesion and commitment 
(Lawler et al. 2000; Homans 1958; Ingram & Robert, 2000). Frequent gift or favor exchange 
is associated with the creation of trust facilitating further cooperation (Coleman, 1988; 
Fukuyama, 1995; Putnam, 1993; Nooteboom, 2002). Gifts exchange establishes a common 
frame of reference, lowering associated risk and uncertainty between parties, and establishes 
partners’ trustworthiness (McAllister, 1995; Shapiro, 1987; Smith Ring and van de Ven, 
1992; van der Eijk et al. 2006). This process allows partners to infer both competence and 
intentional trust in alter (Nooteboom, 2002). What may have started out as a purely goal 
oriented interaction may become embedded overtime in social relations (Granovetter 1985), 
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in part because individuals strive to derive a sense of pleasure or intrinsic satisfaction from 
their interactions (Eccles 1981). 
 “Gifts can be described as an investment in the relationship between donor and 
recipient. The greater the value of the gift, the more substantial the investment” (Larsen & 
Watson; 2001). These investments are not only necessary since connections are not givens 
but require work (Bourdieu 1977, 1986), but also expedient since they can be used to (try 
to) create social obligations (Burt 1992; Coleman, 1988, 1994; Granovetter, 1985; Mauss, 
1954; Darr 2003; Bourdieu 1977; Walton & Mckersie 1969; Kotter 1985; Yukl & Falbe 
1991). By the same token, if others are indebted to the focal actor the focal actor can use this 
as a basis for future influence and an entitlement to future support (Coleman 1988, 1994; 
Mauss 1954). Given that these future obligations are social, non-contractual and legally 
unenforceable, actors cannot draw on them at will. Failing to reciprocate will effectively 
prevent future profitable exchanges but also mean excommunication from the relevant group 
(Ferrary 2003; Van der Eijk et al. 2006; Barney & Hansen 1994 from Rose-Ackerman 1998; 
Williamson 1975). The literature on gift exchange is rightly placed in the broader context of 
social exchange theory (Ekeh 1974), and so the explanation we offer to explain knowledge 
transfer in an open innovation context is, we believe complementary to explanations offered 
by others (von Hippel 1987, Lakhani & von Hippel 2003).
 Exchanges of gifts, since they not only transfer utility but are also socially 
meaningful interactions embedded in relations of mutual dependence and obligation, then 
contribute to the willingness to transfer knowledge (Cheal 1986; Camarer 1988). This is 
evident from the discussion of how corporate scientists share knowledge.
4.6 Gifts, Knowledge, and Corporate Scientists 
Considering the uncertainty, asymmetry and social dimensions related to knowledge, market 
contracts or direction in a hierarchy is not likely to work. In the context of the development of 
open source software, this already is readily acknowledged (Henkel 2006; von Hippel 1987; 
Lakhani & von Hippel 2003). In this section we argue that the mechanism we have elaborated 
play a role in other sectors and environments as well.31 Gift exchange, not necessarily fully 
voluntary, is driven by obligations of a social and informal nature (Dolfsma & Van der 
Eijk 2008). Gift exchange, involving altruistic as well as more self-interested motives, 
as explained above, provides the parties involved with a mechanism for the exchange of 
resources and an incentive to so. Social obligations stemming from gift exchange and the 
network position taken can be employed to try to elicit future support (Coleman, 1988) for 
instance to acquire the knowledge needed for (future) projects (cf. Avner 1997; Blau 1964; 
Bourdieu 1977, 1986; Humphrey & Hugh-Jones 1992; Darr 2003). 
Reciprocal gift exchange establishes a transactional relationship between individuals (Sherry, 
1983) and allows actors to forge and personalize relationships and to develop guarantees 
of personal bonding (Zucker 1986; Shapiro 1987). As these relationships develop and the 
31 Compare the account in The Economist (2004): “An open-source shot in the arm?” (June 12), pp.15-17.
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exchange interactions progress actors learn to cooperate with these particular others (Powell 
et al., 1996, Starpoli, 1998; Galuti, 1995) and establish a common frame of reference 
allowing actors to incorporate new (tacit) knowledge (Hansen, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 
Von Hippel, 1994). As actors thus bridge ‘cognitive distance’ (Nooteboom, 2002) “tacit or 
personal knowledge which is anchored on the commitment of and beliefs of its holder” 
(Nonaka, 1994) can be interpreted and acted upon. 
 In studies looking at what determines the success that some corporate scientists 
have and others lack some noteworthy findings emerge. Those who actively engage in the 
publication of papers, giving to the scientific community at large, are more successful than 
those who don’t. This is, obviously, partly due to the fact that this is a means for them to be 
up‑to‑speed with the most recent developments in their fields, keeping their own and their 
organization’s absorptive capacity high (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989). There is more to this, 
however. These scientists claim themselves that they also receive more from others, working 
elsewhere, formally and informally, in the form of access to scientists in other organizations 
and unpublished tacit knowledge (Furukawa & Goto, 2006; Hicks, 1995). Most of the 
knowledge at the frontier of advanced research may be tacit (Hicks 1995); such knowledge 
can be shared with researchers whom one has established a longer term relationship of trust 
and understanding with, a relationship of strong ties (Hansen 1999). This active behavior in 
publishing of some scientists in an organization boosts their effectiveness within their own 
organizations as well. The resulting flow of knowledge encourages innovation in which 
they themselves and their co‑workers are involved, thereby benefiting the organization as 
whole (Furukawa & Goto, 2006). Corporate scientists, creating goodwill and establishing 
obligations ‘by building a relationship of give and take with the scientific community’ (Hicks 
1995), can act as technological gatekeepers and serve as a bridge between external sources 
of knowledge and their co-workers. 
 The story of successful corporate scientists cooperating informally through gift 
exchange continues. Bouty (2000) has shown that they are involved in relations with 
scientists they know in other, sometimes competing, organizations helping each other out in 
ways that may counter explicit organizational regulations, and if taken advantage off could 
seriously hurt the organization. Still, for specific others, laboratory tests, feed back, hints 
and the like are exchanged. The gift element is clear: if a person is not known, no gifts are 
exchanged; if a person is not known well, gifts of low value such as commonly available 
knowledge is exchanged; if a person is known well and for a long time very valuable 
knowledge can be exchanged. In each of these cases, of course, no guarantee of a counter-
gift, of equal value, is available. Opportunism remains possible at all times, but would lead 
to excommunication and a loss of reputation. These relations between corporate scientists 
within and between firms is not an unknown observation (see Allen 1977; Kreiner & Schultz 
1993; Von Hippel 1987; or the communities-of-practice literature Wenger & Snyder 2000; 
Wenger 1998; Brown & Duguid 1991, 2001), but tends not to be conceptualized in terms of 
gift exchange.
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4.7 Limitations to Gift Exchange
While gift exchange can provide a stimulus for the flow of knowledge, its ability to 
coordinate and provide an incentive for knowledge exchange does have limitations. Firstly, 
gift exchange for the most part takes place between concrete individuals and may be hard to 
formulate formal policy for. Secondly, for gift exchange to personalize relations and develop 
guarantees of personal bonding is inevitably constrained by time. One is only able to initiate 
and maintain so many relationships in a given period of time (Lesser 2000). Thirdly, social 
obligations established through gift exchange cannot be enforced and so actors are most 
likely to coordinate knowledge exchange via gift exchange when other options are not 
sufficient, too inflexible, too time‑consuming or otherwise impractical (Ferrary, 2003; Smart 
1993). Fourthly, gift exchange effectiveness in part depends on the extend to which the 
incentive structure of an organization can be altered in such a way that honoring social 
debts and cooperation becomes an effective course of action for the individual. The 
effectiveness of social enforcement mechanisms can be impaired if the likelihood or benefit 
of continued cooperation is small (Kreps, 1990), the network structure is such that action 
cannot be monitored or communicated limiting the effectiveness of reputations (Hill, 1990; 
Lazaric & Lorenz, 1998; Coleman, 1988), or hostages are unavailability or incredibility 
(Williamson, 1985; Nooteboom, 2002). Finally, while organizations generally strive to 
maximize knowledge flows within organizational boundaries they are likely to endeavor 
to minimize knowledge flows across organizational boundaries. While spillover effects are 
pervasive (Feldman 1999; Audretsch & Feldman 1996; Jaffe et al. 1993; Marshall 1920; 
Krugman 1991; de Laat 1999; Owen-Smith & Powell 2004), they are not only associated 
with formal cooperative arrangements between firms but also with informal personalized 
exchange between knowledge workers (e.g. Allen, 1977; Kreiner & Schultz, 1993; Von 
Hippel, 1987; Agrawal et al., 2003). While, it is evident that companies need to preserve 
core competencies (cf. Henkel 2006), there is a danger that organizations attach to much 
weight to appropriability, while neglecting the dynamic of new knowledge creation and 
knowledge flows between firms and other social entities that they may also benefit from 
in the end (Chesborough 2003; Nooteboom 2002; von Hippel 1987; Saxenian 1994). As 
a result, too strict a policy of spill-over control might hamper the innovation development 
process since those who do not give, do not receive in return. Nonetheless, in gift exchange 
actors evaluate the value of knowledge exchanged, especially when crossing organizational 
boundaries, affecting the kind and scope of knowledge likely to be exchanged via gifts (von 
Hippel 1987; Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Bouty 2000). 
4.8 Conclusion
Firm innovativeness is largely dependent on people within (and beyond) the firm exchanging 
knowledge and information. Therefore, the contacts that people have play an important 
role for the firm. Social Network Analysis (SNA) allows an analysis of the structure of 
interactions within a firm: how do interactions affect behavior of actors within a firm and 
ultimately firm performance? Given the nature of knowledge and its development, discussed 
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in section 2 above, however, the issue of why actors would actually use their relations for 
these purposes and if they actually could do so remains a mystery for SNA. SNA has an 
‘action problem’ as it does not allow for agency.
 We suggest that the notion of gift exchange allows one to explain why persons 
exchange knowledge with each other even if they are not obliged to by contract or instruction. 
Gifts can be non-material to include knowledge and are exchanged for multiple reasons. Gift 
exchange creates mutual trust as well as informal obligations between persons, and allows 
one to understand how relations start, work and end. In this article we have argued how gift 
exchange offers a powerful and necessary complement to the insights  that Social Network 
Analysis offers. In addition, we have shown how researchers involved in gift exchange 
are more successful as researchers. Managers of firms may thus be consoled when they 
allow their team members to selectively exchange knowledge with others close to them 
even if that means that knowledge may spill over. In fact, and especially when the aim 
is to stimulate knowledge transfer within the firm, possibly across department boundaries, 
managers may be well advised to purposefully start the process of giving knowledge. Being 
in a central (powerful) position, they may expect to receive more than they have given, 
as the well-known Matthew effect in gift exchange behavior takes hold (Merton 1968). 
Most immediately, however, we offer participants a perspective for understanding the way in 
which informal, but also formal relations take shape and how they may or may not contribute 
to knowledge transfer. Thus we offer a perspective for the discussion on ‘open innovation’ 
that complements the more strategic discussions of the micro processes of socially sharing 
knowledge within and between organisations. 
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Chapter 5  
Research Design
5.1. Introduction
The preceding chapters have considered both the importance of knowledge transfer (cf. 
Moran & Ghosal, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998) as well as some of 
its difficulties (cf. Ghosal & Barlett 1988; Kogut & Zander 1992; Hansen 1999; Szulanski 
1996; Cross et al. 2001; Winter & Szulanski 2001), in some detail. Within this context, we 
demonstrated that as R&D scientists work on their research projects, they activate their 
network to acquire resources and information (Allen, 1977; von Hippel, 1987; Kreiner & 
Schultz 1993; Bouty 2000). These informal exchanges play an important if not essential role 
in initiating and maintaining the flow of knowledge. As a complement to previous research 
that demonstrated the importance of flow of knowledge, we focus on network structure 
and the underlying exchange mechanism facilitating the exchange of knowledge. Given the 
state of the field, the first objective is to acquire a deeper insight into the micro processes of 
knowledge transfer between R&D scientists utilizing a qualitative research methodology. 
At the same time, the present study aims to provide additional insights by embedding its 
finding further via empirical evidence based on a quantitative research methodology. In 
order to utilize and combine the strengths of both research approaches this study employs a 
multi-method research design. 
Although there are certainly differences between the two research approaches, both methods 
are essentially ways of collecting data about the world (King et al., 1994). And as such, 
the same underlying logic of inference guides both quantitative and qualitative research 
(e.g. King et al., 1994; Silverman, 1993). Given their value, albeit for different research 
purposes, researchers are not necessarily forced to choose between one or the other (Lee, 
1999). Following Lee (1999), Cassel and Symon (1994), Yin (2003) we try to achieve the 
best of both worlds by combining the two strands of research. Qualitative methods are 
then used to explore the knowledge transfer and exchange process between scientists and 
its contextual factors. The use of qualitative methods notwithstanding, survey data and 
the associated quantitative methodology represent the principal part of this study, the use 
of which allows us to investigate relationships between relevant exchange, network and 
performance variables. Thus, considering Cassel and Symon’s (1994) advice “to count 
the countable”, this research opts for a blending of qualitative and quantitative elements 
(e.g. Lee, 1999; Yin, 2003; Silverman, 1993). The dominant-less dominant design seems 
most appropriate since as Lee (1999) points out this design is the most practical blending-
model considering that: “The major advantage of the dominant-less dominant design is its 
utilization of the unique strengths of one research tradition while capitalizing on the selected 
attributes of the other”.
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Consistent with these matters, two research approaches were combined in the present 
study. First, an on‑site field study in an R&D lab of a Dutch multinational was undertaken, 
which resulted in a 4 month study during which data was gathered by conducting 37 in-
depth interviews. Apart from corroborating aspects which are traditionally highlighted in 
literature, we sought to gain a deeper understanding of knowledge exchange in an R&D 
context. Second, an electronic network questionnaire was developed and administered to 
232 researchers and project managers. In addition to the first research setting access to 
another R&D lab was negotiated, enabling us to survey two R&D labs in two large Dutch 
multinational. Respondents were asked to fill out a network survey questionnaire allowing us 
to explore the hypothesized patterns from a network perspective. Results from the electronic 
network questionnaire were used to corroborate finding from our case study. The manner in 
which these studies tie together and the paragraphs in which they are further explained is 
summarized in Table 5-1. 
Table 5‑1 Research Method and Unit of Analysis
Research Method Unit of analysis Research Setting
Qualitative 
   - Interviews
Scientist (individual) R&D Lab
Quantititative
   - Network Survey
Scientist (individual) R&D Lab
The next paragraph will present details on the research settings chosen for this study as well 
as provide an outline of the research methodologies, both qualitative and quantitative, used. 
We continue by reviewing research analysis and data. Finally, the last paragraph considers 
how these two empirical investigations relate to one another and addresses matters of 
validity and reliability. 
5.2. Research Setting 
This paragraph seeks to clarify this study’s empirical operationalization. Within every 
research, and nowhere more so than in the empirical phase, where the conceptual model is 
confronted with social reality, a multitude of choices have to be made regarding a study’s 
research design. Describing the methods and procedural decisions, needed to judge the 
initially posed research question(s) in light of (social) data (Segers, 1983), is important for it 
makes choices explicit which would otherwise remain implicit. Empirical operationalization, 
then, in essence focuses on the question how the empirical data needed in order to test 
the conceptual model will be gathered and measured (Segers, 1983). In the course of this 
paragraph we will review a number of subjects. In paragraph 5.2.1, the research setting 
providing the backdrop for data collection is introduced. Then investigating the data collection 
method, paragraphs 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.2.2 discus the choice for and operationalization of the 
qualitative method after which paragraphs 5.2.2.3 and 5.2.2.4 offers a similar approach for 
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the quantitative (survey) method.  
 5.2.1 Research Methodology
Data collection took place at two Dutch multinational with strong research and development 
capabilities within the food and nutrition sector. Access to the companies was negotiated via 
three senior corporate research and development (R&D) managers. These managers became 
the main sponsors of the study and arranged for the access into two of the companies’ 
research and development laboratories. 
Data was gathered in two companies32 active within the food and nutrition sector. The 
sector represents an important industry and R&D cluster within in the Netherlands. 
Dutch multinationals such as Unilever, Friesland Foods, DSM, Campina and Cosun have 
strong R&D interests within the sector and shape avenues for future research. The greater 
Wageningen area, also dubbed Food Valley, clusters a great many companies (or up to 
10.000 scientists) active within the food and nutrition R&D. Research is supported by a 
constellation of networks and private-public partnerships such as; Top Institute Pharma in 
Leiden, Wageningen Center for Food Science in Wageningen and the Center for Molecular 
Medicine in Eindhoven. Research in the food industry not only has a strong presence in 
the Dutch innovation system it also is closely linked with chemical, biotechnology and 
pharmaceutical R&D centers in the Netherlands (Leydesdorf & Dolfsma, 2008).    
 The first site for data collection was a international cooperative dairy company 
(Company X). The company, active throughout every stage of the dairy chain, is a mayor 
supplier of consumer products such as milk, yoghurts and desserts, cheese and butter 
products, ingredients for the foodstuff and pharmaceutical industries. In 2007, at the time 
of data collection, the company employed some 6300 employees and had annual sales of 
3.6 billion euros. The company consists of three fairly autonomous business groups that 
have operations in North America, Europe and Asia. The organizational structure is a typical 
multi-unit group in which each unit deals with distinct businesses and are responsible for 
product development, manufacturing and sales. In order to achieve growth in a highly 
competitive market the company emphasizes innovation33 as a major driver for growth. 
Aiming to further strengthen its innovation output, the company has concentrated its research 
and development activities in three innovation centers. The study was conducted in one of 
the company’s three innovation centers which focusses on the development of new, healthy 
and innovative consumer products. The research center fosters and maintains strong links 
with global external technology centers and universities. Following a recent centralization of 
R&D activities in a new innovation centre there was an interest in ascertaining the extent to 
which knowledge sharing took place between the innovation center’s different departments 
32 In fact, (subsidiaries of) the two companies apply and use a similar knowledge and technology base and have 
worked on joint R&D projects. 
33 The company’s newly developed products consistently come out as national innovation champions as judged 
by consumers.
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and R&D satellites. 
 The data at the second site was collected at a Research and Development lab of 
a Dutch based multinational chemical company (Company Y) with offices and production 
facilities in 49 countries around the world. The company, which has annual sales of over 
€8 billion, operates across a broad spectrum of business activities including nutritional and 
pharmaceutical ingredients, performance materials and industrial chemicals. The company 
is structured into a number of clusters which are further subdivided into fairly autonomous 
operating business groups responsible for product development, manufacturing and sales. 
These divisions are organized according to the different product-market segments in which 
the company offers its products. In the recent past, the company shifted away from offering 
bulk products towards offering specialty and higher value added products. This shift resulted 
in an even stronger focus on technology and innovation making it an integral part of the 
companies’ strategy. The company commits a substantial percentage of its resources to that 
end and undertakes numerous initiatives to stimulate and improve overall innovativeness. 
Following a local effort to further enhance innovation performance via internal cooperation 
and knowledge sharing, there was an interest in finding ways to improve local work practices 
within as well as between the different departments. 
5.2.2 Research Method 
This study combines qualitative and quantitative34 research methods as a means to explore 
the object of study. Both methods are associated with specific strengths, while building on 
the same logic of inference, which combined can potentially provide a richer and more 
complete understanding of reality (Lee, 1999; Cassel and Symon, 1994; Yin, 2003). The two 
methods can be combined in various ways (Lee, 1999). Qualitative research is oftentimes 
used to lay the ground work35 for fruitful quantification (and visa versa) (Kuhn, 1961), and 
in that sense this study is no different leading us to apply the dominant-less dominant design 
(ibid). Specifics with regards to the two methods and the data collection method this study 
utilized are provided in the next sections. 
5.2.2.1 Qualitative research approach 
With the research object of this study being a complex social phenomenon, the qualitative 
methodology makes for an appropriate and useful method. The methodology, used across 
various disciplines and subject matters (Denzin, et al., 2005), is considered to be especially 
appropriate when it comes to interpreting and understanding social phenomena and 
processes (see also King et al., 1994; Yin, 2003; Silverman, 1993). In line with our aim 
to explore human behavior the method tries to investigate how and why questions, more 
so than what, where and when questions (ibid). Above all qualitative research allows 
34 Quantitative research is the systematic scientific investigation of quantitative properties and phenomena and 
their relationships (Wikipedia, 2008).
35 Kuhn (1961, p. 162) concluded “large amounts of qualitative work have usually been prerequisite to fruitful 
quantification in the physical sciences”.
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researchers to examine a phenomenon in-debt in its real life context (Yin, 2003). As a result 
it enables researchers to infer causal relations in their real setting (Miles and Huberman, 
1994; Numagami, 1998; Yin, 2003), allowing for the exploration of contemporary issues 
and of developing and expanding theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, smaller more focused 
samples are generally preferred over large random samples on which quantitative research 
relies. Data collection was conducted using multiple sources including interviews, electronic 
survey and archival data following the notion that the different sources of evidence are 
highly complementary. The relatively time intensive nature of this approach was justified by 
its contribution to overall study quality by allowing for triangulation of the data (Yin, 2003). 
In reporting our findings, we have sought to combine our quantitative findings with the 
richness of case base research using “thick descriptions” (Geertz, 1973). Of which the latter 
tries to provide insight in the context as well, such that the behavior becomes meaningful to 
an outsider. Thus, the more traditional quantitative measures from structural network theory 
will be complemented, if so required, with descriptive insights from respondents in order to 
provide a ‘richer’ and more ‘complete’ understanding. 
5.2.2.2 Qualitative data collection
Data was obtained by a total of 38 face-to-face semi-structured pro forma interviewsover 
a period of 4 months from 2006 to 2007, as listed36 in Table 5-2. The interviews, of which 
a small number were conducted in English and the remaining in Dutch, were designed to 
cover managers as well as researchers. It was agreed with the senior R&D manager and 
main sponsor of the study that all higher level research and management staff would be 
interviewed. Subsequently, interviews were conducted with 3 managers and 34 associate en 
senior researchers. 
The interviews were conducted to gain an in-debt understanding of knowledge and resource 
exchange that took place between researchers. Interviews were carried out using the same 
outline for every interview. First, by way of introduction the research topic was introduced 
and respondents were asked to describe their jobs, internal and external networks and the role 
of knowledge exchange in their specific job. Second, respondents were asked to describe past 
experiences with resource/knowledge exchanges as well as a number of specific questions 
related to this issue. In keeping with the characteristics of the different data gathering 
methods; the interviews were designed to balance the advantages and drawbacks of the 
methods employed. Interviews were employed because of their effectiveness in uncovering 
and exploring complex (social) issues (Harrison, 1994; Segers, 1983; Saunders et al., 2000). 
The interviews were semi-structured; in order to provide for focus, reliability and increased 
validity (Yin, 2003) given the notion that questions can be repeated across interviewees, 
while at the same time allowing for flexibility to probe deeper and ascertain interpretation 
and motivations of the interviewee. 
36 In addition, interviews, not listed in table 5-2, were conducted at Company Y. 
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Given that interviewing by its very nature is time consuming and our research design intended 
to investigate a sizable sample, the interview methodology needed to be complemented with 
a different methodology. The use of a quantitative research methodology allowed us to 
collect data on a large scale as well as probe for quantifiable relationships between variables. 
Table 5‑2 Company X: Interviewee Description
Person Education Years in Current Firm Job Grade Age Sex 
1 Msc.  3 Scientist 34 M
2 Ph.D. 5 Supervisor 44 M
3 Msc.  3 Supervisor 33 M
4 Msc.  3 Supervisor 36 M
5 Msc.  3 Scientist 33 M
6 Msc.  4 Scientist 29 F
7 Ph.D. 17 Senior 
Scientist
51 M
8 Ph.D. 5 Supervisor 43 M
9 Msc.  5 Scientist 28 F
10 Msc.  4 Scientist 31 M
11 Ph.D. 20 Supervisor 57 M
12 Ph.D. 1 Supervisor 37 M
13 Msc.  4 Supervisor 30 M
14 Ph.D. 4 Supervisor 38 F
15 Ph.D. 18 Supervisor 48 M
16 Ph.D. 7 Supervisor 41 M
17 Ph.D. 1 Scientist 30 M
18 Msc.  30 Scientist 53 M
19 Msc.  3 Scientist 29 F
20 Msc.  7 Scientist 41 F
21 Ph.D. 1 Scientist 30 M
22 Msc.  11 Scientist 36 F
23 Msc.  2 Scientist 30 F
24 Msc.  21 Senior 
Scientist
45 F
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Person Education Years in Current Firm Job Grade Age Sex 
25 Msc.  18 Senior 
Scientist
44 M
26 Msc.  10 Senior 
Scientist
38 F
27 Msc.  3 Scientist 37 F
28 Msc.  26 Senior 
Scientist
49 M
29 Ph.D. 22 Senior 
Scientist
58 M
30 Msc.  39 Senior 
Scientist
54 M
31 Msc.  8 Senior 
Scientist
37 F
32 Ph.D. 11 Supervisor 42 M
33 Msc.  2 Supervisor 42 M
34 Msc.  17 Scientist 41 F
35 Msc.  28 Scientist 48 M
36 Msc.  1 Scientist 34 M
37 Msc.  1 Scientist 42 M
38 Msc.  1 Scientist 26 F
5.2.2.3 Quantitative research approach 
The quantitative part of this study, adhering to Cassel and Symon’s (1994) advice to “count 
the countable”, strives to find further empirical support for both the theoretical and empirical 
findings formulated in the study. This type of research typically starts with the formulation 
of theory or hypotheses, representing a set of expectations, which can be based on the results 
of qualitative research, directing the selection of research populations in order to gather 
quantitative data. In order to test relations posited in the conceptual framework, the data 
for this study was gathered at two Dutch multinational. Given the number of respondents 
as well as general accepted methodology for network studies in an organizational setting 
it was decided to administer a network survey (Borgatti and Cross, 2003; Wasserman & 
Faust, 1994). Following the importance of questionnaire design for data quality in self‑
administered questionnaires (Dillman, 1978; de Leeuw, Hox & Huisman, 2003) special 
attention was given to survey design. The survey was designed to be user-friendly that is; 
easy to understand and operate. This meant that; question wording and number of categories 
(e.g. Leigh and Martin, 1987; Krosnick and Fabrigar, 1997) were recognized to represent an 
important issue and tested exhaustively as well as an ergonomic layout (e.g. questionnaire 
logic and questionnaire flow) of the questionnaire and embedded instructions were provided 
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(Jenkings & Dillman, 1997). As certain questions in the survey could be considered sensitive 
in the eyes of the respondent; the use of computer assisted interviewing was considered 
especially appropriate since this method is associated with more self-disclosure (e.g. 
Richman, Kiesler, Weisband, and Drasgow, 1999).
5.2.2.4 Quantitative data collection 
Management in both companies agreed to the use of a network questionnaire, which was 
tailored for the specific setting and administered to a total of 232 researchers and project 
managers. The target population represented all senior researchers (lab assistants e.g. were 
excluded) and project managers employed by the participating R&D labs. The decision to 
include all research and project managers in the study meant that our survey could potentially 
achieve a complete network overview. 
 After signing a confidentiality agreement with the company, agreeing not to disclose 
the companies’ identity, a pilot design of the survey instrument was developed, which was 
pre-tested in a number of one hour semi structured interviews with project managers and 
researchers. The preliminary interviews were conducted to better understand the context 
and to ensure appropriate response categories and wording for the questions prepared for the 
questionnaire. The final version of the survey was then distributed to the target population 
by email37 with the request to fill out the digital survey within one week. After three weeks, 
approximately fifty‑five percent of the R&D network questionnaires were completed. We 
then sent out a personalized reminder in case of non response (e.g. first‑level non response 
(unit) and second-level non response (item)). In the end, our study achieved 97 percent 
survey response rates for the target population.
The survey instrument. Our data were collected through a questionnaire survey distributed 
via email during 2007. The survey was presented and administered in a digital form using a 
PHP survey program tool developed especially for this project. The survey design allowed 
us to collect both relational and non-relational data; the former were obtained employing 
socio‑metric techniques. The first section, dealt with the respondents contact network. 
This part of the survey comprised of a name generator and a number name interpreters. 
The name generator asked respondents to complete a standard ego-centered assessment 
(Marsden, 1990) identifying their most important work contacts38, focusing on the past 6 
months. The name generator questions used for this study were adapted from questions 
used by Burt (1992) and Podolny and Baron (1997). Respondents were then asked about 
the contacts they had listed via a number of name interpreter questions. These questions 
(See appendix A for an overview of the most important survey questions) included; length 
of relationship, frequency of contact, the extent to which their contacts knowledge base was 
37 Distribution of the survey in company X was not done by email but by means of an assigned work station. 
38 Following concerns about the length of the questionnaire and to maximize the likelihood that all the follow 
up questions regarding the quality of the relationship would be provided for each contact we chose to limit 
the number of alters respondents could name. 
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similar/dissimilar to their own, closeness etc (e.g. Marsden, 1990). The second section of the 
questionnaire elicited general demographic information, including gender, tenure with the 
company, length of time in current job and educational history. In the third and final section 
of the survey non relational data were gathered mostly through questions anchored around 5 
point Likert‑type scales. The questions focused on the respondent’s attitude towards sharing 
knowledge and the exchange of favors in general. A value of ‘1’ was generally associated 
with ‘completely disagree’, whereas a value of ‘5’ generally implied ‘completely agree’. In 
order to reduce the possibility of social desirability bias (e.g. Arnold & Feldman, 1981) we 
took a number of precautions; 1) respondents were assured that all individual responses were 
completely confidential 2) confirmation was provided to respondents that the analyses would 
be restricted to an aggregated level that would prevent the identification of any individual, 
and 3) arranged for a survey tool that would transfer all completed questionnaires directly to 
us instead of being routed through the company.  
 Every respondent received a personalized cover email introducing the project to the 
respondent, signed by the two senior R&D managers to improve response rates (For more 
information see appendix B) as well as the researcher. The email contained a link which, 
incorporating a personal identification code39, redirected the respondent to the digital survey. 
To further reduce the time required to complete the survey, which took approximately 20 
to 30 minutes to complete, the survey form was constructed using a matrix orientation, 
such that names listed could easily be linked to the name interpreter questions. In addition, 
the name generator screen presented respondents with a list of all researchers and project 
managers in the sample both to facilitate completion of the survey and to reduce ambiguity 
concerning contacts’ identities. Following ego-network protocol and in order to keep the 
questionnaire length reasonable, respondents could list up to 7 contacts for each of the two 
R&D units [total 14 names]. The survey was sent out through intra company mail from the 
office of the R&D managers. The decision to send the survey via internal mail rather than 
from a university address served a two-fold purpose, partly to signal the company’s support 
allowing us to increase survey response rates and partly because possible technical issues, 
related to mail delivery and specific I.T. configurations, could be prevented or managed by 
the company. 
5.3 Data and Analysis
Both qualitative and quantitative research methods yield, whenever carried out successfully, 
different types of data. More to the point, more often than not research yields not just 
some data but an abundance of data. Making sense of large datasets requires a systematic 
way of viewing and summarizing gathered data with the aim of developing conclusions. 
Data analysis then can be defined as “ the process of examining, categorizing, tabulating, 
testing or otherwise recombining both quantitative and qualitative evidence to address the 
initial propositions of a study” (Yin, 2003). This research combines both exploratory and 
39 The personal identification code was used to address concerns for confidentiality, endemic to network studies. 
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confirmatory data analysis, as we hope to uncover new relationships and expect to confirm/
falsify existing hypotheses. This paragraph first discusses the unit of analysis of this study 
(paragraph 5.3.1) after which the primary method of analysis is reviewed (paragraph 5.3.2), 
finally paragraph 5.3.3) presents the variables relevant for this study. 
5.3.1 Unit of analysis
Knowledge sharing obviously can take place with and between different organizational 
entities (e.g. individuals, departments, organizations). As such a range of different research 
perspectives are possible necessitating choices regarding the unit of analysis. The unit 
of analysis provides amongst other things research focus, in the absence of which every 
research runs the risk of being spread to thin and ending up saying nothing about everything. 
In line with the focus of this study; the micro processes of knowledge sharing, this research 
takes the individual as the unit of analysis, meaning that the major entity being analyzed here 
is individuals40. In addition to a focus on the individual following our micro perspective, 
the theoretical foundation for such a choice is well grounded in literature. Although 
innovation, which is essentially a new idea (Van der Ven, 1986; p. 591), can be described as 
an organizational outcome, it always involves individuals41 (Glynn, 1996; Amabile, 1988; 
Woodman et al., 1993). This research takes the differences at the individual level (e.g. 
exchange and network variables) as a starting point to explore differences in innovation 
performance. 
5.3.2 Analysis 
For the analysis, we collected relational (dyadic level data) and non-relational attributes 
to test several hypotheses at the individual level. The set of resulting variables will be 
described in the next paragraph. A total of 232 respondents42 were surveyed of which 6 
did not complete the survey. As a result the dataset included 226 respondents which were 
involved in 1334 relationship43 translating into an average of 6,1 contacts per respondent. 
In order to make sense of the data collected this study, in line with quantitative analysis 
methods, will offer descriptive and inferential statistics. The latter allows us to go beyond 
description and move towards rejection or confirmation of our predictions. The empirical 
relationships and associations are studied using a general linear model frequently referred 
to as regression analysis. Regression analysis involves making quantitative estimates of 
40 Within this study the unit of analysis is the same as the unit of observation, which represents the unit on 
which we collected our data. 
41 For example Amabile (1988; 126) defined creativity as “the production of novel and useful ideas by an 
individual or small group of individuals working together”. 
42  The target population of 232 respondents represented the target scientists from both research settings. 
43 Missing, incomplete or superfluous data required us to remove 766 dyads or observations. Only entries which 
provided all corresponding alter related information could be used for analysis. Superfluous data represents 
instances where respondents filled out the survey twice, usually occasioned by user‑related  inter/intranet 
settings. 
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theoretical relationships between variables44,45. Regression analysis thus enables us to study 
causal relationships by means of the manipulation of factors relevant for our research topic 
while controlling for variables which are thought to be relevant in terms of their impact 
on experimental outcomes. However, although statistical models can imply causation they 
cannot inform us about the nature of causality only theory can. 
Exploration of some aspects of the process of exchange between R&D scientists required 
us to make use of relational data (dyadic level data). Relational data precludes the use of 
standard statistical tools for the analysis of variables to examine inferential questions (e.g. 
hypothesis or significance tests) (e.g. Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) due to the fact that the 
observations do not represent independent observations drawn at random from some larger 
population. To put it differently for each respondent we can have multiple observations as 
well as multiple observations for each contact (Reagans & McEvily, 2003). As a result the 
regression standard errors are correlated across observation from the same source of object 
of a relationship. Key Ordinary Least Squares regression (OLS) assumptions are violated 
leading to an artificial reduction of the estimates (i.e. standard errors). We therefore need 
to account for the non-independence of standard errors of the estimates. The use of random 
permutations will allow for the computation of basic linear multiple regression statistics by 
OLS, and the generation of correct standard errors and significance. Whenever appropriate 
we will use a permutation based multi-variate linear regression statistic to calculate the 
correlation coefficient (r‑square) and the standardized regression coefficient (beta).
UCINET VI (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 1992) was used to analyze the network data and 
to test how relational independent variables contributed to the dependent variables using 
permutation based linear regression analysis. Standard statistical analysis of variables was 
conducted with SPSS (version 15).
5.3.3 Measures 
Research data was gathered through a survey instrument and semi-structured interviews. 
Given our interest in the micro-processes of knowledge exchange the semi-structured 
interviews were used to shed additional light on the processes and causal relationships that 
underlie the networks as suggested in the literature. Quantitative indicators of the various 
network dimensions were collected using standardized name generator and name interpreter 
questions via an online survey instrument. The survey methodology enabled the large scale 
collection of both relational attributes (e.g. in-degree centrality, brokerage etc.) measured 
at the dyadic level and non-relational attributes (e.g. gender, age, tenure at the organization 
etc.). The survey questions and required measures were whenever possible adopted, and if 
44 In: Introduction to regression. (Carey, 2007). 
45 Or as Field (2005) succinctly explains “we fit a statistical model to our data and see how well it fits the data 
(in terms of the variance it explains). If it fits the data well (i.e. explains a lot of the variation in scores) then 
we assume our initial prediction is true: we accept the experimental hypothesis”.
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so required adapted, from previous research.
5.3.3.1 Dependent, independent and control variables. 
Innovation performance. Individual’s innovation performance was measured on two 
dimensions as suggested by Rodan and Galunic (2004). The first item assessed individual 
creativity and the second item represented a measure of implementation effectiveness with 
regard to new ideas. Individual creativity was measured by means of a performance item 
which asked managers to carefully rate the researcher’s creativity over the last 6 months. 
[To what extent is this person particularly creative: someone to come up with novel and 
useful ideas, using a 1‑5 scale, from weak to outstanding]. The implementation measure 
asked managers to carefully rate the researcher ability to implement novel ideas over the 
last 6 months.  [To what extent is this person particularly good at implementing novel ideas, 
using a 1‑5 scale, from weak to outstanding]. The use of this type of measure to ascertain 
innovativeness followed the notion that measurement of innovativeness at the individual 
level, as pointed out by literature, oftentimes requires supervisor (or peer) assessment 
(Amabile, 1996; Moran, 2005; Avery and Murphy, 1998). In line with previous research the 
assessment asked managers to asses behaviors not attitudes, for a specific period (cf. Tsui, 
1984). Interviews with senior managers at the organization suggested that line management 
would be most appropriate for ascertaining researcher’s individual innovation performance, 
given their direct involvement with and formal responsibility to rate these researchers. 
Number of patents. In order to complement our individual level data we sought an alternative 
method of measuring individual innovativeness. The number of patents per researcher was 
collected, as a proxy for innovative output [please rate the number of patents you have 
applied for during your tenure at company X/Y, scale 1‑5]. This approach is consistent 
with the existing practice to measure via patents, in an indirect way, both the technological 
competence of a firm (Narin et al., 1987) as well as productivity for individual researchers 
(Bertin & Wyatt,1988). 
Exchange frequency. In order to assess the frequency of favor exchange we adapted an item 
by Flynn (2003). Respondents could indicate for each of their selected network alters how 
often they exchanged favors. [Please rate the frequency with which you exchange favors 
with regard to the innovation development process with this person, scale 1-5, from daily, 
weekly, monthly, quarterly, yearly to never]. The measure was transformed into interval 
data by recoding to the number of exchange days [yearly = 1, quarterly = 4, monthly = 12 
etc.]. An overall measure of favor exchange frequency per respondent was then calculated 
by averaging the reported ratings of favor exchange frequency across respondent’s network 
contacts.
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Perceived generosity. We measured favor exchange balance, which is used to measure 
perceived favor exchange generosity, using an item developed by Flynn (2003.) Respondents, 
using a 5-point likert-type scale, rated each of their selected network alters in terms of favor 
exchange balance [Please rate who has given more in this exchange relationship?, scale 
1-5, from ‘I have received far more than I have given’ to ‘I have given far more than I have 
received’]. In order to create a measure of perceived favor exchange generosity the measure 
was reverse coded (that is, 5 was recoded as 1, 4 was recoded as 2, etc.). This resulted in 
a measure which captures the extent to which alters perceived the focal employee to be 
generous in his favor exchange with them. An increase in this measure reflects the extent to 
which others consider the focal employee to be generous [meaning he/she has given more 
than he/she received]. An overall measure of perceived generosity per respondent was, then, 
calculated by averaging the reported ratings of perceived generosity across respondent’s 
network contacts.
Knowledge (dis)similarity. Building on a measure developed by Rodan and Galunic (2004) 
respondents were asked to assess the extent to which the knowledge base of the reported 
alter was similar or dissimilar to their own [How similar or different is your knowledge 
from your contact’s knowledge?, scale 1-4; 1= very similar, 2 = similar, 3= different, 4=very 
different]. The measure taps into the idea that innovation is facilitated by bringing together 
different, though not too different (cf. cognitive distance), knowledge bases (heterogonous 
knowledge) (Burt, 2004; Pelled, Eisenhardt & Xin, 1999; Nooteboom, 1992, 1999, 2000). 
The measure was reverse coded (that is 4 was recoded as 1, 3 was recoded as 2, etc.) so as 
to have a value increase reflect increased knowledge similarity. 
In-degree centrality. In-degree centrality provides us with a basic indication of the network 
structure of an individual actor also referred to in social network analysis as degree 
centrality (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). Each respondent was asked to list his or her key 
contacts, with a possible range from 0 tot 14 [‘Over the past 6 months are there any work 
related contacts from whom you regularly sought (research related) information and advice 
to enhance your effectiveness as a researcher? Your most valued work contacts’]. For the 
purpose of this study the in‑degree statistics, which is the total number of unique direct ties 
reported by alters with the focal actor, for each actor were calculated. We did not require 
that the contact corroborate the tie, following that the number of alter respondents could 
select ranged between 0 and 14. The presence of asymmetric relationships, representing 
non-reciprocated ties, is to be expected between prominent and less prominent network 
actors46 which form an important indication of an actor’s position. As it is precisely these 
relationships we are interested in, the in-degree centrality measure is used to ascertain an 
actor’s prominence within the network. In-degree ties provide insight in the number of 
sources that send information or resources to the focal actor. Put differently, the higher the 
46 Knoke and Burt  (1983: 199) point out that in network research: “Prominent leaders are the object of 
extensive relations from followers, while the latter are the objects of few relations. 
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in‑degree the more an actor is in direct contact with many alters. Total number of unique 
contacts ranged between 0 and 42 for this data set, meaning that some actors had up to 
42 reported contacts (Average: 9,2, Median: 7,5, S.D: 7,19). As reported in the frequency 
distribution of network size in Table 5‑3 most respondents [62,9 %] commanded networks 
between 2 and 11 contacts. 
Table 5‑3 Frequency Distribution of Indegree‑Centrality
# of direct ties Frequency Percent Cumulative 
1 9 4 4
2 14 6,3 10,3
3 28 12,5 22,8
4 18 8 30,8
5 14 6,3 37,1
6 15 6,7 43,8
7 14 6,3 50
8 14 6,3 56,3
9 12 5,4 61,6
10 16 7,1 68,8
11 10 4,5 73,2
12 8 3,6 76,8
13 7 3,1 79,9
14 3 1,3 81,3
15 5 2,2 83,5
16 6 2,7 86,2
17 5 2,2 88,4
18 4 1,8 90,2
19 2 0,9 91,1
20 1 0,4 91,5
21 2 0,9 92,4
22 3 1,3 93,8
23 4 1,8 95,5
24 3 1,3 96,9
25 1 0,4 97,3
26 1 0,4 97,8
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# of direct ties Frequency Percent Cumulative 
27 1 0,4 98,2
34 1 0,4 98,7
37 1 0,4 99,1
41 1 0,4 99,6
42 1 0,4 100
Total 224 100  
Gender. Information about the gender of the respondent, as a demographic attribute with 
possible explanatory value, was gathered using the survey instrument (dummy variable: 
female =1, male =0) (Female: 23 percent, Male: 87 percent). 
Age. Information about the age of the respondent, as a demographic attribute with possible 
explanatory value, was gathered using the survey instrument (years) (Average: 44; S.D.: 9). 
Lab size. Following Tortoriello (2006) unit size was taken into account. As a contextual 
factor the number of people working at a given department could be an important factor 
of networking and exchange opportunities. The measure was operationalized by taking the 
Log47 of the number of people working in a given lab. 
Tenure. Respondents were asked to report their tenure in the organization (years), as a 
possible explanation for performance (Average: 14,6; S.D.: 11,32, Minimum: 1, Maximum: 
43).   
Seniority. The hierarchical position of the respondents was included for its potential 
explanatory power with regard to performance and network position. Our seniority measure 
was based on company personnel data. The data was used as a basis for our measure of 
hierarchal level [scientist, senior scientist and science manager]. These possible outcomes 
were converted into a dummy variable [0= scientist, 1 = senior scientist, 2= manager]. 
Tie strength. Relational strength was measured by asking respondents to assess ‘closeness’ 
and ‘communication frequency’ with respect to their alters (Granovetter, 1973; Fischer, 
1982; Burt, 1984; Hansen, 1999). Tie strength was then calculated as the sum of these two 
measures, which according to literature represent different yet related dimensions of tie 
strength (Marsden & Campbell, 1984; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). 
Respondents were asked to describe the relationship with each selected alter in terms of 
47 The logarithmic is useful for transforming positively skewed data (Field, 2005), as such it brings the values 
closer together.  
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these two measures. Closeness allowed us to ascertain how close the relationship with each 
contact was. [How close is your working relationship with the person in question? scale 
1‑5; 1 = especially close, 5 = distant]. An overall measure of closeness per respondent is 
calculated by averaging the reported rating of closeness across a respondent’s network 
contacts. Similarly, respondents were asked to report the communication intensity with the 
selected alters. [How frequently did you interact with the person in question?, scale 1‑5; 
from daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly to yearly]. The measure was transformed into interval 
data by recoding to the number of exchange days [yearly = 1, quarterly = 4, monthly = 12 
etc.]. The overall communication frequency measure per respondent was then calculated by 
averaging the reported ratings of communication frequency across respondent’s network 
contacts. The joint distribution between the two dimensions of tie intensity, emotional 
closeness and communication intensity, is shown in Table 5-4. As becomes apparent from 
the table, on average individuals felt closer to those alters they communicated with more 
frequently. 
Table 5‑4 Joint Distribution of Tie‑strength Variables
Communication Frequency
Emotional Closeness Daily Weekly Monthly Quaterly Less often
Especially Close 158 58 19 17 4
Close 203 281 134 102 54
Neutral 76 157 178 234 143
Somewhat distant 17 13 28 56 67
Distant/ arms length 15 2 12 34
Tie strength was, then, in line with prior research, calculated by relating tie intensity to 
network proportions (Burt, 1992; 2004; Uzzi, 1996, 1999; Reagans and McEvily, 2003). 
Following Reagans and McEvily (2003), we used the following formula:
jqiq
N
qijij zzp ==∑= ,1
In the equation ijp reflects tie strength from respondent i to contact j, where ijz is the 
relational intensity [computed as the product of emotional closeness and communication 
intensity] from respondent i to contact j and jqiq
N
q z ==∑ ,1  defines tie strength in terms of 
network proportions providing us with the context of the aggregate level of intensity across 
a person’s network. 
Brokerage. The variable brokerage provides insight into the extent to which an ego connects 
other pairs of actors which are not directly connected, where brokerage has been associated 
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with different benefits (competitive advantages as well as creative benefits)  (Burt, 1992; 
2004; Rodan & Galunic, 2004; Henze & Bauer, 2007; Cross & Cummings, 2004). The 
brokerage index measures the percentage of alters in ego’s network which are not directly 
connected to one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005). It thus provides insight into ego’s 
potential for brokerage. Formally: 
Network brokerage index = 
)(
)(
2
1 1
2
nn
xnn
p
n
i
n
j
ij
ij −
−− ∑∑
− =
The equations above represents the brokerage index, where n is the number of ego’s alters, 
)( 2 nn −  the number of potential pairs between alters without ego, and ijx reflects the 
number of ties between alters excluding ego. The theoretical range of this measure ranges 
from 0 to 1, where 1 represents a 100 percent connection rate between alters. Calculation of 
this measure was done by means of UCINET 6.0 (Borgati et al., 2002). More specifically, the 
in-neighborhood normalized broker measure provided by the ego-network routine was used. 
This measure reflects the individual level of brokerage opportunity. 
5.4 Validity 
5.4.1 Introduction
As the aim of any empirical investigation is to either test hypotheses from existing theory 
or formulate new theory with the aim of expanding current theory, the research must be 
designed accordingly. The particular research strategy48 (e.g. Saunders et al., 2000; Yin, 
2003; Silverman, 1993; Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2001) embodied in the research design 
chosen must reflect the particular research questions as well as ensure research quality. 
Especially relevant for ensuring and judging research quality, irrespective of whether the 
type of approach is qualitative or quantitative, are the concepts of validity49 and reliability50. 
The research design chosen incorporates the principles of triangulation in order to improve 
the strength of the main conclusions (Denzin, 1978; Jick, 1983; Yin, 2003; Silverman, 1993; 
Bijlsma-Frankema & Drooglever-Fortuijn, 1997 ;Saunders et al., 2000). The method aims 
to cancel out the method effect (Saunders et al., 2000) and to overcome the possibility of 
context-boundedness of the gathered data (Silverman, 1993) thus improving credibility and 
validity of the results. Although different types of triangulation can be discerned (Denzin, 
1978), between-method triangulation involving the use of different data collection methods 
is generally considered both appropriate and viable (Jick, 1983). In response to these 
48 A research strategy can be defined as a series of decisions with regard to the way the research object will be 
investigated, and the research in general will be handled (Verschuren & Doorewaard, 2001).
49 Validity refers to and is defined as the veritability of observations and conclusion one draws on its basis (or 
put differently does one measure what one set out to measure) (Bijlsma-Frankema & Drooglever-Fortuijn, 
1997).
50 Reliability refers broadly to the consistency of observations (Bijlsma-Frankema & Drooglever-Fortuijn, 
1997) and its overall goal is to minimize the errors and biases in a study (Yin, 2003).
104
92
recommendations, the study set up incorporates multiple observers/data sources as well as a 
multi‑method approach, meaning that both quantitative and qualitative methodologies were 
used. Though both methods were used the qualitative elements of this study, following a 
dominant‑less dominant design approach, have to give way to the quantitative part of this 
study in terms of sheer breadth. Volume in this case, as in many others, is not a measure of 
value as qualitative research has proven invaluable in understanding the context as well as 
processes involved providing the depth to develop and understand the quantitative part of 
this study.   
5.4.2 Representativeness and Generalizibility
The extend to which the findings of a study, in effect the degree to which propositions are 
supported by empirical evidence, are generalizable is an important issue for any type of 
study. Assuming that the study was conducted adequately, the question of generalizibility 
then becomes one of assessing the ramifications of the particular research design chosen. 
 The electronic survey was distributed to a population of R&D researchers in two 
R&D labs, located in different parts of the Netherlands. Within network analysis, one site 
sampling schemes are not uncommon, since this type of research design allows for the 
identification of a clear network boundary (e.g. Krackhardt, 1990). In that sense this study 
does not employ the sampling logic often associated with survey research, where the entire 
population of relevant respondents is identified and statistical procedures ensure that the 
sample surveyed can be assumed to reflect the entire population. Accordingly, given that 
the case research strategy follows a different logic, respective cases have been selected by 
means of non-probability sampling (Yin, 2003; Saunders et al., 2000; Segers, 1983). 
 Case selection has been based on a purposive approach (Saunders et al., 2003), 
meaning that from the possible research population (research domain) some research units/
instances are chosen on logical-theoretical considerations (Segers, 1983). With the research 
domain51 of this study extending to the knowledge workers in R&D environments two R&D 
labs were selected as a site for this study. The cases were selected based on the notion that the 
settings closely resembled one another in terms of type of research and research population. 
Selection of a specific industry sector with to some extent overlapping technology bases, 
though not essential, aimed to further add to case similarity. Both settings emphasized 
knowledge transfer and cooperation, building and maintaining external networks and 
researched basic as well as more applied technologies 
 In sum, with network analysis lying at the heart of this study, where one site 
sampling due to the clear network boundary is a common and expedient research strategy 
(e.g. Krackhardt, 1990), the case study research method represents the appropriate strategy 
for empirical operationalization. Whenever case study research and representativeness are 
considered; one inevitably is required to consider the concepts of research domain and 
replication. Within this study the research domain, generally described as the specific and 
51  The research domain of a theory is defined as the universe of all different instances of the object of study to 
which the theory applies (Dul & Hak, 2007). 
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concrete system from which elements for research are chosen and for which the propositions 
of the theory are believed to be true (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968 taken from Segers, 1983), has 
been defined as the concrete system (totality) of higher level knowledge workers within R&D 
labs. Analogous to a research strategy employing experiments, generalizibility with regard 
to case studies is the result of replication, the more cases are carried out that corroborate a 
theory or proposition(s), the stronger the support for that theory or proposition. Therefore 
the replication of results employed in analytical generalizibility52 increases the likelihood of 
the results being applicable across the target population. However statistical generalization 
to a larger population, or statistical inference, cannot be assumed (Yin, 2003).
5.4.3 Conclusion
Every research design in essence represents a number of far reaching decisions with regard 
to the research strategy. The multi-method research design implemented here represents 
an appropriate and effective strategy for the uncovering of the mechanisms that underlie 
cooperation/exchange between knowledge workers. Using a qualitative methodology this 
study benefited from a better understanding of the social phenomena we set out to study. The 
results were used both to formulate specific prediction about reality and the construction of 
the network survey. Quantitative research was carried out in R&D labs, purposively selected 
on the basis of case similarity, in order to further explore and test predicted relationships. 
Through the combination of these different research approaches, and the triangulation of 
research data this approach enabled, the study essayed to provide additional insight into the 
micro processes of knowledge exchange.
52  Yin (2003: p.37) defines analytical generalization as an scientific method where ‘the investigator is striving 
to generalize a particular set of results to some broader theory’. 
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Appendix A
Summary of Key Survey Questions
Name generator Part of the main survey send to all selected participants. 
Over the past 6 months are there any work related contacts from whom 
you regularly sought (research related) information and advice to enhance 
your effectiveness as a researcher? Your most valued work contacts.' (cf. 
Burt, 1992; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Marsden 1990).  
Name interpreters Part of the main survey send to all selected participants. 
Respondents answered the questions 
below on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 1 to 5 [ranging from daily to 
yearly]. 
1. How frequently did you interact with the person in question? (cf. 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992)
2. How similar or different is your knowledge from your contacts’ knowledge? 
(cf. Rodan and Galunic, 2004)
3. How close is your working relationship with the person in question? (cf. 
Marsden & Campbell, 1984; Burt, 1992)
4. Please rate the frequency with which you exchange favors with regard to 
the innovation development process with this person (very infrequently vs. 
very frequently)? (cf. Flynn, 2003). 
5. Please rate who has given more in this exchange relationship? (cf. Flynn, 
2003). 
Assessing innovation performance
Part of the survey send to senior managers asked to assess performance 
of employees in their team.
Respondents answered the questions 
below on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 1 to 5 [ranging from weak to 
outstanding]. 
Please write the number from the 5-point scale that best corresponds to 
your assessment of this knowledge workers performance over the last 6 
months. (cf. Rodan and Galunic, 2004). 
1. To what extent is this person particularly creative: someone able to come 
up with novel and useful ideas?
2. To what extent is this person good at implementing novel ideas?
Control variables
1. What is your age?
2. Please indicate your tenure with the organization.
3. Please indicate your tenure with the department you currently work for.
4. How many scientific articles have you published during your tenure at 
Company X/Y? 
5. How many patens have you applied for during your tenure at Company 
X/Y? 
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Appendix B 
RSM Research Knowledge Sharing 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
At Erasmus University Business School, research on how knowledge sharing within several Dutch companies 
contributes to innovation is undertaken. Within this framework, in conjunction with Company Y R&D both DFS 
and DAI, this survey is send to you. 
Research aim
The aim of this research is to gain understanding in how knowledge is shared within and across departments and 
business-unit boundaries. 
Why you?
The survey was pre-tested within Company Y. You have been selected as one of the people who plays an import 
role when it comes to knowledge sharing. Your cooperation is essential for the quality of the investigation and 
your participation is therefore highly appreciated.
How does it work?
Please indicate who are your most important work contacts (max. 7) within DAI and your most important work 
contacts (max. 7) within DFS. Also, briefly characterize your contact in the terms suggested in the survey. The 
electronic survey will allow you to select departments after which you can select individuals working for that 
particular department. 
Discretion
The information you provide will be handled discretely. Names of your contacts are necessary to map 
relationships within networks, but will be presented in a coded form. The information that you will enter will 
not be visible to other respondents.
The electronic questionnaire will require approximately 20 minutes of your time. In order to complete the 
questionnaire just click on the following link: www.erasmusresearch.nl/companyY/en/?userid=
Please fill out and return the questionnaire by Friday, March the 30th. 
Kind regards, 
Also on behalf of ……………. (Director R&D Company Y) and …………(Director R&D Company Y), 
Rene van der Eijk, Erasmus University, (email: reijk@rsm.nl; phone: 010-4082921)
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Chapter 6  
Innovation Performance: Structural and Relational 
Determinants
6.1 Introduction
The common thread throughout this study has been the process of exchanging information 
and developing knowledge. Intellectual capital was shown to be a valuable resource in 
its own right which has become a key source of competitive advantage (e.g. Wiig, 1997). 
Knowledge’s intangible nature sets it apart from other tangible resources. Essential to 
knowledge generation, in a large part because of its cumulative nature, is its transfer; 
since in the giving and receiving of knowledge lays the key to multiplying it. Using past 
research as a starting point, the preceding chapters explored different bodies of literature 
on the practice of knowledge exchange. It became clear that in terms of explaining the 
transfer of knowledge the field owes a lot to network theory (e.g. Allen, 1977; Tushman, 
1977; Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Rogers, 1995; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966). It is 
this field that allows us to consider the influence of the social context in which actors are 
embedded and how the position of actors in a network influences their actions. The social 
nature of human cooperation is exceedingly relevant in a context of knowledge generation 
as relational ties between individuals form the conduits through which knowledge and 
resources can be swapped (e.g. Podolny, 2001; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998; Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004). New knowledge generation requires the input of knowledge and ideas, preferably 
from multiple and heterogonous sources, and networks (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996) 
are a means of providing access to those resources. While acknowledging the importance 
of networks, also dubbed the “the plumbing of the market” (Poldolny, 2001), a focus on 
structural elements such as an agent’s position in a network and the types of relations 
entertained cannot explain why actors actually engage in the exchange of knowledge. 
Given knowledge’s elusive nature, exchange can easily be avoided. Parties involved must 
be willing to exchange knowledge, leading us to emphasize the content of relationships as 
well. Gift exchange theory may provide a framework to consider both social and economic 
aspects of the knowledge exchange process simultaneously. It provides the parties involved 
with a mechanism for the exchange of resources and an incentive to so. Gift exchange was 
shown to incorporate altruistic as well as more self-interested motives, of which the latter 
are generally emphasized. Characteristics of knowledge create a context in which informal 
exchange becomes a relevant part of its creative and production process. Knowledge sharing 
can, as we have argued, be envisioned as a form of exchange where each transfer represents 
a gift or favor. 
The chapter at hand aims to put notions we have posited in the preceding paragraphs to the 
test. In order to explore knowledge exchange in a real life setting, data havebeen collected at 
R&D laboratories in the Netherlands. R&D laboratories’ principle business is the generation 
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of knowledge. In these and other knowledge intensive settings, knowledge sharing is 
recognized as an important if not essential prerequisite. In his empirical section, we aim to 
explore the effects of both structural network related aspects and more content related [gift] 
exchange variables on knowledge exchange as well as other knowledge related outcomes.  
The following section, will start out with a number of key observations with regard to 
knowledge transfer between scientists based on qualitative research. Paragraph 6.2.2 
presents a descriptive overview of the collected network data followed by a comparison of 
a number of selected ego-networks. In paragraph 6.3 the expected relationships between 
variables are introduced formally by means of a set of propositions. Paragraph 6.4 continues 
with a principal analysis of the effects of network and gift exchange related variables on 
both subjective and objective innovation related outcomes. A more in-depth analysis of the 
observed relationships will be presented in paragraph 6.5, after which paragraph 6.6 will 
explore perceived generosity and network position. Finally, the findings are discussed in 
paragraph 6.7.  
6.2 Knowledge sharing in Dutch R&D labs  
6.2.1 A qualitative approach to knowledge exchange / understanding 
knowledge exchange 
Our study so far has been theoretical to a high degree. Taking ‘knowledge sharing’ as a 
starting point, we have explored the notion that gift exchange serves as a mechanism for 
knowledge sharing and as such represents a prerequisite for knowledge creation. Going 
from the abstract to practice, from a macro to a micro level, this section sets out to explore 
the micro foundations of knowledge creation. Past studies have shown that knowledge 
creation requires a consistent access to and input from a diverse set of resources (Allen 
& Cohen 1969; Burt, 2004; Freeman 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Powell et al., 1996). 
Interpersonal exchanges between R&D scientists have been shown to be an important 
mechanism for the acquisition of needed resources. These exchanges, oftentimes because of 
their personalized nature, can even transcend divisional and organizational boundaries (see 
Allen 1977; Allen & Cohen, 1969; Bouty, 2000; Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Von Hippel 1987; 
Dahl & Pedersen, 2004; or the communities-of-practice literature Wenger & Snyder 2000; 
Wenger 1998; Brown & Duguid 1991, 2001). Scientists who know one another, belong to 
the same networks (e.g. communities of practice), can activate their own and each other’s 
networks in order to secure resources and/or validate findings (ibid). In part these exchanges 
are purely interpersonal (Allen & Cohen, 1969; Bouty, 2000; Kreiner & Schultz 1993) and 
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embedded within ongoing social relations (Granovetter, 1973; 1985). Aiming to acquire a 
more in-depth understanding of knowledge sharing, the initial stage of this study sought to 
explore the nature of exchanges between R&D scientists by means of an in‑depth qualitative 
approach. Given the subject matter and the exploratory nature of the research aims at this 
stage data were collected through interviews with 38 researchers in the Netherlands. Goal 
of this first part of the study was to acquire a more in‑depth understanding of mechanisms 
and contexts individual actors make use of and are faced with in order to be effective in a 
R&D context. 
Interviews yielded a number of key observations on knowledge sharing between R&D 
scientists. The interviews conducted for this research suggest that scientists share knowledge 
and resources in wide range of situations. Furthermore, sharing is indeed not limited to 
information and ideas, transactions include a diverse set of services as well (e.g. verifying 
results, use of equipment and utilizing network connections).
Where intra-organizational exchanges are generally considered as appropriate and ‘the 
right thing to do’, knowledge is also shared across organizational boundaries. Important 
considerations for sharing seem to be time constraints, level of involvement, type of relationship 
and, especially when dealing with an inter‑organizational context, confidentiality. Scientists, 
although to a varying extent, cultivate, maintain and utilize a personal network (see box 1, section 
2) ranging from connections such as direct colleagues, colleagues from other departments, 
fellow researchers met at conferences, contacts from former employers and contacts going 
back all the way to university53. Whenever networks are activated to share information or 
perform services, the mechanism underlying exchange becomes relevant and apparent. 
 Reciprocity, the interplay between give and take, plays an important role, where 
refusal to reciprocate can severely hinder future exchanges (see box 1, section 1). The level 
of trust and familiarity to a large extent determines willingness and the type of information/
resources available for exchange. Confidentiality issues (see box 1, section 3) feed into these 
decisions however the decision to exchange in these circumstances is not a black and white 
issue. The playing field consists of shades of grey and exchangeability is a concept that is not 
to be approached mechanistically but rather fluid as it depends on person, context, associated 
confidentiality etc. To use Granovetter’s (1985) terminology relationships are embedded and 
exchangeability is moderated to some extent by type of relationship and level of trust. For 
that reason relational atrophy was reported to be an issue, as ties which are not maintained 
over time become more difficult to activate. 
53 The notion that ties from former settings persist and play an important role in research also became apparent 
in a study by Agrawal, Cockburn & McHale (2003) which tracked patent citations and found that former 
colleagues continued to cite each others work. Agrawal et al. (2003) conclude: ‘In effect, geographical 
proximity works to overcome social distance and, once relationships are established individuals can remain 
socially close when they become geographically separated’.  
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Box 6‑1 Excerpts on the Topic of Knowledge Exchange
Researchers’ views on the topic of knowledge exchange, networks, confidentiality and 
reciprocity
1. Reciprocity
• “You always look to balance; what can you give and what can you get back.”
• “There needs to be a win-win situation for both parties involved. Some parties only ask and you know you 
will never get anything in return.”
• “In my experience, you need to give if you want to receive. If you give little you receive little.”  
• “Honesty and candor are essential for knowledge exchange. It is all about give and take.”
2. Informal network
• “My personal/informal network contacts are important. I have contacts from university and a former 
employer I regularly contact and which contact me.” 
• “Personal/informal contacts can be faster; especially when they have knowledge that is not available 
within the company or when it might be available but it is difficult [for example when you don’t know the 
person who might have the particular information]. 
• “My network is very important for me [in the context of work effectiveness]”
• “The [information] requirement is leading, but when you have a choice you opt for the person you have a 
good relationship with.”
• “They [close contacts] are very relevant for my work. I use it [my network] to confirm results, access 
knowledge and speed up my research.”  
3. Confidentiality issues 
• “When I contact personal/external contacts and the issue is confidential; you tell them don’t trade 
this around. Trust and a personal relationship is important. You always make a trade-off between the 
information you need and confidentiality issues.”
• “Confidentiality makes it sometimes difficult to gauge why you don’t receive pertinent feedback during a 
scientific discussing. You don’t know if the lack of feedback is the result of the fact that they are not willing 
or because they are not allowed. I usually point out when things become confidential so that people don’t 
doubt my willingness.”
• “There aren’t really hard [specific] rules with regard to what you can exchange and what you can’t. In 
case of doubt I discuss the issue with my manager.”
Prevalence of interpersonal exchange among researchers make the topic difficult to dismiss. 
Although difficult for companies to get a grip on, as became apparent from interviews with 
managers (e.g. evidenced by the lack of debate and company guidelines about what can 
and cannot be exchanged), interpersonal exchange plays an important role in knowledge 
creation. The lack of debate in organizations is notable considering that whenever individuals 
engage in gift exchange and the give and take this process invariably entails, as its threefold 
obligation (e.g. to give, receive and reciprocate (Mauss, 1954)) implies, the potential for 
intellectual capital leaks exists. When asked 77.8 percent of researchers surveyed reported 
that interpersonal exchanges were important (e.g. strongly agree to agree54) for their research 
effectiveness55, further underscoring the relevance of exchange for R&D. Indeed, this 
observation is in line with what other studies have reported (see Allen 1977; Bouty, 2000; 
Dahl & Petersen, 2004; Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Von Hippel 1987). Few studies, however, 
have tried to link exchange to actual innovation performance, where the question if it really 
54 Breakdown of the results: strongly agree (26.55%), agree (51.33%), neutral (16.37%), disagree (4.42%), 
strongly disagree (1.33%). 
55 Exact phrasing of the question: ‘When confronted with a bottleneck in my research, favors rendered via my 
informal network significantly enhance my research effectiveness’.
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makes a differences in terms of bottom line performance might be regarded as the most 
relevant by most. Addressing these questions, requires us to proceed to the second, and 
largely quantitative, part of this study, where we will explore the impact of network and 
exchange orientation on innovation performance. 
6.2.2 Network data  
Using a standard survey method incorporating name generators and interpreters (e.g. 
Marsden, 1990; 2004) data was gathered in two Dutch R&D labs. For the analysis, we 
collected relational (dyadic level data) and non-relational attributes. The set of resulting 
variables were described in the preceding chapter, Box 6-2 in appendix A provides 
a succinct overview of used variables. The survey captured virtually the entire research 
population as 226 of the 232 surveyed researchers56 completed the network questionnaire. 
The respondents were involved in 1334 relationships57  translating into an average of 6,1 
contacts per respondents. Two types of possible relationships between two respondents were 
distinguished; 1) one person cited the other as someone from whom one regularly sought 
(research related) information and advice, 2) both cited each other as someone from whom 
one regularly sought research related information and advice. Put differently, both types of 
relationships, corroborated as well as uncorroborated, were important to this study and in 
either case a tie is said to exist between two actors. As such, we used in-degree ties to assess 
ego-networks, allowing us to ascertaining the number of sources that send information or 
resources to the focal actor. The presence of asymmetric relationships, representing non-
reciprocated ties, is to be expected between prominent and less prominent network actors58. 
In fact, these asymmetries represent important cues regarding the position an actor inhabits 
within the network and as such are considered relevant for this study. Moreover, the use of 
in‑degree networks is consistent with the specific survey method applied59, as it allowed us 
to assess the network position of individuals based on the assessment of alters.
The socionetwork, using survey data for company Y, is depicted in Figure 6-1. The socio-
gram displays 186 research members (represented by nodes) with lines indicating research 
related information and advice exchanges between actors 
(798 relationships60). Not depicted in this figure are the social isolates (6), which represent 
56 Breakdown of response rate per company: Company X: 37 (100% response rate), Company Y: 195 (189 out 
of 195/ 97% response rate).
57 The research population reported a total of 1334 relationships at different levels of intensity (relationships 
broken down per company; company X represented 223 relationships and company Y 1111 relationships). 
58 Knoke and Burt (1983: 199) point out that in network research: “Prominent leaders are the object of 
extensive relations from followers, while the latter are the objects of few relations. 
59 The name generator allowed the respondents to enter a maximum of 14 network contacts, use of the in-
degree of the point enabled us to go beyond fixed network size and assess a focal actors relative importance. 
60 Company Y provided a total number of 1111 relationships, for the purpose of the socio-gram all relationships 
which represented frequent (e.g. defined as daily or weekly) interactions were selected representing 798 
relationships.  
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less connected individuals who would be represented by disconnected nodes dispersed in the 
periphery of the network.   
 From a network perspective, Figure 6-1 provides us with an overview of the total 
network configurations or a social map of sorts of the research lab. Research activities in 
company Y, due to divisional boundaries, were divided between two different organizational 
departments. The socio-gram incorporates these boundaries utilizing red and blue nodes 
to represent the different researchers. Using Multi‑Dimensional Scaling techniques, nodes 
that were ‘more similar’ are positioned closer together. Similarity in this context is based 
on the actors citing one another and the extent to which they shared the same alters. The 
clustering of red and blue nodes indicates the presence of some type of boundary between 
two organizational sub-units.  
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Table 6‑1 Illustrative N
etw
ork Positions Averaged per Job G
rade
Figure 6‑1 K
now
ledge Exchange N
etw
orks (excluding social isolates)
 Mean Network Size 
 Two Step Reach 
 Normalized   
 Brokerage 
M
ean Path 
D
istance 
(M
in‑ M
ax) 
for the 186 
connected 
respondents 
in the graph.
M
anager (60)
12,7
50,7
0,4
2,6 (1,9-4,0)
S
enior S
cientist (29)
10,1
44,2
0,38
2,8 (2,2-4,0)
S
cientist (97)
6,8
33,9
0,36
3,0 (2,0-6,1)
M
ean (186) 
9,8
41
0,37
2,8 (1,9-6,1)
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Network measures as presented in Table 6-1 represent a different way of looking at the 
network depicted visually in Figure 6-1. The actors and relationships they entertain 
are investigated further by categorizing actors by job grades and relating these to the 
corresponding network (position) measures. Essentially, these measures enable us 
to zoom in one more step as they quantify differences in network positions actors, 
categorized by job grade, inhabit in the social context in which they are embedded. 
Informative to a high degree, the network measures employed allow us to consider 
the implications of network position in terms of opportunities and constraints. 
 The first column of Table 6‑1 shows that the size (# indegree ties) of scientist’ 
Networks were on average substantially smaller than those of senior scientists and managers. 
While scientists had networks averaging 6,37 contacts, a senior scientist’s average network 
consisted of 10,05 contacts, only to be surpassed by an average of 12.69 contacts for 
managers.  Networks size or indegree centrality can also be used to determine an actor’s 
centrality within a given overall network. As such, it provides a straightforward and effective, 
but by no means the only, measure of an actor’s centrality. Having many ties is considered 
beneficial in terms of access to resources and deal maker opportunities.     
 Column two of the table provides a Two-Step-Measure for the different job grades. 
The measure reports the percentage of actors a focal actor can reach within two directed steps 
of ego (that is, friends of friends). As becomes clear from the table, scientist are on average 
able to reach 33,94 percent of the entire network increasing to 44,17 and 50,7 percent for 
senior scientists and managers respectively. Two‑Step‑Reach is influenced directly through 
network size (more contacts, more indirect contacts) and indirectly through the network 
size of a focal actor’s alters. Having more central contacts enables a focal actor to access a 
larger part of the network without having to incur the costs in terms of network maintenance. 
 The table’s third column considers the Normalized Brokerage Measure. Brokerage 
considers the number of pairs which are not directly connected, creating an opportunity to act as 
a broker between these two unconnected alters. As such structural holes (cf. non-redundancy) 
(Burt, 1992) are considered to facilitate access to diverse sources of information offering 
actors access to more timely and relevant information about upcoming opportunities and 
complications or contingencies. The table indicates that higher job grades are associated with 
more brokerage opportunities, even when we take into account the associated larger networks61. 
 In the final column of the table, Average Geodesic Path Distances are considered. 
Using the path distance measure the minimum number of relations required to connect alters 
are determined. Average path distance is calculated for each actor, resulting in the mean 
geodesic distance for a respondent which captures an actor’s closeness to all other nodes 
in the network. In case of a direct contact between two individuals the distance is one, a 
connection that takes two directed steps (friends of friends) is two etc. As network density 
increases the path distances will generally become smaller and vice versa (Hanneman & 
61 Note that the Nbrokerage index represents a normalized measure meaning that it accounts for the notion that 
larger networks have more opportunity to broker. Thus, a normalized index allows us to interpret the results 
net from network size effects.
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Riddle, 2005). Results for the knowledge exchange network in Figure 6-1 show that the 
diameter of the network (largest path distance) is 6 steps with an average of 2.8 steps. Job 
grades are associated with different average path distances. Results show that more senior 
people on average have lower path distances across the network (mean path distances vary 
from 2,58 to 2,77 and 2,97 for managers, senior scientists and scientists respectively). The 
best connected actor could reach every other actor in the network in 1,87 steps (that is, 
within one connection past their direct network contacts (that is friends of friends)), whereas 
the worst connected actor needed 6,05 bridging relations to accomplish the same feat. 
Results indicating that a higher job rank is related to shorter paths are not surprising if one 
considers seniority was associated with larger networks62 (mean path distance is correlated 
‑.74 (p<0.01) with mean network size in figure 2).         
6.2.3 Individual networks 
Looking at the overall network in terms of job grades, differences in overall network 
configuration became apparent. In this setting job grade represents a significant level of 
aggregation, as such a close up of an individual network within each job grade can be 
informative. In Figure 6-2 a stylized example of three ego networks63 is depicted. The 
knowledge exchange networks presented in Figure 6-1 essentially consists of various 
interconnected ego networks, three of which, taken from the network’s upper right corner, 
were isolated and depicted in the figure on the next page (Figure 6‑2). 
  
Scientist 113’s network consists of three connections within the same business unit R&D 
department (indicated by the blue node). The impact of structural attributes on innovation 
performance represents an important and recurrent theme within this study. For this particular 
scientist, subjective performance as rated by his or her supervisor indicates that creativity 
and implementation skills are above average (4 and 5 respectively), although this has not 
(yet) translated into objective performance outcomes (# of patents, # of published scientific 
articles). The implementation score also reflects the importance of implementation for the 
corresponding job description. Node 103 illustrates a Senior Scientist’s network, a network 
(11 alters) which is substantially larger than node 113’s network and spans several sections 
within the same business unit R&D department. While subjective performance for creativity 
and implementation as rated by a supervisor is lower (2 and 3 respectively), objective 
performance is significant (5 or more patent applications). Comparing both scientist and 
senior scientist to node 152, representative of the job grade (science) manager, the size and 
breadth of the network immediately stand out. The network spans different sections as well 
as both business unit R&D departments (as indicated by the blue and red nodes). Moreover, 
62 At the same time, job grade is positively associated with organizational tenure a different, yet in terms of 
explanatory power, related variable providing a (partial) explanation for the observed relationship between 
senority and larger average networks. 
63 Ego networks consist of a focal node (“ego”) and the nodes to whom ego is directly connected to (these are 
called “alters”) plus the ties, if any, among the alters (http://www.analytictech.com/networks/egonet.htm.).
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Figure 6‑2 Illustrative Ego Networks
many of the network contacts hold central positions within the overall network, providing 
ego with an even larger indirect (two-step) network. In terms of performance, objective and 
subjective performance are well above average (Creativity: 5, number of patents applied 
for > 5, and scientific articles published > 5). A score of 2 on implementation performance 
reflects a job description where implementation is no longer as important a part of daily 
activities. 
These examples provide at least a taste of differences in network size (in-degree centrality), 
network embeddedness and innovation performance for different job grades. Ascertaining 
if initial observations based on three different nodes hold any merit requires us to consider 
different methods of analysis. 
6.3 Quantitative Analysis and Hypotheses 
Socio‑metric techniques provided an overview of the structure of the communication 
Scientist Senior scientist
Science Management Individual Networks Conjoined 
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networks in a research setting. Taking job grade as a point of departure, as we considered 
scientists, senior scientists and managers (average and individual) networks, differences in 
network position became apparent. Essentially, the next sections will zoom in further and 
combine structural network and exchange variables to obtain a deeper understanding of the 
process as well as its outcomes. This translates into questions such as; what does a different 
network position imply for researcher effectiveness? What is the role of favor exchange 
in the transfer of knowledge between researchers in R&D labs? Questions such as these 
reveal a number of expectations on the part of the researcher. This section will, revisit our 
conceptual framework and formalize our expectations by means of a set of propositions. 
Figure 6-3 visualizes the relationships between the independent and dependents variables of 
this study, as announced in chapter 1 and substantiated in chapters 2,3 and 4. The constructs 
and their measures have been explained in chapter 5. Consequently, the relationships 
between the variables as well as a priori expectations will be discussed here in particular. 
This thesis specifically investigates the effect of gift exchange on both economic and social 
outcomes as elucidated by literature (Belk, 1979; Larsen and Watson, 2001; Cheal, 1996). 
Accordingly, the propositions as well as the corresponding empirical sections are categorized 
and structured according to the economic and social properties of gift exchange. The next 
section will discuss and explicate the relationships between the independent and dependents 
variables in the context of economic and social outcomes, as announced in chapter 1 and 
substantiated in chapters 2,3 and 4. The constructs and their measures have been explained 
in chapter 5. Consequently, the relationships between the variables as well as a priori 
expectations will be discussed here in particular.
6.3.1 Gift exhange and its economic returns: Propositions
Setting out to explore the impact of exchange while specifically acknowledging its ‘social 
properties’ (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Moran & Ghosal, 1996; 
Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998) this study investigates the economic as well 
as the social outcomes of exchange. The economic sphere of gift exchange deals perhaps 
most directly with the ideology of the gift. According to this perspective gift exchange can 
be regarded as a purely economic exchange between two parties (Larsen and Watson, 2001) 
as gift exchange enables parties to exchange and secure valued resources believed to provide 
additional utility. Utility in the context of this study is defined as individual innovation 
performance. The theoretical rationale being that individual scientists utilize their network 
and exchange information and resources as they set out to reach their individual and 
organizational innovation goals. 
The Impact of Network Centrality and Favor Exchange incidence on Innovation Performance. 
 Networks, a set of relations linking actors (people or organizations), objects or events (Knoke 
& Kuklinski 1982; Scott, 1991; Wasserman & Faust, 1994), are assumed to influence actors’ 
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actions. As has been argued in chapter 4, knowledge is created by individuals (cf. ;Knight, 
1967; Nonaka, 1994) and is the outcome of a process that requires relational networks to 
facilitate the search, exchange and activation of knowledge (Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1977; 
Tushman & Scanlan, 1981; Rogers, 1995; Coleman, Katz and Menzel 1966). The extent 
to which individuals can utilze a network as a resource for knowledge creation is closely 
related to the position of actors in a network (e.g. centrality) as well as the type (e.g. tie 
strength) and number of ties they maintain (Hansen, 1999; Uzzi, 1997; Reagans & McEvily, 
2003; Granovetter, 1973; 1985). As researchers are more embedded in the network they are 
believed to have access to more information (Burt, 1992) as well as alternative exchange 
partners (Emerson, 1972). These opportunities to acquire knowledge and resources are 
believed to be beneficial for achieving research objectives (cf. Allen, 1977; Tushman, 1977; 
Tushman & Scanlan, 1981). 
Proposition 1A. Subjective innovation performance will increase as actors are more 
centrally located within the network. 
Proposition 1B. Objective innovation performance will increase as actors are more centrally 
located within the network. 
The exchange of favors in the social exchange literature has been recognized to play an 
important role in social relationships between actors. The exchange of gifts represents 
more than the exchange of economic utilities, they are also social interactions embedded 
in social structures (Cheal, 1996). It is believed, that as a corollary of the cycle of giving 
and reciprocating of a resource, obligation, trust and cooperation are generated between 
the (exchange) parties involved (e.g., Sahlins, 1996; Mauss, 1954; Gouldner, 1960; 
Uehara, 1990). Relationships then are formed and maintained through the exchange of 
gifts (Emerson, 1976; Lawler et al., 2000). Indeed, exchange generates the intrinsic (and 
depending on the social structure extrinsic motivation) to comply with exchange requests. 
What’s more, through the exchange of knowledge giver and receiver learn more about the 
other developing a common frame of reference thereby facilitating (future) knowledge 
transfers (Hansen, 1999; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Nooteboom, 1992, 1999). As such the 
incidence of exchange could be regarded as an important indication of an actor’s potential 
resource pool and access. Resources which, especially in the field of research, are believed 
to be essential for R&D performance. 
Proposition 1C. Subjective innovation performance will increase as the frequency with 
which actors exchange favors increases. 
Proposition 1D. Objective innovation performance will increase as the frequency with 
which actors exchange favors increases. 
Figure 6-2 visualizes and summarizes the relationships between the independent and 
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dependents variables with regard to the economic outcomes as explored in this study. 
Figure 6‑3 Summary of propositions: gift exchange and economic outcomes
 
6.3.2 Gift exchange and its social returns: Propositions 
Exchange, however, is not only an economic transaction, it is also a good in itself, a ‘process 
benefit’ that affects the nature of the relationship (Avner, 1997). Gifts are therefore not only 
transfers of utility but are also social interactions embedded in social structures (Cheal, 
1996). The personal relations between giver and receiver are an important dimension of 
many transactions as they are instrumental in regulating transactions (Rose-Ackerman, 
1998). As every gift carries the implicit obligation for the recipient to reciprocate, gift giving 
creates social indebtedness between people (Belk, 1979; Cheal, 1988; Mauss, 1954; Ruth 
et al., 1999; Sherry, 1983; McGrath et al., 1996). This indebtedness is what highlights gift 
giving as an exchange and perpetuates the exchanges process. At the same time indebtedness 
is regarded as a resource as being perceived as a creditor, rather than as a debtor, increase 
one’s status or reputation as well as one’s ‘right’ to call on the repicient when needed. As 
such indebtedness (in this study operationalized as ‘perceived generosity’) can facilitate 
future action. 
The Impact of Brokerage Opportunities, Favor Exchange Incidence and Network Centrality 
on Perceived Generosity. Network structures and the position actors inhabit within these 
structures differ. Some are characterized as dense and others as sparse networks, the latter 
characterized by only a few contacts in a network that have mutual linkages. These structural 
holes, linkages to groups not otherwise connected, are associated with advantages (Burt, 
1992; Baker, 2000; Granovetter, 1973). In fact, structural holes provide opportunity to broker 
the flow of information. The extent to which an actor can broker between unconnected alters 
is expected to translate into a positive exchange balance (or higher perceived generosity) for 
Gift exchange 
incidence
In-degree 
centrality
Control variables
1. Tenure
2. Gender
3. Lab size
4. Job grade: Sr. Scientist
5. Job grade: Management
Subjective Innovation
Performance
Objective Innovation
Performance
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the focal actor.  
Proposition 2A. The extent to which an actor is perceived to be generous will increase as an 
actor has more brokerage opportunities. 
Favor exchange incidence may affect perception of an actor’s perceived generosity. 
Or as Larsen and Watson (2001) phrase it: “Gifts can be described as an investment in 
the relationship between donor and recipient. The greater the value of the gift, the more 
substantial the investment”. Because gift exchange is generally unbalanced when viewed at 
one point in time, a longitudinal perspective more accurately reveals the nature of gift giving. 
A deferred return obligates one individual to another, and therefore creates social debt. At 
the same time, Belk (1976) has described the tension generated and reduced in unbalanced 
exchanges as an important dynamic in gift giving (cf. equity theory, Adams, 1965; Deckop 
et al, 2003; Gouldner, 1960; Maitland, 2002; Walster et al., 1873). The continuing balance 
of debt – now in the favor of one member, now in the favor of the other – coupled with a 
certain amount of ambiguity as to whether indebtedness has been repaid over time and the 
uncertainty it creates about who is in whose debt, insures the relationship between the two 
actors. 
Proposition 2B. Perceived generosity will increase as the frequency with which actors 
exchange favors increases. 
The value of network structures can, according to Burt (1992), be judged on the basis of both 
information64  and control benefits. As an actor is more advantageously positioned within the 
network it is likely that these associated benefits influence an actor’s ability to give. In the case 
of exchange networks bigger is better (Burt, 1992). Ceteris paribus, a large, diverse network 
is the best guarantee of having a useful contact present. A larger resource base is likely to 
enable an actor to give and also receive more both in quantitative or qualitative terms. As gift 
exchange is characterized by a need for reciprocity, balance is an important concept. People 
are believed to ‘maintain loose mental accounts of favor exchange’ (Flynn, 2003; p540) by 
which they judge balance in the exchange relationship. Whenever, one party his given more 
an imbalance or indebtedness is believed to be present. Thus a deferred return obligates one 
individual to another, and therefore creates social debt (cf. Bourdieu, 1977; Mauss, 1954; 
Gouldner, 1960; Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973). Social debt and the likelihood of other 
to inniate and provide an actor with favors are also related to actor status (Merton, 1968), 
as higher higher status actor have been shown to credited with as well as receive more than 
those who enjoy a lower status. This leads us to expect that centrally located individuals 
having access to a larger resource base are likely to entertain relationships where the focal 
actor is perceived to have given more. As a result of which actors are perceived as generous. 
64 Networks facilitate access to broader sources of information at lower cost and information’s quality 
(Laumann & Knoke, 1987), relevance and timeliness (Burt, 1992).
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We therefore hypothesize that: 
Proposition 2C. The extent to which an actor is perceived to be generous will increase as 
actors are more centrally located within the network.  
The relationships between the independent and dependent variables with respect to the social 
outcomes are summarized in figure 6‑3. 
Figure 6‑4 Summary of propositions: gift exchange and social outcomes 
The following paragraphs will put these propositions to the test as we explore the available 
ata set. Determinants of innovation performance, as posited by propositions 1A, 1B, 1C, 
and 1D will be examined in paragraphs 6.4 and 6.5. Lastly, paragraph 6.6 investigates the 
extent to which propositions 2A, 2B and 2C, which propose a relationship between network 
position and perceived generosity, are tenable in the face of the available data. 
6.4 Network, Exchange and Innovation Performance 
Chapters 2,3 and 4 sought to impart the central role individuals, and the structural and 
relational attributes they command,  play in the high stacked game of knowledge creation. In 
terms of relational attributes, we posited gift exchange’s relevance as an effective coordination 
mechanism that provides economic as well as social benefits (Belk, 1979; Larsen & Watson, 
2001). While the social function of gift exchange will be explored in paragraph 6.6, this 
section explores economic outcomes. As knowledge creation unfolds parties cooperate in 
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order to secure required resources. To that end they activate both structural and relational 
attributes (Granovetter, 1992). 
Ascertaining the impact of these attributes on innovation performance requires us to define 
and measure innovation outcomes. In the context of this study, we used both an objective 
and subjective measure to operationalize performance. In terms of objective data the number 
of patents applied for by a researcher was used, supervisor assessment of researcher’s 
creativity65 provided valuable subjective performance data. Note that the latter represents 
an ongoing evaluation of innovative performance and the former measure represents the 
sum of a researchers successful (past) patent applications. So whereas creativity rated by a 
supervisor represents a current performance indicator, patent output reflects to some extent 
past performance. Thus the use of both measures is likely to provide both a more balanced 
as well as a more accurate proxy for innovation performance. The hierarchical regression 
analysis incorporates both measures as the dependent variables allowing us to run several 
models and explore the impact of structural and exchange variables66.   
In order to avoid bias from other effects on performance, control variables are included. 
The selected control variables (variables 1 to 5) represent demographic and situational 
variables which are likely, as demonstrated by previous studies, to affect the dependent 
variables. These are held constant so as to allow us to study the net effect of this study’s 
main variables. First, organizational tenure was included as individuals who have been 
with the company longer might have had more time to develop their networks, acquire 
on-the-job experience, accumulate patents, as well as demonstrate their innovativeness 
versus recent hires. Second gender in many studies is shown to have some effect. 
Third, lab size, the number of people working in a lab, is a situational variable that 
might affect an individual’s opportunity to develop networks. Larger networks are 
likely to offer more possible contacts, visibility and a larger resource base. Fourth, job 
grade is likely to be important as it presumably conveys skill and past achievements. 
 Table 6-2 presents the means, standard deviations, and correlations (descriptive 
statistics) for all the variables analyzed in this study67. As noted, the average in-degree 
centrality (representing network size) was 9.2 contacts and the largest network comprised 
65 In terms of performance, researchers were assessed by their immediate supervisors on both creativity and 
implementation proficiency. Although the later proved to hold little explanatory value it did create a clear cut 
distinction between the concepts of creativity and implementation.  
66 Non-respondent bias, the idea that non-respondents differ from respondents on dimensions which may be 
linked to the dependent variable and for which one (usually) cannot control, was not considered an issue for 
this study given the fact that virtually the entire network was surveyed [97 percent response rate].
67 The two related datasets, gathered under similar circumstances and using the same survey instrument, were 
merged to one dataset. The datasets were generally comparable. Underlying distribution and parameters were 
assessed; Student’s two sample t-test indicated that overall means were comparable. In those cases where 
differences where found to be present, variables related to the overall network were affected by the number of 
relationship present in the dataset.
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of 42 relations. The average respondent was 43 years of age and had worked 14 years on 
average for their organization. The average lab size in the organization was 11. Within the 
dataset twenty-three percent of the respondents were female. The correlation matrix shows 
that being female is negatively correlated with in-degree centrality, subjective (creativity) 
and objective (patent output) performance. In line with expectations results show a positive 
correlation between objective performance and tenure. A management position is positively 
correlated with in‑degree centrality and negatively with exchange frequency. It seems that 
managers both have larger networks and exchange less knowledge. Finally, both subjective 
and objective performances are positively correlated with in-degree centrality. As the results 
of the different regression analyses are considered and interpreted these observations are 
explored further.   
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Table 6‑2 M
eans, Standard D
eviations and C
orrelations
M
eans, Standard D
eviations, and C
orrelations 
Variable 
M
ean 
s.d. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1.   Tenure 
14,60
11,32
1
2.   G
ender
24,46%
0,43
-,29**
1
3.   Lab size
2,25
0,72
,01
,04
1
4.   Job grade: S
r. S
cientist 
16,31%
0,37
,06
-,12
,05
1
5.   Job grade: M
anagem
ent 
32,19%
0,47
,03
-0,07
-,35**
-,30**
1
6.   E
xchange frequency
47,16
43,16
-,17*
,05
-,12
,03
-,18**
1
7.   In-degree centrality 
9,20
7,19
,10
-,18**
-,15*
,05
,34**
-,27**
1
8.  S
ubjective perform
ance 
3,39
0,99
-,11
-,17*
-,01
,15*
,06
-,14*
,26**
1
9.  O
bjecttive output 
1,59
1,93
,20**
-,23**
,14*
,16*
,11
-,08
,27**
,14*
1
** C
orrelation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*  C
orrelation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6‑3 R
esults of H
ierarchical R
egression A
nalysis Predicting Perform
ance
Step and Variable 
Subjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 1  
O
bjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 2 
Subjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 3
O
bjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 4
Subjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 5
O
bjective 
Perform
ance 
M
odel 6
1
Tenure 
-0,18**
0,15*
-0,21**
0,15
-0,21**
0,15*
 
G
ender 
-0,17*
-0,15*
-0,17*
-0,15*
-0,15*
-0,13†
 
Lab size
0,04
0,22*
0,01
0,22*
0,03
0,24**
 
Job grade: S
r. S
cientist
0,22**
0,18**
0,21**
0,18**
0,18*
0,15*
 
Job grade: 
M
anagem
ent
0,16*
0,22**
0,19
0,22**
0,05
0,16*
2
E
xchange frequency 
-0,15*
0,02
-0,10
0,06
 3
In-degree centrality
0,21**
0,22**
  
R
2
0,10
0,15
0,12
0,15
0,15
0,19
A
dj R
2
0,08
0,13
0,09
0,13
0,12
0,16
O
verall F
4,04**
7,63**
4,67**
6,34**
5,34**
7,13**
df 
5,  213
5,  215
6,  212
6,  214
7,  211
7,  213
a 
E
ntries 
represent 
standarized coefficients
† p ≤ .10
*  p ≤ .05
** p ≤ .01
130
118
In order to evaluate the effect of favor exchange on individual innovativeness we have 
conducted a hierarchical regression analysis68 69 based on ordinary least squares70. Table 
6‑3 presents regression coefficients (betas)71, absolute value of t‑statistics, R‑squares72 and 
adjusted R‑squares. In addition, F‑test values for changes in R‑square when new variables 
are included are also reported. Control variables were entered on the first step. Favor 
exchange frequency was entered on the second step, and number of contacts (network size) 
was entered on the final step. 
Subjective innovation performance [creativity] is the dependent variable in models 1, 3, 
and 5 while in models 2, 4, and 6 objective innovation performance [patent output] is the 
dependent variable. 
 In model 1 we regress the different control variables on subjective performance. 
Among the controls hierarchical level, gender and tenure are significant for both creativity 
and patents. Generally, scientists with a higher job grade (reflecting the position in the 
hierarchy of R&D division) are more creative/innovative whereas job tenure and gender 
(female) have a negative effect on creativity/innovativeness. Put differently longer tenured 
employees as well as females are significantly less innovative than recent hires and males 
respectively. The latter effect may be related to the small overall percentage of women in 
the sample. Alternatively, status, internal policies and organizational culture might play a 
role. Incorporation of these controls ensures that impact of favor exchange and in-degree 
centrality are net of individual and departmental differences which might account for 
differences in the dependent variable individual innovativeness. 
 Model 3, in line with proposition 1C, considers the impact of favor exchange 
on individual innovativeness (as measured by the proxy creativity). Favor exchange is 
68 Several tests were conducted to test if regression assumptions were met. In order to examine if the residual 
terms were uncorrelated (or independent), essentially a form of autocorrelation, a Durbin-Watson test was 
carried out. Durbin-Watson test statistics indicated that adjacent residuals were not correlated (ranging from 
1.8 to 2.0). Sample size was sufficiently large to allow for the use of a t‑distribution for tests of significance 
(Henkel, 1976). Finally, a variance inflation test (VIF) was conducted to test for multi‑collinearity (existence 
of a linear relationship between predictors), results (average VIF: 1,21, largest value: 1,48 for the variable 
job grade) showed that VIF’s were well within limits (Belsley, Kuh & Welsch, 1980) indicating that multi-
collinearity did not bias the regression model.  
69 Additional analyses not reported here for the de-aggregated datasets were conducted to assess the robustness 
of results reported in tables 6-2 and 6-3. Models 1 to 8 were regressed on the dataset for company Y (Sample 
size for company X was not large enough to allow for the use of a t‑distribution for tests of significance), the 
set of regression coefficients (betas) and levels of significance offered similar overall results.  
70 Additional analyses were conducted using an ordered logit model to asses the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and the dependent variables, which allows for estimation of the relationship when a 
variable is categorical and ordered. The OLS regression model however provided littleexplanatory power. 
71 The regression coefficients (betas) provide insight in the influence of individual independent variables on the 
dependent variable, where the independent variable with the highest beta‑value has the largest influence on 
the outcome variable innovativeness (dependent).
72 The R‑square gives an indication of the explanatory value of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable innovativeness. 
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negatively and significantly related to individual innovativeness (B= ‑.147, p< .05) a result 
which runs to counter to our predicted positive relationship. This counter intuitive finding 
suggests that as the average gift exchange frequency within an ego‑network increases 
individual innovativeness decreases73. The finding seems to contrast Flynn’s (2003) finding 
that favor exchange increases productivity within a network of professional engineers.  
 Model 5 includes in‑degree centrality (a measure which reflects network size) and 
considers its effect on subjective innovation performance (creativity). The effect of in-degree 
centrality is positive and significant (B= .206, p< .01) and as such supports proposition 1A. 
The results suggest that a larger network with more exchange partners positively contributes 
to individual innovativeness. To the extent that an individual’s (in-degree) centrality increases 
and the individual is connected to more alters their access to resources and new and novel 
ideas increases (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). Interestingly, once in-degree centrality 
has been included the impact of favor exchange on individual innovativeness diminishes 
and becomes statically in‑significant, which seems to suggest that the structural network 
measures capture a number of effects, including favor exchange. Network measures have 
been recognized to capture, and as such have been used as proxies for, different effects such 
as social capital, actor status, informational advantages etc. (Gabbay & Zuckerman, 1998; 
Galunic & Moran, 2000; Hansen, 1999; Landry et al., 2002; Allen & Cohen, 1969; Allen, 
1977; Tushman, 1978; Tushman & Scalan, 1981; Burt, 1992, 2001, 2004).
 
The relationship with objective innovation performance [as measured by the number of 
patents applied for] is the focus of models 2, 4, 6 and 8. 
 Model 2 provides an overview of the effect of the controls on patent output. In 
contrast to Model 1 which had subjective innovation performance [e.g. creativity] as the 
dependent variable, tenure is positively related to patent output, that is longer tenured 
employees on average have a higher patent output. This result is in line with expectations 
since patent output measures the number of patents applied for by employees over time, as 
the value represents the sum it is expected to increase. While unit size was not significant 
when we considered creativity, it is significant and positively related to patent output. 
Including unit size or the number of people working in each department allows us to 
account for contextual factors which influence individuals’ patent output. The variables job 
grade (hierarchical level) and gender were significant and negatively and positively related 
respectively to the dependent variable. 
 Favor exchange frequency is entered in model 4; results reveal that the effect of 
favor exchange frequency on patent output has a small positive yet insignificant effect. 
Based on these results we have to reject proposition 1D. This counterintuitive result is in 
line with model 3 and will be explored further in paragraph 6.5. 
Model 6 adds the predictor in‑degree centrality, which is positively and significantly related 
73 We also tested for a curvilinear (inverted U‑shaped) relationship between gift exchange frequency and 
creativity, which would suggest that an increase in favor exchange frequency is beneficial up to a certain 
point (Flynn, 2003). Results however were not significant (p>0.1). 
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to patent output (B= .22, p< .01).This result corroborates the findings in model 3 and supports 
proposition 1B, having a greater network provides benefits both in terms of subjective [e.g. 
creativity] and objective [e.g. patent output] performance. In sum, while gift exchange 
frequency matters for subjective performance [creativity] its effect is at first glance puzzling. 
Furthermore favor exchange frequency falls from significance when the structural network 
property ‘in-degree centrality’ is introduced. In order to explore these results further the 
following paragraphs will look closer at the relationships between exchange behavior and 
innovation.
 
A comparison between the subjective and objective performance models highlights 
differences in observed relationships between independent and dependent variables in the 
two models. First, when considering subjective performance, the extent to which a researcher 
is rated as creative, organizational tenure is negatively related to creativity (B= -.18, p< .01). 
This result seems to suggest that as researchers work longer for the organization their 
creativity decreases74. However, when the simultaneous effect of job grade is considered, 
the relationships show that a higher job grade is related to higher creativity performance 
(B= .22, p< .01; B = .16, p< .05). The simultaneous presence of both effects might suggest 
the existence of an up or out selection process, be it by design or unintended, promoting 
successful, that is innovative, researchers to higher job grades.  
Examination of the objective performance model (e.g. model 2), shows that tenure is 
positively related to objective performance (patent output). A result which is in line with 
prior expectation and is closely related to the performance variable as it is based on patent 
output. As tenure increases so does the likelihood that, based on the research one has 
undertaken, one has applied for patents. Again, job grade is positively related to performance 
(B= .18 p< .01; B = .22, p< .01) a result which seems to reflect the promotion of successful 
researchers. Second, the variable ‘lab size’, reflecting the number of researcher working for 
a department, shows markedly different results for both performance models. Where lab 
size has no significant effect (B= .04, p > .05) on subjective performance (e.g. creativity) it 
does positively influence researchers’ patent output (B= .22, p < .01). The larger resource 
base larger departments have at their disposal seemed to be an important facilitator. Of 
course, larger departments due to their size and manpower have more ongoing research 
projects at any given moment than smaller departments. A larger project base provides 
an increased opportunity that patentable results arise. Finally, differences in the impact of 
the main dependent variable become apparent when considering both models examining 
subjective and objective performance simultaneously. Gift exchange, capturing in economic 
terms the frequency with which an actor exchanges information and knowledge, negatively 
impacts subjective performance (B= -.15, p < .05) but does not affect objective performance 
74 Additional analyses not reported here found an interaction effect between tenure and job grade Senior 
Scientist (B = -.242, P<.05) indicating that longer tenured senior scientists also are reported to be less 
creative. 
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(B= .02, p > .05). Moreover, a researcher’s in-degree centrality (indication for size of ego 
network) positively impacts both subjective and objective performance (B= .21 p< .01; B = 
.22, p< .01) which at the very least seems to underscore the important role that networks and 
cooperation play in research. Of course, one cannot rule out the possibility that the causality 
runs in the opposite direction. That is, successful scientists are contacted more frequently 
by other researchers and find it easier to maintain larger networks. Though the study did 
control for tenure, job grade is likely to be associated with scientist performance as such 
we cannot completely rule out this possibility. Nonetheless, the importance of networks and 
cooperation for productivity in science is undisputed (cf. de Solla Price & Beaver, 1966; 
Zuckerman, 1979). 
The following paragraphs will take the results from this section as a basis for further 
exploration. These paragraphs will introduce additional analyses and variables, with the aim 
of providing a more in-depth analysis.    
6.5 Favor exchange and innovation performance  
The regression analyses conducted in the last paragraph revealed that favor exchange 
incidence and innovativeness are significant though negatively related. This finding 
seems to be contrary to prior research (Flynn, 2003), which showed that favor exchange 
frequency and productivity were positively related. More specifically the study carried out 
by Flynn (2003) looked at the individual productivity of professional engineers working 
in the telecommunication branch. Productivity was measured by looking at proxies such 
as: number of jobs completed, number of specs drafted, number of hours logged and the 
number of technical drawings produced. Theoretically the positive benefits of frequent favor 
exchange are attributed to an increased efficiency of exchange of resources as well as the 
particular benefits (e.g. access to resources, more flexibility in handling problems of varying 
size) the exchange offers (Flynn, 2003; Molm & Cook, 1995).   
A case can thus be made for a positive relationship between innovativeness and favor 
exchange frequency, along the lines of Flynn’s research. The argument would be that as 
researchers on average engage more frequently into exchange with relevant others, they 
have more resources, knowledge and pertinent ideas at their disposal contributing to 
their individual innovativeness. Though reasonable the results clearly don’t support this 
argument. To understand why, we need to consider the difference between productivity and 
innovation outcomes. This study focuses on the benefits of favor exchange for innovation 
related outcomes. As has been discussed, knowledge, the basis of innovation, has properties 
that set it apart from other more tangible outcomes. The focus here is on the cumulative 
nature of knowledge, that is the idea that knowledge creation depends on the combination 
and recombination of existing knowledge (Moran & Ghosal, 1996; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 
1998; Tsai & Ghosal, 1998). Combining knowledge requires actors to access and exchange 
knowledge the structural attributes for which are provided by professional networks. 
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Networks are important because individuals rely to a considerable extent, especially in 
knowledge-intensive settings, on their networks of relationships in order to solve problems 
and find the required knowledge or information (Cross et al., 2002; Park 2002; Dougherty 
and Hardy, 1996; Rogers, 1995; Coleman, Katz, and Menzel, 1966). Who one knows affects 
one’s ability to obtain required information (Burt, 1992; Granovetter, 1973). Our analysis 
corroborated the predictive value of in-degree centrality of individual innovativeness both 
in terms of creativity and patents output.  
Correlation coefficients, means and standard deviations for in‑degree centrality, exchange 
frequency and tie strength are displayed in Table 6‑4 The descriptives show that exchange 
frequency differs across respondents. At the same time, in‑degree centrality results between 
respondents display markedly different network sizes (min.: 1 tie, max.: 42 ties) as well. 
Such differences between ego-networks may affect network dynamics as well as outcomes.
 
Table 6‑4 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
 Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4
1. In-degree centrality 9,20 7,19 1
2. Exchange frequency 47,16 43,16 -,27** 1
3. Tie strength 0,13 0,08 -,30** ,28** 1
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*  Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
The correlation matrix reveals that favor exchange frequency is negatively associated 
with in-degree centrality (cf. Table 6-4) meaning that as an ego network becomes larger 
average favor exchange frequency decreases. An explanation for the observed decrease 
in favor exchange frequency is likely to have to consider the notion that individuals are 
constrained in terms of time and energy. As in-degree centrality increases, that is the number 
of ties an individual entertains, the average [exchange] interaction is likely to diminish. 
Likewise, Granovetter (1973) and Burt (1992) argue that building strong ties involves a 
larger commitment in time and energy. This conceptualization of tie strength is adopted in 
this study in that tie strength is defined as a combination of the amount of time spend and the 
emotional intensity involved. Table 6-4 shows that, in line with prior research, the average 
tie strength in our research population decreases as an ego’s in-degree centrality increases.
The results, which indicate that in-degree centrality (network size) is positively related to 
individual innovativeness and larger networks on average are made up of weaker ties [as 
well as lower favor exchange frequencies], beckon the question why weak ties are more 
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conducive to individual innovativeness than strong ties? The strength-of-ties literature has 
looked extensively at the nature of relational bonds and the effects on information sharing 
(e.g. Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993; Granovetter, 1973; Hanssen, 1999; Uzzi, 1999). In terms 
of information sharing strong ties are associated with an increased likelihood that actors 
will share complex as well as sensitive information, whereas weak ties afford access to a 
greater and more diverse knowledge potential (Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993; Hanssen, 1999). 
Granovetter (1973) introduced the notion that weak ties provide access to non-redundant 
information and facilitates knowledge diffusion. Frenzen and Nakamoto (1993;p.373) 
emphasize weak ties’ ability to bridge since, there is a “structural tendency for strong ties to 
cluster in dense, island‑like cliques and weak ties to scatter widely as non‑redundant bridges 
that links cliques together”. Hansen (1999) concludes that depending on the situation, 
although strong ties are associated with knowledge (transfer) benefits, weak ties are more 
conducive to facilitate the search for ideas, new knowledge and solutions. 
Weak ties75 that bridge otherwise disconnected social groups can be more valuable than 
connections that do not have such a varied set of resources within reach (see also Tsai & 
Ghosal, 1998; Granovetter,1973). An argument that is also made by Burt (2004) who stresses 
the importance of bridging disconnected actors for obtaining creative benefits. Innovation 
then is more likely to be discovered through knowledge brokering (Sutton & Hargadon, 
1996). 
The ability for individuals to broker is associated, although not synonymous, with network 
size76. As Burt (1992; 2004) emphasizes individuals who are in a position to broker and 
span structural holes have a greater exposure to alternative perspectives, good ideas, 
opportunities and so forth translating into what he dubs ‘creative benefits’. The idea that 
innovation, representing a combination and recombination of existing knowledge, benefits 
from better access to knowledge and ideas ties is reflected by our results (See also table 6‑3: 
subjective performance: B=.21, p<.01 and objective performance B=.22, p<.01). Objective 
and subjective performance both are positively associated with a higher in-degree centrality. 
The benefits offered by weak ties for innovation related outcomes are not reflected for 
implementation performance77. This seems to indicate that individual implementation 
performance does not benefit to the same extent from the informational advantages offered 
by a larger network exposure. 
75 Closely related to the idea that weak ties provide access to non-redundant information is the notion that they 
are less costly to maintain allowing ego to maintain a larger network. 
76 A larger network is likely to provide more brokerage potential, that is bridging unconnected network pairs, 
however this is not to say that larger networks necessarily equate with the ability to broker it all depends on 
the structure of the network.
77 Additional analyses not included indicated that both in‑degree centrality and favor exchange frequency were 
not statistically significant predictors of implementation performance.  
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6.6 Perceived generosity and network position
The relationship between exchange and innovation related outcomes, as explored in the last 
two paragraphs, provided a singular focus on economic outcomes of exchange. However, 
as Avner (1997) points out, exchange is more than just an economic transaction as its effect 
extents beyond the economic into the social by affecting the relationship between the parties 
involved (cf. Belk, 1979; Larsen & Watson, 2001). Although personal relations between 
giver and receiver represent an important dimension in many transaction (Rose-Ackerman, 
1998), their instrumental functions in regulating transactions should not be overlooked. 
Given our focus on reciprocal forms of exchange, where actors separately contribute and 
reciprocity is generally deferred, indebtedness between exchange partners represents an 
important variable. Whenever actors are not able to (sufficiently) reciprocate received 
benefits (e.g. perceive that they have received more than they have provided) exchange 
theory posits that actors incur social debts. Indebtedness then represents the extent to which 
the giver can call on the recipient for future benefits (Mauss, 1954; Bourdieu, 1977; Ferrary, 
2003; Deckop et al., 2003; Coleman, 1988). 
The equality or inequality of the exchange relations, representing the basis for indebtedness, 
were measured by asking respondents to indicate with regard to their exchange partners who 
had given more. Combining these results with network data and individual control variables 
allows us to explore the effect of the aforementioned variables on perceived generosity 
(e.g. the extent to which a focal actor was considered generous). Correlations among 
variables presented in these models are reported in Table 6-5. As discussed in the previous 
paragraphs job grade management is positively correlated with in-degree centrality. These 
results also show a positive relationship between management and the opportunity to broker. 
The opportunity to act as a go-between, as becomes clear from the correlation matrix, is 
positively associated with tenure. At the same time brokerage is positively correlated with 
perceived generosity. This outcome will be explored further when we discuss our regression 
results. Table 6-6 presents results based on linear multiple regression based on random 
permutations. Control variables were entered in the first step. Brokerage was entered on the 
second step, and the variable ‘in‑degree centrality’ was entered in the final step.
The dependent variable in models 1-3 is perceived generosity. 
 Model 1 represents the base model and includes the control variables gender, 
tenure, lab size and hierarchical level. Contrary to expectation the variables job tenure 
and hierarchical level (as well as gender) were not significant predictors of perceived 
generosity. In line with previous research (Goffman, 1971; Buunk, Doosje and Hopstaken, 
1993, Merton, 1968; Homans, 1950; Bodeman, 1988) it was expected that hierarchical 
status would influence the dependent variable perceived reciprocity. For example Buunk, 
Doosje and Hopstaken (1993) found that although employees indicated that their exchange 
relationships with colleagues were reciprocal, exchange relationships with supervisors were 
not balanced, more specifically they felt the exchange over‑benefited them (e.g. they had 
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Table 6‑5 M
eans, Standard D
eviations and C
orrelations
M
eans, Standard D
eviations, and C
orrelations 
Variable 
M
ean 
s.d. 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1. Tenure 
14,60
11,32
1
2. G
ender 
0,24
0,43
-,29**
1
3. Lab size 
2,25
0,72
,01
,04
1
4. Job grade: S
r. scientist
0,16
0,37
,06
-,12
,05
1
5. Job grade: M
anagem
ent 
0,32
0,47
,03
-,07
-,35**
-,30**
1
6. B
rokerage
134,19
216,43
,14*
-,11
-,06
,09
,04
1
7. In-degree centrality 
9,20
7,19
,10
-,18**
-,15**
,05
,34**
,22**
1
8. E
xchange frequency
47,16
43,16
-,17*
,05
-,12
,03
-,18**
,10
-,27**
1
9. P
erceived generosity
3,05
0,38
-,05
-,05
,12
-,10
-,09
,20**
-,04
,12
1
** C
orrelation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).
*  C
orrelation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 6‑6 R
esults of H
ierarchical R
egression A
nalysis Predicting Perceived G
enerosity
M
eans, Standard D
eviations, and C
orrelations 
Step and variable
M
odel 1 
M
odel 2 
M
odel 3 
M
odel 4 
1
Tenure    
-0,15
-0,17
-0,20
-0,28
G
ender  
0.80
-0,06
-0,04
-0,05
Lab size 
0,15*
-0,13†
0,12†
0,12†
2
B
rokerage 
0,19**
0,21**
0,22**
3
In-degree centrality 
0,27**
0,23**
4
E
xchange frequency 
0,16*
R
2
0,05
0,09
0,16
0,19
A
dj. R
2
0,02
0,06
0,13
0,15
O
verall F
2,102
3,152*
5,086**
5,178**
a E
ntries represent 
standarized coefficients
† p ≤ .10
*  p ≤ .05
** p ≤ .01
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received more from their supervisors than they had given). 
The notion of differences in perceived value in relation to higher status actors has also been 
referred to as the Mathew effect78 (Merton, 1968) capturing the idea that those who ‘have’ 
are credited with/receive more than those who ‘have less or have not’. Similarly Homans 
(1950) points out “the higher a man’s social rank, the larger will be the number of persons 
that originate interaction for him”. 
 Model 2 explores the impact of brokerage on perceived generosity. Brokerage 
considers an actors opportunity to act as a go-between between alters who are not directly 
connected. As such the measure considers the extent to which the network position of an 
actor is beneficial. Brokerage is positively and significantly related to perceived generosity 
(B= .19, P< .01) as predicted by proposition 2A. This finding suggests that as actors inhabit 
network positions that allow them to broker between unconnected alters, the focal actor is 
perceived to be more generous by his alters. 
 Model 3 includes in-degree centrality (size of network) and considers its effect 
on the dependent variable perceived generosity. The effect of in-degree centrality is both 
positive and significant (B = .27, p< .01) confirming proposition 2C. The results indicate that 
as an actor’s network increases and he or she is connected to more alters, the focal actor is 
considered to be more generous. 
Model 4 assesses the impact of exchange frequency on perceived generosity. In line with 
proposition 2B exchange frequency is significantly and positively associated (B = .16, p< .05) 
with the extent to which one is considered generous. That is exchanging frequently enables 
actors to influence perceived social indebtedness, which according to theory facilitates an 
actor’s future access to resources. 
The structural network measures added in models 2‑3, reflecting differences in the network 
position of actors, show a marked effect on perceived generosity. At the same time, contrary 
to theoretical and empirical expectations, hierarchical position did not have a significant 
impact on perceived generosity. These relationships give us ground to reconsider the 
notion that differences in hierarichal position impact perceived generosity as put forward 
by theory79. Instead the results indicate that the  network position an individual inhabits 
holds more explanatory power influencing the way alters assess a focal actor’s generosity. 
78 The Matthew effect refers to the parable of the talents in the gospel of Matthew. Where it says: ‘for unto 
every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken 
away even that which he hath’ (Matthew 25:29 King James Version). 
79 The alternative explanation which posts that hierarchical position (e.g. job grade) does not affect perceived 
generosity (B= -.09, P>.1) because of managers’ detachment from the actual R&D process and hence their 
limited ability to prove a valuable exchange partner seems unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, management 
positions may reduce an individual’s ability to provide research related benefits but does put him/her in 
a position to provide other types of valued benefits. Secondly, job grade senior scientists (B= ‑.01, P>.1) 
representing a group of senior employees very much involved in the R&D process also proved to hold no 
explanatory power with regard to outcome variable perceived generosity.
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Perceived generosity in turn is posited to strengthen an actor’s right to call upon an actor to 
provide resources when needed. Or as Bodemann (1988) points out; (informally) powerful 
people –being in a position where they can confer benefits to others – will receive more gifts 
than less powerful individuals, so that they might be more likely to reciprocate the focal 
agent. These results enable us to consider and take account of informal forms of power as an 
important predictor of exchange related outcomes. 
 As suggested by model 4 the impact of exchange frequency on the loose mental 
accounts, individuals are believed to maintain of prior favor exchange cycles, allowing them 
to determine the extent to which a giving and receiving is balanced or unbalanced (Flynn, 
2003; Clarc, 1984; Clark, Mills & Corcoran, 1989), has interesting implications both from 
a practical and theoretical perspective. In order to offer an explanation for the interplay 
between exchange frequency and perceived generosity we draw on exchange literature. 
People’s perceptions of exchange balance are subjective and people maintain loose mental 
accounts. As such memory biases as well as egocentric biases (Sprecher, 1988; Flynn, 2003) 
are thought to affect these accounts. Frequent giving does not necessarily equate with large 
favors and can also and is more likely to reflect numerous smaller gifts. However, as one 
receives favor more frequently they might be recalled more readily by the recipient. As 
the specifics of the exchanges are forgotten what might remain is the notion that one has 
received numerous times. At the same time, literature emphasizes the tension generated by 
unbalanced exchanges as an important dynamic in gift giving Belk (1976). The value of 
indebtedness as a determinant of alter’s willingness to respond to requests has been stressed 
before. 
Network structure – the size and shape, and connections among actors – imposes limitations 
on and provides opportunities for exchange. Network structure creates incentives for actors 
to exchange, influencing ‘who is likely to interact and exchange with whom’ (Skvoretz & 
Lovaglia, 1995; Lawler, Thye & Yoon, 2000). To the extent that the actors inhabit more 
favorable positions (e.g. network centrality, brokerage opportunities) within a network 
and/or command a larger network, actors will, ceteris paribus, have more resources and 
alternative exchange partners at their disposal. As such favorable network positions serve as 
a basis for power differentials between actors (e.g. Emerson, 1972; Blau, 1964) as well as 
inequalities in exchange outcomes (Cook & Rice, 2003). The effects of network structure 
and its relationship with perceived generosity lead us to consider two possible explanations. 
By virtue of their larger networks and increased brokering opportunities actors are able to 
access a larger resource base allowing them to provide extensive benefits to their alters. As 
alters are not able to reciprocate to the same extent this results in a relational imbalance 
in their relationship with the focal actor, affecting perceived generosity. At the same time, 
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perceived generosity can also be related to the value of the provided resources. 
The argument being that as actors command larger networks and have more brokering 
opportunities their networks extend into more exchange domains80 (Emerson, 1972) giving 
them access to different and potentially more valued resources. As a consequence they are 
able to provide alters not with more but higher valued resources. Within the context of 
knowledge generation this argument ties in with Burt’s (1992; 2004) notion of creative 
benefits (resulting from an exposure to alternative perspectives, good ideas, opportunities) 
which he links to structural hole spanning and brokerage opportunities.   
At the same time, perceived generosity offers considerable advantages in part brought about 
by favorable network positions. Whenever actors can maintain one partner’s exchange 
with only intermittent reciprocity, they are in a position to pursue other exchange relations 
and maintain larger networks and appropriate the associated benefits. Moreover, perceived 
generosity strengthens an actor’s right to call on the partner to provide assistance/resources. 
Both benefits can bolster an individual’s effectiveness as evidenced in earlier paragraphs and 
might very well reflect a self‑reinforcing phenomenon. 
80 The concept of an exchange domain is defined as a set of functionally equivalent outcomes, where the 
receipt of one outcome in the set reduces the value of all outcomes in that specific domain (Emerson, 1972). 
Applying economic terms would lead us to consider outcomes in the same domain as substitutable and those 
in different domains as possible complementary (Yamaguchi, 1996). 
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 Model 2 indicates, in line with earlier results, that in-degree centrality effectively 
reduces the average exchange frequency between any two notes (B =  ‑.23, p< .01). Having 
a larger network with more alters imposes time and energy constraints on the focal actor 
meaning that exchange intensity with individual alters is substituted for overall network 
range. This result runs counter to our initial expectations as formulated in proposition 1D. 
 Model 3 considers the impact of knowledge heterogeneity on exchange frequency. 
Knowledge heterogeneity is positively and significantly related to exchange frequency (B 
=  .24, p< .01). That is, exchange frequency significantly increases when exchange partners 
share a similar knowledge base. Thus, proposition 2A is supported. Similarity in expertise 
base positively impacts average exchange frequency. As a predictor of exchange frequency 
this makes sense, in that their shared knowledge base facilitates communication and 
exchange. At the same time, innovation literature indicates that innovation benefits from the 
combination of different areas of expertise (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Galunic & Rodan, 
1998; Rodan & Galunic, 2004). Results show that exchange in such settings, although 
beneficial, at the same time is less frequent or less likely. As posited by Nooteboom (1992; 
1999) the relationship between innovation performance and knowledge heterogeneity is 
believed to represent a curvilinear relationship. An increase of knowledge heterogeneity is 
likely to be positive up to point, providing opportunity for novel combination of knowledge, 
however when actor’s knowledge is too different it precludes the mutual understanding 
needed to reap potential innovation benefits.  
 Model 4 introduces tie strength and considers its effect on exchange frequency. 
The effect of tie strength, a variable which reflects both ‘closeness’ and ‘communication 
frequency’, on exchange frequency is positive and significant (B =  .17, p< .05). Proposition 
2B is supported in that actors exchange more with their alters as tie strength increases. 
Literature indicates that strong ties facilitate exchange in general and knowledge exchange 
in particular. As relationships develop and the exchange interactions progresses actors learn 
to cooperate (Powell et al., 1996, Starpoli, 1998; Galuti, 1995) and establish a common 
frame of reference allowing actors to incorporate new (tacit) knowledge (Hansen, 1999; 
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Von Hippel, 1994). During the exchange of knowledge actors also 
have the opportunity to gauge the expertise and abilities of the exchange partner and develop 
competence trust (Nooteboom, 2002).
In sum, models 2‑4 indicate that the frequency of exchange increases when actors share the 
same knowledge base and are connected by strong ties. Theoretically these findings make 
sense as exchange will tend to be easier for actors who have learned to cooperate, developed 
a shared frame of reference and trust. However, although knowledge exchange between 
actors may be more efficient, in terms of innovation outcomes the result may be suboptimal. 
New knowledge generation requires the input and combination of knowledge and ideas 
preferably from multiple and heterogonous sources. Strong ties and a similar knowledge 
background increases redundancy and reduces the likelihood of the introduction of disparate 
ideas or concepts which is likely to hamper creativity. In light of the expected benefits 
that come from combining and diverse knowledge and actors tendencies to exchange with 
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actors likely to possess redundant information we should not expect the existing exchange 
configurations to automatically represent the optimum.   
6.7 Discussion
This study considered the impact of structural and relational attributes on innovation and gift 
exchange outcomes. As such, the study yielded both expected as well as unexpected results.
 Table 6‑8 summarizes the key finding of this study. Structural attributes and too a 
lesser extent relational attributes provided cues that contribute to innovation performance. 
At the same time, structural and relational variables were used to explore the notion of 
knowledge transfers as gifts. 
Table 6‑7 Summary of Propositions and Results
Propositions Description Hypothesized 
Relationship
Results 
Proposition 1A.  Subjective innovation performance will increase 
as actors are more centrally located within the 
network.
+ +
Proposition 1B. Objective innovation performance will increase 
as actors are more centrally located within the 
network. 
+ +
Proposition 1C. Subjective innovation performance will increase as 
the frequency with which actors exchange favors 
increases. 
+ -
Proposition 1D. Objective innovation performance will increase as 
the frequency with which actors exchange favors 
increases. 
+ n.s.
Proposition 2A. The extent to which an actor is perceived to be 
generous will increase as an actor has more 
brokerage opportunities. 
+ +
Proposition 2B. Perceived generosity will increase as the frequency 
with which actors exchange favors increases. 
+ +
Proposition 2C. The extent to which an actor is perceived to 
be generous will increase as actors are more 
centrally located within the network.  
+ +
Work in a R&D lab is characterized by regular interpersonal requests for information or 
resources, and as such considered both an interesting and appropriate venue for this type of 
research. Indeed, researchers exchange regularly with other R&D scientists, both within and 
outside their own firm. Conceptualizing knowledge flows as an exchange of gifts, this study, 
in addition to the impact on innovation related outcomes, also explores the exchange process 
itself. As such, we investigated determinants of exchange incidence. 
 As dyadic exchanges are believed to affect actors’ (subjective) perception of the 
exchange balance (Blau, 1964; Flynn, 2003; Clark et al., 1989) this study investigated 
determinants of perceived generosity. Given network structure’s explanatory value in 
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a variety of settings, this study set out to extend previous research by exploring network 
structure’s effect on perceived generosity. It was believed, that is we expected, that favorable 
network positioning (e.g. opportunity to broker and in-degree centrality) as well as a 
frequent exchange between actors would be positively associated with perceived generosity. 
Where results supported the notion that network position operationalized by means of the 
variables ‘brokerage’ and ‘in-degree centrality’ resulted in actors being credited with a 
higher perceived generosity, gift exchange incidence held less explanatory value. Therefore, 
frequency of exchange as a determinant of perceived generosity as demonstrated by Flynn 
(2003) could not be corroborated. Interestingly network structure (brokerage and network 
size) proved to explain partly why certain actors are perceived as generous. Thus, the results 
indicate that as an actor’s network increases and he or she is connected to more alters, the 
focal actor is considered to be more generous. In contrast to previous findings (Goffman, 
1971; Buunk, Doosje and Hopstaken, 1993, Merton, 1968; Homans, 1950; Bodeman, 1988) 
however, hierarchical status did not significantly affect the dependent variable perceived 
reciprocity. These relationships give us ground to reconsider the notion that differences in 
hierarchical position has an impact on perceived generosity as put forward by theory. Instead 
the network position an individual inhabits holds more explanatory power, as it influences 
the way alters assess a focal actor’s generosity. The implication of this finding might very 
well be that it is not as much an actor’s formal position that counts as is his of her (informal) 
position within the social network. 
 The first part of this study considered how structural (network) and relational 
attributes affect individual innovation outcomes. We anticipated a positive association 
between both network position/gift exchange incidence and individual innovation 
performance. Findings were supportive with regard to a number of expectations. The 
study confirmed the notion that a favorable network position operationalized as in‑degree 
centrality is favorable for both subjective [e.g. creativity] and objective performance [e.g. 
patent output]. The observed effects are explained by considering that as an actor’s centrality 
increases, he or she is more likely to have increased access to both resources as well as new 
and novel ideas (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). Indeed, the association between network 
structure and (innovation related as well as general) performance has been demonstrated 
in a number of studies (Burt, 2004; Ingram & Roberts, 2000; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; 
Hanssen, 1999; Uzzi, 1999; Moran, 2005). Contrary to expectation as well as previous 
studies (cf. Flynn, 2003) favor exchange incidence proved to be significant though 
negatively related to subjective performance and not associated with objective performance. 
The negative relationship between favor exchange incidence and subjective performance 
was not originally hypothesized. However, further investigation suggested an explanation 
consistent with literature underscoring the importance of weak ties for knowledge creation 
(cf. (Frenzen & Nakamoto, 1993; Hanssen, 1999; Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 2004). Additional 
analyses demonstrated network size’s positive association with individual innovativeness 
and larger networks’ (on average) higher composition of weaker ties [as well as lower favor 
exchange frequencies], emphasizing the role of weak ties in knowledge creation. The notion 
that weak ties are beneficial to knowledge creation rests on weak ties tendency to provide 
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access to non-redundant information, ideas, knowledge and solutions (Frenzen & Nakamoto, 
1993; Hansen, 1999; Burt, 2004). The reduction of the average favor exchange frequency 
then could be explained by considering that individuals are constrained in terms of time 
and energy. As in‑degree centrality (size of network) increases the average [exchange] 
interaction is likely to diminish (Granovetter, 1973; Burt, 1992).
 
An interest in the reality of knowledge transfers between scientists provided the starting 
point for this study. The idea that know-how transfers essential for innovation are not 
simply explained by either market of hierarchy represented the starting point. Our findings 
underscore the importance of structural and relational attributes for innovation and insight 
in the exchange process itself. Of course, statistical significance is not always synonymous 
with scientific significance (cf. McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996). However, understanding 
the theoretical mechanisms underlying interpersonal exchange enables us to explain an 
important and salient knowledge transfer reality. A reality where scientists continue to 
exchange knowledge on an informal basis with fellow researchers within as well as outside 
the firm. 
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Appendix A
Box 6‑2 Summary of Key Research Variables
Variable Variable Description
Dependent
 - Exchange Frequency An overall measure of favor exchange frequency was calculated by averaging the 
ratings of favor exchange with the focal employee.
 - Perceived Generosity A measure which captures the extent to which alters perceived the focal employee 
to be generous in his favor exchange with them. 
 - Objective Performance The number of patents applied for per researcher was collected, as a proxy for 
innovation output. 
 - Subjective Performance Supervisor's evaluation of the researcher's creativity (defined as the ability to come 
up with novel and useful ideas) over the last 12 months. 
Independent
 - Knowledge heterogeneity The measure reflects the respondents assessment of the extent to which the 
knowledge base of the reported alter was similar or dissimilar to their own. 
 - Tie strength A measure capturing relational strength with reported alter, calculated by means of 
two measures: ‘closeness’ and ‘communication frequency’. 
 - Brokerage The brokerage index measures the percentage of alters in ego’s network which are 
not directly connected to one another (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005) which puts ego in 
a position to act as a go between. 
 - In-degree centrality The in-degree centrality measure offers a basic indication of the network position of 
an individual actor as it measures the number of (incoming or in-degree) ties that 
make up an ego-network (Wasserman & Faust, 1994). 
Control 
 - Tenure Respondents were asked to report their tenure in the organization (years), as a 
possible explanation for performance.  
 - Gender Gender respondent.[0= male, 1 = female] 
 - Lab size The measure reflects the size of a respondent's unit reflecting the notion that the 
number of people working at a given department could be an important factor of 
networking and exchange opportunities. 
 - Jobgrade: Sr. scientist  A measure of hierarchy based on three job grades recoded into a dummy variable [0= 
scientist, 1 = senior scientist, 2= manager]. 
 - Jobgrade: Management   A measure of hierarchy based on three job grades recoded into a dummy variable [0= 
scientist, 1 = senior scientist, 2= manager]. 
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Appendix B
Box 6‑3 Summary of Key Survey Questions
Summary of Key Survey Questions
Name generator Part of the main survey send to all selected participants. 
Over the past 6 months are there any work related contacts from whom 
you regularly sought (research related) information and advice to enhance 
your effectiveness as a researcher? Your most valued work contacts.' (cf. 
Burt, 1992; Podolny and Baron, 1997; Marsden 1990).  
Name interpreters Part of the main survey send to all selected participants. 
Respondents answered the questions 
below on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 1 to 5 [ranging from daily to 
yearly]. 
1. How frequently did you interact with the person in question? (cf. 
Wasserman & Faust, 1994; Burt, 1992)
2. How similar or different is your knowledge from your contacts’ knowledge? 
(cf. Rodan and Galunic, 2004)
3. How close is your working relationship with the person in question? (cf. 
Marsden & Campbell, 1984; Burt, 1992)
4. Please rate the frequency with which you exchange favors with regard to 
the innovation development process with this person (very infrequently vs. 
very frequently)? (cf. Flynn, 2003). 
5. Please rate who has given more in this exchange relationship? (cf. Flynn, 
2003). 
Assessing innovation performance
Part of the survey send to senior managers asked to assess performance 
of employees in their team.
Respondents answered the questions 
below on a 5-point scale, ranging 
from 1 to 5 [ranging from weak to 
outstanding]. 
Please write the number from the 5-point scale that best corresponds to 
your assessment of this knowledge workers performance over the last 6 
months. (cf. Rodan and Galunic, 2004). 
1. To what extent is this person particularly creative: someone able to come 
up with novel and useful ideas?
2. To what extent is this person good at implementing novel ideas?
Control variables
1. What is your age?
2. Please indicate your tenure with the organization.
3. Please indicate your tenure with the department you currently work for.
4. How many scientific articles have you published during your tenure at 
Company X/Y? 
5. How many patens have you applied for during your tenure at Company 
X/Y? 
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Appendix C
The main findings of our empirical study were presented in chapter 6. Paragraph 6.2.2 
amongst others provided an overview of network relationships as observed in company Y. In 
order to preserve structural clarity results for company X could not be incorporated, however 
for the sake of completeness this section will provide a comparable network analyses for 
company X. 
The socio-gram for company X consists of 37 researchers. The nodes represent researchers 
and lines indicated research related information and advice exchanges (224 relationships81). 
 Figure 6‑5, then provides a visual summary of the network configuration of the 
research lab in question. The R&D activities for company X were concentrated in one R&D 
department, as a result and in contrast to company Y, divisional boundaries were not an 
issue82. Again Multi‑Dimensional Scaling techniques are used to position nodes that are 
‘more similar’ closer together. Similarity in this context is based on the actors citing one 
another and the extent to which they shared the same alters.
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Manager (12) 9,25 97,3 0,35 2,06 (1,7-3,5)
Senior Scientist (8) 5,25 64,53 0,30 2,37 (2,1-3,1)
Scientist (17) 4,06 52,7 0,31 2,70 (1,9-4,0)
Mean (37) 6,0 64,22 0,32 2,42 (1,7-4,0)
81 Company X provided a total number of 224 relationships, the social network contained no social isolates. 
82 The socio-gram therefore utilizes a single node color. 
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Figure 6‑5 Knowledge Exchange Network
While the socio-gram provides us with an overall understanding of the context, table 
6-10 allows us to zoom in further by considering job grades and relating these to the 
corresponding network (position) measures. The measures quantify differences in 
network positions actors, categorized by job grade, inhabit in the social context in which 
they are embedded. Informative to a high degree, the network measures employed 
allows us to consider the implications in terms of opportunities and constraints. 
 The first column of the table in figure 2 shows that scientists’ In-degree Networks 
were on average substantially smaller than those of senior scientists and managers. While 
scientists had networks averaging 4,06 contacts, a senior scientist’s average network consisted 
of 5,25 contacts, only to be surpassed by an average of 9.25 contacts for managers.  Network 
size provides us with a straightforward and effective measure of an actor’s centrality. Having 
many ties is considered beneficial in terms of access to resources and deal maker opportunities. 
 Column two of the table, provides the Two-Step-Measure for the different job grades. 
The measure reports the percentage of actors a focal actor can reach within two directed 
steps of ego (friends of friends). As becomes clear from the table, scientist are on average 
able to reach 52,7 percentage of the entire network increasing to 64,53 and 97,3 percent for 
senior scientists and managers respectively. Two‑Step‑Reach is influenced directly through 
154
142
network size (more contacts, more indirect contacts) and indirectly through the network 
size of a focal actor’s alters. Having more central contacts enables a focal actor to access a 
larger part of the network without having to incur the costs in terms of network maintenance. 
 The table’s third column considers the Normalized Brokerage measure. Brokerage 
considers the number of pairs which are not directly connected, creating an opportunity to act 
as a broker between these two unconnected alters. As such structural holes or non-redundancy 
(Burt, 1992) are considered to facilitate access to diverse sources of information providing 
actors access to more timely and relevant information about upcoming opportunities and 
complications or contingencies. The table indicates that higher job grades are associated 
with more brokerage opportunities, even when accounting for the associated larger networks. 
 In the final column of the table, Average Geodesic Path Distances are considered. 
Using the path distance measure the minimum number of relations required to connect alters 
are determined. Average path distance is calculated for each actor, resulting in the mean 
geodesic distance for a respondent which captures an actor’s closeness to all other nodes 
in the network. In case of a direct contact between two individuals the distance is one, a 
connection that takes two directed steps (friends of friends) is two etc. As network density 
increases the path distances will generally become smaller and vice versa (Hanneman & 
Riddle, 2005). Results for the knowledge exchange network in figure 6‑5 show that the 
diameter of the network (largest path distance) is 4 steps with an average of 2.42 steps. 
Given the relatively small overall size of the social network in Company X average path 
distances do not differ significantly across job grades. Actors are on average able to reach 
every other actor within 3 steps. 
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Chapter 7  
Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
Technics in man’s life is conscious, arbitrary, alterable, personal, inventive. It is learned and 
improved (Spengler, 1932, p25).
[….] the phenomena with which we have to deal: the unavoidable imperfection of man’s 
knowledge and the consequent need for a process by which knowledge is constantly 
communicated and acquired. (Hayek, 1945, p 530).
Technology and the knowledge thereof, on a basic level, has become the cornerstone of 
human civilization and prosperity, a notion also explored by Sprengler (1932) in Man 
and Technology. In our everyday live, both directly and indirectly, we use or profit from 
innovations83, essentially an outcome of knowledge creation, invented by past famous or 
oftentimes long forgotten inventors. It seems that today’s economic reality like never before 
embraces as well as actively pursues knowledge creation and application both for its own 
sake and for economic value creation. Bransford, Brown, and Cocking (1999) for example 
conclude that ‘[…] information and knowledge are growing at a far more rapid rate than ever 
before in the history of humankind.”. As such, knowledge has become an organization’s and on 
a macro level society’s key resource. This dissertation, echoing Hayek’s (1945) observations 
on communication and acquisition of knowledge, sought to better understand the process of 
knowledge transfer essential for knowledge creation. Unlike Hayek however, I argue that 
(especially) knowledge transfer continues to take place (efficiently) outside the market (or 
hierarchy for that matter), by means of interpersonal gift exchange cycles. That is to say, I 
not so much argue against other forms of (knowledge) exchange mechanisms, as I endeavor 
to explain the value and prevalence of an alternative exchange mechanism; gift exchange. 
This study empirically has focused on intra-organizational knowledge transfers between 
R&D scientists, believed to be at the core of an organizations knowledge creation capability. 
At the same time, I have sought to embedded gift exchange theoretically explaining both its 
value as its incidence. I will start this concluding chapter by discussing both theoretical and 
empirical (key) findings, followed by managerial implications, limitations, and suggestions 
for future research. 
83 The underlying principles we, as pointed out by Hayek, do not necessarily understand: “We make constant 
use of formulas, symbols, and rules whose meaning we do not understand and through the use of which we 
avail ourselves of the assistance of knowledge which individually we do not possess”. (Hayek, 1945, p528)
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7.2 Key findings
Throughout the course of this study we have argued consistently for and weighed the merits 
of gift exchange in the context of knowledge development. In fact, arguing in favor of gift 
exchange, this study implicitly (and explicitly) underscores the importance of cooperation 
and coordination. The extent to which actors are willing to cooperate, that is exchange, is 
crucial for organizations and societies. Conceptually, gift exchange is well positioned to 
buttress cooperation between individuals under uncertain circumstances. Indeed, contrary to 
a more romantic notion of what constitutes a gift, most resources can be gifts, as gifts may 
be defined84 as those goods, material or immaterial, including knowledge, feedback and tips, 
given to an alter in the expectation that it will be accepted and reciprocated (van der Eijk, 
et al., 2006). As such, gift exchange could represent a powerful motivational driver behind 
intra (or inter) organizational knowledge transfers. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 explored different 
bodies of literature and make a case for gift exchange in the context of knowledge creation. 
Chapters 5 and 6 proceeded to investigate the veracity of our research question: ‘What 
is the impact of gift exchange incidence and network position on individual innovation 
performance?’. Knowledge transfers as any exchange involves actors, resources and 
structures (Molm, 2003), this study addresses the extend to which these different elements 
affect innovation outcomes. Primarily this study seeks to make a case for cooperation in 
research and development. The different sections of this study have sought to contribute to 
that aim emphasizing different aspects of exchange, cooperation in communities as well as 
knowledge its characteristics and its transfer. 
 In chapter 2, we argue that while cooperation and coordination via the market 
or hierarchy remain important, gift exchange has often been the preferred alternative in 
the context of knowledge development and diffusion. That is to say, depending on the 
circumstances one mechanism may be better suited to provide coordination while in other 
circumstances coordination mechanisms work in tandem (Adler 2001; Bradach & Eccles 
1989). It is argued that gift exchange is conceptually different from the market or hierarchy, 
and as such requires additional concepts to understand it (Biggart & Delbrigde, 2004). 
 Chapter 3 focuses on relations between individuals in a community and the 
cooperation between them. Subsequently, the notion of social capital is introduced 
capturing the idea that relationships and social networks are a valuable asset, in that they 
can facilitate action. As such, social capital resides in members of a group, and in their 
relations. Understanding social capital is relevant for understanding what is going on within 
and between companies. Coleman (1988) emphasizes that social capital constitutes an 
aspect of the social structure and is capable of facilitating the actions of individuals within 
that structure. These actions relate to the (potential) benefits of social capital, identified and 
categorized by Sandefur and Laumann (1998): information, influence and solidarity. These 
84 Alternatively and more formally gift exchange is defined in this dissertation as the, in fulfillment of 
an obligation or spontaneous, conference of some material or intangible benefit that is, consciously or 
unconsciously, subject to expectations of reciprocity whereby the particulars of the return in terms of form 
and time are left unspecified at the time of the transaction.
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benefits allow actors to achieve ends which would be impossible to achieve without social 
capital, or only by means of (significant) additional costs. A review of the literature showed 
that much attention in the literature has been directed to identifying social capital and less so 
to issues of how social capital is created, how it is put to use and how it is maintained. These 
processes are not self‑evident: the benefits of social capital do not materialize at will and 
not every individual is likely to benefit to the same extent. The literature on gift exchange 
suggests ways of opening the black box proposing that creation, use and maintenance of 
social capital is to be understood as a corollary of gift exchange. From this literature, social 
capital emerges as a consequence of exchange relations, capturing the procedural aspects 
of social relationships. The literature on gifts suggests mechanisms for reciprocity, equity, 
interpretation/meaning and the strength of a relationship, which may be tied up with the 
existing literature on social capital. Gift exchange allows actors to forge and personalize 
relationships and to develop guarantees through personal bonding (Zucker 1986; Shapiro 
1987). As anthropologists in line with Mauss (1954) have argued: there is a need to give, 
and receive, and reciprocate in these circumstances in particular. If one does not adhere to 
this, one may be ex-communicated and barred from exchanges that are both socially and 
economically meaningful. The creation, use, maintenance and depletion of social capital is, 
thus, to be understood as a corollary of gift exchange. Thus, in time, social capital is created 
and sustained by gift exchange, but at the same time, once created, social capital facilitates 
exchange of both gifts and market commodities particularly under conditions of uncertainty 
(Bourdieu, 1986; Nahapiet & Ghosal, 1998). 
 Chapter 4 explores, in some detail, new knowledge creation within the context of 
the firm. As development of new knowledge is impossible without previously developed 
knowledge, actors are depended on one another. The need for cooperation, specifically 
exchange of knowledge and information, stems from human (limited) knowledge and 
the distribution, dispersed in both time and space, of knowledge among various actors. 
Hence, firm innovativeness is largely dependent on the cooperation between people and 
the relationships they entertain within (and beyond) the firm. However, the extraordinary 
characteristics of knowledge (e.g. uncertainty, asymmetry and social dimensions related to 
knowledge) make the exchange of knowledge between people by no means an easy or self-
evident process (Hansen 1999; Szulanski 1996; Winter & Szulanski 2001). For these reasons 
a number of scholars have, in the past, suggested that a mode of exchange and coordination 
different from that of market or hierarchy may be better suited for exchange of knowledge 
(Bradach & Eccles 1989; Dore 1983; Macaulay 1963; Ouchi, 1980; Powell 1991). Whenever 
achieving some goal involves the assistance of others, actors will still need to enlist the 
cooperation of other parties. In the context of innovations, for instance, relational ties and 
networks do play a crucial part in locating and accessing relevant knowledge. As such 
informal (and formal) cooperation between corporate scientists within and between firms 
is not an unknown observation (cf. Allen 1977; Kreiner & Schultz 1993; Von Hippel 1987; 
or the communities-of-practice literature Wenger & Snyder 2000; Wenger 1998; Brown & 
Duguid 1991, 2001), but tends not to be conceptualized in terms of gift exchange. This 
chapter argues that the notion of gift exchange allows one to explain why persons exchange 
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knowledge with each other even if they are not obliged to by contract or instruction. Gifts 
can be non-material to include knowledge and are exchanged for multiple reasons. Gift 
exchange creates mutual trust as well as informal obligations between persons, and offers 
participants a perspective for understanding the way in which informal, but also formal 
relations take shape and how they may or may not contribute to knowledge transfer. 
 Bridging theory and empirics, chapter 5 elaborates on the particular research design 
adopted by this study. Qualitative and quantitative methodologies both were believed to offer 
valuable insights. Subsequently, data collection methods, analysis as well as the relevant 
variables were explained and justified. 
 So far, there is little empirical research to guide theoreticians and practitioners. In 
chapter 6 the conceptual contribution of relational and structural attributes to the production of 
knowledge are investigated empirically. In particular, this chapter tested the supposition that 
creative and productive researchers are more likely to inhabit favorable networks positions 
and actively engage in exchange. The study showed mixed results in regards to the effect of gift 
exchange on innovation success. The regression results showed that although gift exchange 
incidence was associated with subjective innovation performance (e.g. creativity), this effect 
could not be demonstrated for objective innovation performance (e.g. patents output). At 
the same time,  results indicate that an actor’s position within the network (centrality) has 
a positive and significant effect on both subjective and objective innovation performance. 
The results suggest that a larger network with more exchange partners positively contributes 
to individual innovativeness. This result is in line with previous studies which indicate that 
as an actor’s centrality increases and an actor is connected to more alters their access to 
resources and new and novel ideas increases (Burt, 2004; Granovetter, 1973). In addition to 
the economic outcomes (e.g. innovation performance) this study also explores the impact of 
gift exchange on social or relationship variables. As has been argued, gift exchange theory 
posits that gifts are associated with informal social obligations strengthening the givers 
entitlement  to future support. Thus, outstanding social obligations will make it easier to call 
on the recipient in the future (as well as likely that support will be actually provided). Results 
indicate that the extent to which actors were considered generous (that is, perceived to have 
given more and eligible to a return gift) was associated with both network centrality and 
brokerage opportunity. Interestingly and contrary to expectations formal hierarchical status 
proves not to be a significant predictor of perceived generosity. These findings suggests 
that it is not so much hierarchical status that influences perceived generosity as is an actor’s 
network position. 
 Central to this study has been the idea that cooperation in social communities 
is essential, inevitable even, due to the particular characteristics of knowledge. While 
knowledge transfers continue via both market and hierarchy, the social nature of knowledge 
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creation underscores the importance of gift exchange. Conceptualizing knowledge transfer 
as gifts represents as much an exchange mechanism as a metaphor. A metaphor which will 
enable companies and practitioners to make explicit what by its very nature is likely to 
remain implicit. This study started with a quote from Alexis de Tocqueville. His observation 
that “In democratic countries knowledge of how to combine is the mother of all other forms 
of knowledge; on its progress depends that of all the others.” captures a process (i.e.(re)
combination) which is believed to be essential to knowledge creation and is at the hart of 
exchange. The quote comes, of course, from de Tocqueville’s classical report on American 
society, “Democracy in America”, a study more about America, the society and its people 
than on knowledge creation. In fact, the quote is preceded by the observation that “Americans 
of all ages, all stations of life and all dispositions are forever forming associations. There 
are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a 
thousand different types - religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, 
very large and very minute.”. However, the willingness to cooperate so marveled by de 
Tocqueville as argued by our study is not just essential for society but also, and maybe even 
more so, key to successful and effective organizational knowledge creation. 
7.3 Contribution to literature 
In the introduction we voiced our initial expectations regarding the contribution this 
study would make to extant literature. The study is motivated to a large extent by 
the observations of authors who conclude that micro processes or social dimensions 
of knowledge sharing in the innovation development process are in need of further 
exploration (Tsai, 2000; Kim & Mauborgne, 1998; Darr, Argote & Epple, 1995; Obstfeld, 
2005). In line with the title of this book, this study set out to go ‘behind networks’ as 
we explore the underlying mechanism for informal (and formal) cooperation within 
networks. In so doing, we made a number of contributions to existing literature. 
 Firstly, this study proposed gift exchange as an alternative to the hierarchy 
and market dichotomy. Although alternatives proposes by previous studies (e.g. social 
relations (Adler & Kwon, 2002), communities (Adler, 2001; Bowles & Gintis, 1998), 
clans (Ouchi, 1979;1980), (social) networks (Powell, 1990; Miles & Snow, 1986; Thorelli, 
1986)) recognize to some extent the social nature of exchange outside of the market and 
hierarchy debate, they fail to find a common denominator. Disciplines outside of economics 
(notably anthropology) have demonstrated that gift exchange has long since been used 
by men to structure exchange. Not only is the mechanism as such well established it 
also incorporates a range of mechanisms85 that account for its effectiveness. There is 
some recognition of this, which this thesis subsequently synthesizes and elaborates upon. 
 Secondly, this research built on and extended social capital literature. Social 
85 Gift exchange creates a shared frame of reference, reduces uncertainty which overtime can result in mutual 
trust and is based on social obligations. A number of social mechanisms such as expected benefits of 
continued future cooperation, hostage and reputation affect the incentive structure of participants to honor 
their social debts.   
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capital residing in members of a group and their relations has been widely used to explain 
the value of relations and the way they can facilitate action. A substantial amount of 
research, in different areas, has focused on the (mostly positive) consequences of social 
capital (e.g. Alder & Kwon, 2002; Jackman & Miller, 1998; Field, 2003; Fine, 2000; 
Portes & Sensenbrenner, 1993; Woolcock, 1998). Significantly less has been written 
about the way social capital is created, maintained or depleted, which is at stake in this 
thesis. Conceptually, this study has introduces and ties gift exchange theory into social 
capital literature streams. As such, we demonstrate its potential in proposing that creation, 
use and maintenance of social capital is to be understood as a corollary of gift exchange. 
 Thirdly, Social Network Analysis (SNA) suffers from an action problem as professed 
by a number of authors (see Obstfeld, 2005) in that it fails to explain how people in a network 
actually share knowledge, using the network structure that is there. We offer a solution to the 
action problem faced by this literature by offering the concept of gift exchange. As a means 
of creating and maintaining social ties, gifts explains why individuals engage in exchange, 
how relations are sustained and will be used when knowledge transfer is explored.   
 Fourthly, this study underscores the importance of the position of actors within 
a network for individual innovation performance. Both individual creativity and patent 
output, two measures of innovation performance, were shown to be strong predictors. 
 Fifthly, research results on ‘perceived generosity’, the extent to which people feel 
the relationship is balanced, demonstrate the significance of alternative predictors. Results of 
this study provides grounds to reconsider the notion that hierarchical status presents a strong 
predictor of perceived reciprocity, as put forward in literature (Goffman, 1971; Buunk, 
Doosje and Hopstaken, 1993, Merton, 1968; Homans, 1950; Bodeman, 1988). Instead results 
indicate that the network position an individual inhabits holds more explanatory power, as it 
influences the way alters assess a focal actor’s generosity.
7.4 Managerial relevance/implications 
Conceptualizing knowledge transfers as gift exchanges offers managers a perspective for 
understanding the informal but also formal exchanges that are so essential to knowledge 
creation. Although that notion alone merits consideration, findings from this study offer 
opportunities for management to influence and better manage (informal) knowledge flows. 
 Firstly, we have shown how researchers involved in gift exchange are more 
successful as researchers. At the same time, many of these exchanges are purely interpersonal 
(Allen, 1977), driven by personal micro objectives (Bouty, 2000) and take place ‘without 
management support or urging’ (Leonard-Barton & Deschamps, 1988; 1252). While these 
exchanges represent important acquisition and learning processes essential for innovation, 
they offer potential for knowledge spillovers. Recognizing that interpersonal exchange 
essentially is an exchange of gifts, with the give and take that it entails, two managerial 
implications become apparent. On the one hand, too strict a policy of spill-over control 
might hamper the innovation development process since those who do not give, do not 
receive in return. On the other hand, the importance of interpersonal exchange and the need 
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for companies to preserve core competencies (cf. Henkel, 2006) requires companies to 
debate the issue and make explicit what represents company core and non-core technologies 
or knowledge. Thirdly, gift exchange’s effectiveness in part depends on the extend to 
which the incentive structure of an organization can be altered in such a way that honoring 
social debts and cooperation becomes an effective course of action for the individual. 
‘Encouraging’ the dynamic of (knowledge) exchange therefore requires an appropriate 
structural arrangement. Organizations can actively endorse and invest in ‘communities of 
practice’(Wenger & Snyder, 2000; Brown & Duguid, 1991, 2001; Nonaka, 1994), which 
facilitate exchange, in that they serve as an intra‑network clearinghouse enabling quick 
identification of and connection with those individuals with or access to relevant knowledge, 
a reference mechanism by providing the opportunity to evaluate the knowledge of others 
without having to contact al relevant parties, a closed structure allowing the formation of 
reputation and trustworthiness, and lastly as repositories of knowledge and best practices 
(Lesser, 2000). Lastly, especially when the aim is to stimulate knowledge transfer within the 
firm, possibly across department boundaries, managers may be well advised to purposefully 
start the process of giving knowledge.  
 Secondly, a researcher represents scientific and human technical capital (S&T 
capital) which translates into the sum of researcher’s professional network ties and his 
technical skills and resources (Bozeman, Dietz & Gaughan, 2001). This definition explicitly 
recognizes professional networks, as the conduits through which knowledge is exchanged, 
as an important determinant for scientists’ performance. Management is well advised to 
actively promote network development within the organization. Indeed, to some extent 
managers can shape and encourage individual networks formation. First of all, recruitment 
can be partly based on scientists’ networks in the relevant scientific or inter‑organizational 
communities. Essentially buying the company access into specific networks. In addition, 
organizations can shape formal networks in ways thought to contribute to the development 
of (informal) knowledge networks. The extent to which organizations can create informal 
networks remains an interesting question. However, we might not need to resolve that debate 
as formal networks have been shown to both overlap with and set the stage for informal 
networks (Dolfsma, 2008). Indeed, as formal relations are considered more purposefully 
malleable, organizations seem well advised to explore available options. For example, inter-
organizational and inter-personal networks could be deliberately supported and created by 
means of job rotating systems in R&D settings (Griffing et al, 1996). Thereby, providing 
opportunities for employees to get to know, trust and work with different researchers (e.g. 
learn their respective knowledge base and expertise) and departments. Moreover, despite 
‘death-of-distance’ through technology claims, face-to-face meetings remain essential for 
the creation and maintenance of informal networks (Park, 2002; Dar, Argote & Epple, 1995). 
Actively building internal communities and networks will require organizations to invest 
in opportunities for face-to-face encounters (e.g. informal meetings, workshops, seminars 
and conferences). Furthermore, organizations can benefit from mapping organizational 
networks, allowing them to anticipate possible network disruption following the departure 
of key employees. Lastly, mentor program where new employees are paired with ‘well-
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connected’ senior personnel can speed up network formation for new employees. In this 
particular situation, gift exchange dynamics might be especially effective. Since new 
employees initially will have less to offer, they are likely to be indebted to their mentor but 
overtime they will be able to reciprocate to the benefit of both parties.  
7.5 Limitations and future research 
This empirical study is marked by a number of limitations that should be acknowledged and 
which should be addressed in future studies. 
 First, by design this study focused on exchanges that take place within the 
organization, that is inter-organizational exchange. The design allowed us to investigate 
the gift exchange properties of knowledge transfer in a more ‘controlled’ setting. An intra-
organizational setting provides no boundary for network analysis, as it enables one to 
survey (with adequate organizational support) complete networks, and is likely to make 
confidentiality considerations in exchange decisions less salient. In the future, however it 
might be worthwhile to include actor’s external networks and exchange patterns as well. 
Inclusion of this type of data might provide a better overview of an actor’s network resources 
and its effect on innovation performance. In addition, there might be differences in exchange 
behavior that could be become apparent by a more all-encompassing approach. 
 Second, there are factors that limit generalizability of the results this study. The 
organizations studied both represented R&D laboratories within the food-technology sector. 
It is therefore possible that the results of this study are specific to this industry. Future 
research might therefore include, as part of a replication or extension strategy, different (for 
example technology or market driven) industries. 
 Third, the study could be criticized for the use of cross-sectional data, limiting 
the extent to which causal inferences can be drawn. We controlled for different effects by 
including several control variables and theory provided a solid bedrock, but cause and effect 
analysis can benefit from an indepth examination via a different research design. Indeed, 
longitudinal data in addition to providing further support or refutation could offer insight in 
how actor networks change over time and the extent to which these developments can be 
related to gift exchange behaviors. 
 Fourth, assessing the accuracy of gift exchange accounts of respondents pertaining 
to other employees is difficult. The extent to which respondents are affected by (ego centric) 
(Sprecher, 1988) memory bias applies to network research in general (e.g. name generating 
and interaction frequency) (Marsden, 1990; Brewer, 2000; Marin, 2004; Kogovsek & 
Ferligoj, 2005) and gift exchange research in particular (e.g. frequency and perceived 
generosity). However, the extent to which actors accurately recall exchange balance is 
not necessarily important. Since, as Blau (1964) points out evaluations of exchange is a 
subjective matter, and these subjective interpretation guide future gift exchange behavior. 
Nonetheless, a research design that limits the influence of memory bias might be a research 
avenue worth exploring. A possible research strategy might be to incorporate different 
survey measures to assess the construct ‘perceived generosity’. 
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 Fifth, while this study has investigated general relationships between gift exchange 
and performance, the set up of this particular study did not allow for a more fine‑grained 
analysis of the gift exchange process. In line with a framework as proposed by Bouty (2000) 
subsequent projects might include a typology of gifts, type of exchange setting (Fiske, 1992) 
and inter and intra-organizational exchanges. Such an approach could also shed light on the 
exchange, or trading if you will, of resources of a more confidential nature. 
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Summary 
Firms’ success in today’s marketplace depends on their ability to innovate. Faced by 
this emerging reality, companies are spurred to manage, (re)combine and increase their 
knowledge stocks. This development has led to a recent and marked interest in the benefits 
of networks and technological aids for improving knowledge transfer. But the real question, 
as this book posits, is not so much what processes aid knowledge flows but how knowledge 
comes to be transferred to begin with. Companies’ interests are obvious but not necessarily 
in line with those of its employees. Why would knowledge workers want to share knowledge 
in light of the potential costs?
The answer, as this book argues, lies (partly) in the observation that knowledge transfers 
continue to take place (efficiently) outside of the market (or hierarchy for that matter), by 
means of interpersonal gift exchange cycles. Thus while knowledge exchange is undoubtedly 
facilitated via market and hierarchy, an important part of the knowledge flows within and 
between companies is underpinned by gift exchange’ principles. This study has empirically 
focused on intra-organizational knowledge transfers between R&D scientists, believed to 
be at the core of an organization’s knowledge creation capability. At the same time, this 
book seeks to highlight gift exchange as an analytical framework for knowledge sharing, 
explaining both its value and its incidence. 
 The notion that economic value creation in general and knowledge creation in 
particular requires cooperation and coordination is investigated in chapter two. Indeed, 
coordination of human activity can take several forms. In addition to an all pervasive 
market mechanism, where prices coordinate, or a hierarchy epitomized by corporations, 
where authority coordinates, other forms have been suggested. Some have called these 
networks, others clans. This book suggests that the notion of gift exchange allows for the 
middle ground between market and hierarchy to be explored more fruitfully. The three 
coordination mechanisms are assessed in the context of knowledge creation and diffusion. 
Each has particular advantages, but those offered by gift exchange make it an effective and 
sometimes preferred alternative. Gift exchange’s ability to coordinate, more so than any 
other mechanism, relies on the relationships between individuals in a community. 
 Chapter 3, introduces the notion of social capital capturing the idea that relationships 
and social networks are a valuable asset, in that they can facilitate action. As such, social 
capital resides in members of a group, and in their relations. Social capital allows actors to 
achieve ends which would be impossible to achieve without social capital, or only by means 
of (significant) additional costs. Social capital as a concept is relevant for understanding 
what is going on within and between companies in that it offers a conceptual mechanism 
for the intuitively compelling notion that the relationships individuals cultivate matter. 
Social capital represents especially within knowledge intensive environments, a potentially 
powerful tool for understanding why actors, in knowledge communities, continue to interact 
and cooperate. The creation, use, maintenance and depletion of social capital is, as is argued, 
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to be understood as a corollary of gift exchange. 
 Chapter 4 explores, in some detail, new knowledge creation within the context of 
the firm. As development of new knowledge is impossible without previously developed 
knowledge, actors are dependent on one another. The need for cooperation, specifically 
exchange of knowledge and information, stems from human (limited) knowledge and 
the distribution, dispersed in both time and space, of knowledge among various actors. 
Hence, firm innovativeness is largely dependent on the cooperation between people and 
the relationships they entertain within (and beyond) the firm. However, the extraordinary 
characteristics of knowledge (e.g. uncertainty, asymmetry and social dimensions related to 
knowledge) make the exchange of knowledge between people by no means an easy or self-
evident process. Whenever achieving some goal involves the assistance of others, actors 
will still need to enlist the cooperation of other parties. In the context of innovations, for 
instance, relational ties and networks do play a crucial part in locating and accessing relevant 
knowledge. As such informal (and formal) cooperation between corporate scientists within 
and between firms is not an unknown observation, but tends not to be conceptualized in 
terms of gift exchange. This chapter argues that the notion of gift exchange allows one to 
explain why persons exchange knowledge with each other even if they are not obliged to by 
contract or instruction. Gifts can be non-material to include knowledge and are exchanged 
for multiple reasons. Gift exchange creates mutual trust as well as informal obligations 
between persons, and offers a perspective for understanding the way in which informal, 
but also formal relations take shape and how they may or may not contribute to knowledge 
transfer. 
 Bridging theory and empirics, chapter 5 elaborates on the particular research 
design adopted by this study and provides a description of the research setting. As such the 
companies and R&D organizations investigated, as the context for this study, are introduced 
in more detail.  
 In chapter 6 the conceptual contribution of relational and structural attributes to the 
production of knowledge are investigated. Empirically, we generate a network perspective 
of knowledge exchange using Social Network Analysis. In particular, this chapter tests the 
supposition that creative and productive researchers are more likely to inhabit favorable 
network positions and actively engage in exchange. The study shows mixed results in regards 
to the effect of gift exchange on innovation success. Although gift exchange incidence 
is associated with subjective innovation performance (e.g. creativity), this effect is not 
demonstrated for objective innovation performance (e.g. patents output). At the same time, 
the results indicate that an actor’s position within the network (centrality) has a positive 
and significant effect on both subjective and objective innovation performance. In the sense 
that centrality is related to actors having larger networks with more exchange partners, 
maintaining an extended network positively contributes to individual innovativeness. 
Indeed, this result is in line with previous studies which indicate that as an actor’s centrality 
increases and an actor is connected to more alters their access to resources and new and 
novel ideas increases. 
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 The most important contributions of this book are made in the field of innovation. 
Contributions which ultimately translate into a number of academic and theoretical 
implications. If cooperation and knowledge transfers are indeed essential for the development 
of new knowledge, then understanding its drivers should be a priority. Even more so, since 
knowledge transfers have been shown to be anything but automatic. This book makes a 
case for viewing knowledge exchange as a complex process of give and take. As such, it 
introduces the human factor in an otherwise almost mechanical view of knowledge exchange. 
Indeed, knowledge exchanges oftentimes are purely interpersonal, driven by personal micro 
objectives and take place ‘without management support or urging’. Such a perspective on 
knowledge sharing has marked implications for our view on how, when and under what 
circumstances people exchange knowledge. Theoretically, it may be a first step in tackling the 
action problem Social Network Analysis (SNA) is professed to suffer from- it fails to explain 
how people in a network actually share knowledge, using the network structure that is there. 
Managerially, a gift exchange perspective on knowledge exchange also has implications for 
the creation and inter- and intra-organizational sharing of knowledge. Implications for spill-
over effects, organizational structure and innovation strategies are identified and discussed. 
This thesis contributes by elucidating the process by which knowledge comes to be created 
and utilized. The implications of which affect organizational innovation strategies. Strategies 
to facilitate and speed up innovation are sought after as firms strive to remain competitive. 
A challenge not to be taken lightly, given that knowledge in today’s economic landscape 
is believed to be key to the ability of organizations to compete in an increasingly global 
playing field.
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Nederlandse samenvatting
Het succes van organisaties in het hedendaags economisch speelveld hangt in toenemende 
mate samen met het vermogen om te innoveren. Geconfronteerd met deze realiteit, worden 
organisaties in toenemende mate aangezet tot het effectief managen, (her)combineren and 
vergroten van de aanwezige kennis. Deze ontwikkeling heeft geleid tot een groeiende 
interesse in de mogelijkheden van (kennis)netwerken en een scala van (IT-gerelateerde) 
hulpmiddelen om kennisuitwisseling binnen (en tussen) organisaties te verbeteren. De 
vraag is echter niet zozeer welke processen kennisuitwisseling kunnen faciliteren, als wel 
waarom kennisuitwisseling - alles in aanmerking nemend - nog steeds plaatsvindt. Het 
belang van organisaties is niet altijd noodzakelijkerwijs in overeenstemming met die van 
haar werknemers. Waarom zouden kenniswerkers kennis willen delen de potentiële kosten 
hiervan in aanmerking nemende? 
Het antwoord, zoals dit boek beargumenteert, ligt (gedeeltelijk) in de observatie dat 
kennisdeling (efficiënt) plaats blijft vinden buiten de markt (en hiërarchie), door middel van 
interpersoonlijke gift uitwisselingscycli. Dus terwijl kennisuitwisseling ontegenzeggelijk 
gefaciliteerd wordt door de markt en hiërarchie, is tegelijkertijd een belangrijk deel 
van de kennisstromen binnen en tussen ondernemingen gebaseerd op de principes 
van giftuitwisseling. Deze studie onderzoekt zowel theoretisch als empirisch de inter-
organisationele kennisuitwisseling tussen R&D onderzoekers, welke verondersteld worden 
nauw verbonden te zijn met het vermogen van organisaties om nieuwe kennis te creëren. 
Tegelijkertijd beoogt dit boek giftuitwisseling theoretisch nader in te bedden door zowel 
haar waarde als frequentie te verklaren. 
 De gedachte dat economische waardecreatie in het algemeen en kenniscreatie in het 
bijzonder coöperatie en coördinatie vereist staat aan de basis van hoofdstuk 2. In feite kan 
de coördinatie van menselijke activiteiten op verschillende manieren plaatsvinden. Naast 
een alomtegenwoordig markmechanisme, waar prijzen coördineren, en de hiërarchie, die 
allereerst geassocieerd wordt met de onderneming en waar autoriteit coördineert, zijn andere 
vormen voorgesteld. Sommigen noemen het alternatief netwerken, anderen clans. Dit boek 
stelt dat het concept van giftuitwisseling ons in staat stelt om het speelveld tussen markt en 
hiërarchie effectiever te onderzoeken. De drie genoemde coördinatiemechanismen worden 
beoordeeld in de context van kenniscreatie en diffusie. Elk van hen vertegenwoordigt 
specifieke voordelen, maar die van de gift maken het tot een effectief and soms geprefereerd 
alternatief. Het vermogen van giftuitwisseling om te coördineren, meer dan enig ander 
mechanisme, berust op de relaties tussen individuen in een gemeenschap. 
 Hoofdstuk 3 introduceert het begrip sociaal kapitaal, oftewel de gedachte dat 
relaties en sociale netwerken een concrete waarde vertegenwoordigen doordat zij actie in 
de brede zin van het woord kunnen faciliteren. Als zodanig, bevindt zich sociaal kapitaal 
in de leden van een groep, en hun onderlinge relaties. Sociaal kapitaal stelt individuen in 
staat doeleinden te bereiken die niet zonder sociaal kapitaal, of alleen tegen (significante) 
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additionele kosten, zouden kunnen worden bereikt. Sociaal kapitaal is relevant om 
te begrijpen wat er gebeurt in en tussen ondernemingen doordat het een conceptueel 
mechanisme aanreikt voor de intuïtief aansprekende gedachte dat de relaties waarover 
individuen beschikken van belang zijn. Sociaal kapitaal presenteert, in het bijzonder in 
kennisintensieve omgevingen, een potentieel krachtig instrument om te begrijpen waarom 
individuen, in kennisgemeenschappen, bestendige relaties en samenwerkingsverbanden 
onderhouden. Creatie, gebruik, onderhoud en verbruik van sociaal kapitaal moet, zoals 
wordt betoogd, worden gezien als een neveneffect van giftuitwisselingscycli. 
 Hoofdstuk 4 gaat nader in op het kenniscreatieproces binnen de context van de 
onderneming. Doordat de ontwikkeling van nieuwe kennis niet kan plaatsvinden zonder 
kennis van en toegang tot bestaande kennis, zijn actoren in zekere mate afhankelijk van 
elkaar. De noodzaak tot samenwerking, specifiek de uitwisseling van kennis en informatie, 
komt voort uit de gelimiteerde cognitieve capaciteiten van de mens alsmede de distributie, 
in zowel tijd als ruimte, van kennis tussen verschillende actoren. Om die reden is het 
innovatievermogen van ondernemingen in hoge mate afhankelijk van de samenwerking 
tussen mensen en relaties die zij onderhouden binnen (en buiten) de organisatie. Nochthans 
is de uitwisseling van kennis, ten gevolge van de buitengewone kenmerken van kennis 
(onder andere; onzekerheid, asymmetrie, en de sociale dimensies van kennis) in geen 
geval een eenvoudig of vanzelfsprekend proces. Telkens wanneer het bereiken van een 
doel de assistentie van anderen behoeft, zijn individuen genoodzaakt tot samenwerking 
met andere partijen. Dit gegeven krijgt in een innovatiecontext een additionele dimensie 
doordat relaties en netwerken een cruciale rol spelen in het lokaliseren van en toegang 
krijgen tot relevante kennis . Om die reden is informele (en formele) samenwerking tussen 
R&D onderzoekers zowel binnen als buiten de organisatie geen onbekende observatie, 
maar dit wordt in het algemeen niet geconceptualiseerd als een giftuitwisselingsproces. Dit 
hoofdstuk beargumenteert dat het concept van giftuitwisseling ons in staat stelt te verklaren 
waarom individuen kennis uitwisselen zelfs wanneer ze daartoe niet verplicht zijn door 
contract of instructie. Giften kunnen niet-fysiek zijn en als zodanig kennis omvatten waarbij 
de motieven voor uitwisseling divers kunnen zijn. Giftuitwisseling creëert wederzijds 
vertrouwen evenals informele verplichtingen tussen personen en biedt een perspectief om 
de wijze waarop informele maar ook formele relaties vorm krijgen, alsook hoe deze wel of 
niet kunnen bijdragen aan kennisuitwisseling. 
 Hoofdstuk 5 slaat de brug tussen theorie en empirie en biedt een beschrijving met 
betrekking tot de gekozen onderzoeksopzet evenals de specifieke onderzoeksomgeving. In 
het bijzonder worden de onderzochte bedrijven en de R&D organisaties, welke de context 
vormen voor deze studie, nader toegelicht. 
 In hoofdstuk 6 wordt de conceptuele bijdrage van relationele en structurele 
attributen op de productie van kennis onderzocht. Voor ons empirisch onderzoek generen we 
een netwerkperspectief op kennisuitwisseling gebruikmakend van Sociale Netwerk Analyse 
(SNA). Specifiek test dit hoofdstuk de propositie dat creatieve en productieve onderzoekers 
vaker gunstige netwerkposities innemen en vaker actief kennis via giftuitwisseling delen. 
De studie bood gemengde resultaten met betrekking tot het effect van giftuitwisseling op het 
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innovatiesucces. Alhoewel de frequentie waarmee individuen (kennis) giften uitwisselden 
gerelateerd was met subjectieve innovatieprestaties (oftewel de mate van creativiteit), kon 
dit effect niet aangetoond worden voor objectieve innovatieprestaties (oftewel toegekende 
patentaanvragen). Tegelijkertijd, tonen de resultaten aan dat de positie van een individu in 
een netwerk (oftewel de mate van centraliteit) een positief en significant effect heeft op zowel 
de subjectieve als objectieve prestatie-indicatoren voor innovatie. Voor zover centraliteit is 
gerelateerd aan de netwerkgrootte van individuen (dat wil zeggen, een netwerk met meer 
contacten), levert een omvangrijk netwerk een positieve contributie aan de innovativiteit van 
individuen. Een uitkomst die in lijn is met vorige studies, welke aantonen dat naarmate de 
centraliteit van een individu toeneemt en deze is verbonden met meer netwerkpartners zijn 
toegang tot nieuwe ideeën en kennis toeneemt. 
 De belangrijkste bijdrage van dit boek worden gemaakt aan het innovatie 
onderzoeksveld. Contributies die zich uiteindelijk vertalen in een aantal academische en 
theoretisch implicaties. Indien samenwerking and kennisuitwisseling essentieel zijn voor 
de ontwikkeling van nieuwe kennis, dan is een begrip van de onderliggende factoren 
‘drivers’ een prioriteit. Temeer om dat kennisuitwisseling blijkens onderzoek alles 
behalve vanzelfsprekend is. Dit boek breekt een lans voor de conceptualisatie waarin 
kennisuitwisseling wordt geïnterpreteerd als een complex interpersoonlijk proces van geven 
en nemen. Als zodanig, introduceert het de menselijke factor in een onderzoeksveld waarin 
een voornamelijk mechanische en gedepersonaliseerd begrip van kennisuitwisseling wordt 
gehanteerd. In werkelijkheid, zijn kennisuitwisselingen vaak een puur interpersoonlijke 
aangelegenheid gedreven door persoonlijke microdoeleinden en vinden plaats ‘zonder 
management, ondersteuning of aansporing’. Zulk een perspectief op kennisuitwisseling 
heeft aanzienlijke implicaties voor onze kijk op de vraag, hoe, wanneer en onder welke 
omstandigheden mensen kennis uitwisselen. Theoretisch, kan het een eerste stap zijn in 
het definiëren van een aanpak van het collectieve actie probleem waar Sociale Netwerk 
Analyse (SNA), zoals benoemd door sommigen, mee worstelt. Waarbij het actie probleem 
slaat op het achterwege blijven van een verklaring hoe mensen in een netwerk daadwerkelijk 
kennis delen op basis van de bestaande netwerkstructuur. Vanuit management oogpunt, 
heeft een giftuitwisselingsperspectief op kennisuitwisseling eveneens implicaties voor 
de creatie van inter- en intraorganisationele kennisdeling. Implicaties voor spill-over 
effecten, organisatiestructuur en innovatiestrategieën worden geïdentificeerd en besproken. 
Dit proefschrift draagt bij aan een verder begrip van het proces op basis waarvan kennis 
wordt gecreëerd en toegepast. De implicaties hiervan hebben ondermeer gevolgen voor de 
innovatiestrategie van organisaties. Strategieën om innovatie te faciliteren en te versnellen 
zijn veelal een organisatieprioriteit. Meer dan ooit speelt kennisproductie en innovatie een 
sleutelrol in het behoud en verstrekking van de concurrentiepositie van de organisatie. 
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KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER, FAVOR EXCHANGE AND PERFORMANCE
The value of knowledge for economic development can hardly be overstated as it
essentially determines what organizations do as well as how they do it. To ensure firm
survival or meet fierce competition, organizations are required to continually improve their
product and operations. That is, upgrade their knowledge base and develop new knowledge
on how to do the right things more efficiently. Managing organizational knowledge and
stimulating its development means that firms must carefully consider their knowledge
development and diffusion strategies. Doing so, as this book argues, requires practitioners
to realize that knowledge development and diffusion is a social cooperative process. At its
most basic level new knowledge is created as a result of human interaction. Knowledge is
shared between individuals an d is fueled by micro-objectives and motivations. Applying a
micro perspective, this book posits that knowledge exchange resembles the exchange of
gifts. It follows that professional networks, as the conduits through which knowledge is
exchanged, are an important determinant for scientists’ performance. Utilizing the full
potential of organizational scientific and human technical capital requires firms to map,
shape and encourage individual network formation. 
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